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2. FOREWORD
I am delighted to write this Foreword to an excellent collection of khuṭab (sermons, 
sing. khuṭbah) and published articles crafted by Prof. Aslam Fataar, whom I have 
known for most of my adult life.
The compositions brought together in this book began a quarter of a century ago 
in 1994, with the onset of South Africa’s non-racial democracy, and in one way it 
may be viewed as the critical observations of an ‘organic intellectual’ engaging the 
exigencies of life during the first 25 years of South Africa’s democracy.
The book’s compositions are presented in chronological order, so the reader is able 
to follow the ebb and flow of life in post-apartheid South Africa. It is also fitting 
that the book commences with an excellent sermon about the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) that was delivered at the Claremont Main Road 
Masjid (CMRM) in 1994, since the core of the compositions are sermons which 
were delivered here. These were all outstanding sermons, as those who witnessed 
their public performance can attest to. Their inclusion in this book thus provides a 
wonderful opportunity for a wider audience to benefit from Prof. Fataar’s profound 
insights.
Prof. Fataar, through his own personal journey and commitment to justice, has 
developed the unique ability to consistently and courageously convey the call ‘to 
speak truth in clear terms to power’. This is one of the central messages that runs 
throughout this rich selection of essays and is best illustrated in his CMRM sermon 
commemorating the 20th annual celebration of Human Rights Day delivered on 
21 March 2014. In this sermon he lauds the wisdom and uncompromising witness 
for justice by Advocate Thuli Madonsela, who at that time was serving as South 
Africa’s Public Protector. He calls on all South Africans to embrace “the wisdom” 
of Thuli Madonsela and recommit themselves to a politics of engaged democratic 
citizenship in the service of social justice.
It is thus fortuitous that, after completing her term of office in 2016, she subsequently 
joined the Faculty at the University of Stellenbosch, where Prof. Fataar is based. It 
is also apposite that at its December 2017 graduation ceremony, the University of 
Stellenbosch honoured Prof. Aslam Fataar by awarding him the Chancellor’s Medal 
for Excellence in Research.
A few of the essays included in this collection first appeared in the Annual Review of 
Islam in South Africa (ARISA), which is a yearly analysis of and report on important 
events and developments in the Muslim community and is published by the Centre 




I am deeply honoured to pen these few words in support of the ruminations of 
Prof. Aslam Fataar. I know that the readers of this book will learn much from it and 
that these sermons and essays will inspire passion and action in the next generation 
of those who speak truth to power.
Imam Dr A Rashied Omar
Imam of the Claremont Main Road Masjid, Cape Town, South Africa





It is again time for “a new first” in the Beyers Naudè Centre Series on Public 
Theology. It came about with a request by Nico Koopman, former Director of 
the Centre and current Vice-Rector for Community Interaction and Personnel at 
Stellenbosch University, for the consideration of the publication of a collection of 
essays, opinion pieces and sermons from a different religious tradition. Up to now, 
all 12 volumes in the Series – edited editions by multiple authors as well as collected 
essays or monographs by individual authors – were by Christian authors. Therefore, 
we invited Aslam Fataar to consider sharing some of his work on public theological 
themes with us. 
Even if the concept of public theology may not be as common in Islamic Theology 
or Studies as in Christian discourse, it does not mean it does not exist in Islam! In 
fact, in 1995, Pakistani Muslim scholar Ausaf Ali, reflecting on the development of 
his own interest in public theology – a term that, according to him at the time was 
“much less known and used in the Islamic world” and that, by then, “the two words 
– public and theology – joined together”, he “had neither heard nor seen in print.”1 
Studying Christian understandings and writings on public theology, he realised that 
he has always been a public theologian himself! 
Ali continues by saying, 
Actually I would not even hesitate to call Moses and Jesus and 
Muhammad (peace be on them) public theologians; which does not 
detract from the fact that they were prophets. [And], [a]t any rate 
our ‘ulamā’ (religiously learned men who speak on social, political, 
economic, ethical, etc., issues) are definitely public theologians as are, of 
course, indeed, the Jewish rabbis, Catholic priests, Protestant ministers, 
etc., who concern themselves with the problems of the world.2
With this volume in the series we therefore have the privilege to share a collection 
of public theological reflections written over a period of 25 years by Aslam Fataar. 
He is not only a respected scholar – the latter as Distinguished Professor in 
Education (specifically in the areas of Sociology of Education and Education Policy) 
at Stellenbosch University – but also a well-known South African, Muslim, public 
commentator. It is, thus, not surprising that theologian David Tracy’s view of 
theology being done in three publics, namely the church (mosque), the academy 
and within broader society, finds expression in these works from Fataar’s pen. 
The collection paints not only a picture of his involvement in exactly these three 
publics – from sermons delivered in mosques, academic papers and opinion pieces 
in newspapers all with public theological characteristics or implications – but, also, 
arranged chronologically, it offers a fascinating view of the history of our country, 
with the challenges it faced and still faces as well as the successes achieved or 
1 Ali, A. 1995. An essay on Public Theology. Islamic Studies 34(1):67-89.
2 Ali, A. An essay on Public Theology, 67.
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Editor’s Foreword
opportunities sadly missed. We trust that our readers will equally enjoy, be enriched 
and be challenged by this collection. 
Len Hansen
Editor: Beyers Naudè Centre Series on Public Theology
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1. INTRODUCTION
The chapters in this anthology were written from my perspective as an engaged 
Muslim activist. They speak to political and Muslim socio-cultural contexts as these 
unfolded during the 25-year post-apartheid period. They are my attempt to give 
religio-political character to this period and make a statement about the interaction 
between Islam, politics and ethics in Cape Town.
This anthology is comprised of sermons (khuṭab), newspaper articles and opinion 
pieces. I present them as my evolving thoughts about Islam and Muslim life in Cape 
Town. It should be of particular interest to high school and university students, 
and those interested in one person’s engaged perspective from an ethical religious 
standpoint. The foundation for this text was laid in my political socialisation during 
my high school years at Parkwood High School in Ottery, and my student years at 
the University of the Western Cape (UWC). I was part of a generation of students 
who were politicised by the heroic student boycotts of 1980 and 1981, when students 
took control of schools across the Cape Flats to reject gutter apartheid education. 
We launched self-directed alternative education programmes and established 
a myriad of clubs and societies. I became the chairperson of the debating society 
at my school at 15 years old, and was the chairperson of the school chess club for 
three years, in addition to participating in a full range of sport activities during my 
school years. 
Reading, arguing and experimenting with various sets of leftist ideas became the 
sine qua non of our political diet. This happened while we participated throughout 
the 1980s in a plethora of youth, sport, political and recreational clubs and societies. 
I found particular resonance for my activism through my participation in the late 
1980s in the United Democratic Front (UDF) aligned Save the Press campaign where 
I represented Al-Qalam, the Muslim Youth Movement’s monthly newspaper, which 
was banned at that time. 
The year 1983 represented an inflection point that brought my early life trajectory 
into conversation with my ensuing Muslim religious political path. I was by this 
stage thoroughly politicised, yet living a life immersed in the popular culture of the 
time, while pursuing a youth activist path. A momentous event was my attendance 
of the launch of the UDF in Rocklands in August 1983. I finished writing Matric in 
that year as a 17-year-old and started in December to do casual sales work selling 
clothing at Lightbody’s Clothing Store in downtown Claremont. While working 
there, I attended Friday congregational prayers at the Al-Jaamia Mosque in Stegmann 
Road, where the charismatic Imam Ebrahim ‘Sep’ Davids (1936-1998) officiated. 
Imam Sep, as he was fondly known, was erudite and outspoken. He delivered his 
sermons in English, which I found attractive and beguiling despite my limited ability 
in the language. Like the majority of kids from the Cape Flats, my mother tongue is 
Kaaps Afrikaans. Imam Sep followed in the footsteps of Imam Abdullah Haron as 
the Imam of the Al-Jaamia Mosque. 
It was in this context that I was introduced to the figure of Imam Haron, the 
renowned revolutionary Muslim leader who was martyred by the apartheid regime 
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in September 1969. The logical development of the book culminates in a set of four 
chapters that draw on Imam Abdullah Haron’s legacy. It is no coincidence that this 
martyrological figure has emerged so powerfully in the last two years. We are in the 
midst of commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of his martyrdom. Together with 
all other martyrs killed by the apartheid machinery, his death has given generations 
of people the capacity to imagine life. The chapters on Imam Haron call attention 
to the necessity of living an ethical life, in the service of others, and I make a call in 
the book for mobilising the Imam’s ethical commitments in the newer terrain of the 
twenty-first century with vastly different circumstances and challenges, one of the 
most important of which is the threat associated with climate change and global 
warming, a theme that I focus on in two of the book’s later chapters. 
The question that we have to turn to in contemporary times is how we use the ethical 
figure of the martyr to respond to what has been described as the ‘post-human’ 
condition in respect of which humans, machines and technology are now merging 
in novel and unpredictable ways to provide the substantive outlines of our lives. 
Answering this question will require new conceptual frames based on courageous 
and novel readings of texts and contexts. This is the stuff of exciting, yet urgent, 
intellectual work during the next months and years. 
It was out of the Al-Jaamia Mosque context that I began to experiment autodidactically 
with a kind of engaged, yet somewhat independent-minded, activist persona. This 
is the discursive environment that sparked the orientation towards independent 
thinking that has been a feature of my adult life. My activist life was always an 
uneasy balance between positive, engaged participation, on the one hand, and the 
struggle to stand back and develop an independent, even detached, eye on political 
developments, on the other. I felt that the anti-apartheid moment required diligent, 
committed participation more than the armchair critic’s equivocation. However, 
while activism always won out in the end, a cautious attitude towards political 
dogma lodged itself in my being, which influenced how I organised the thoughts 
that I express in the various chapters of this text.
It was at a different mosque, not more than five hundred meters away from the 
Al-Jaamia, Stegmann Road mosque, where I, together with a number of my Muslim 
youth activist comrades, became inspired by another revolutionary Imam, the 
redoubtable Imam Hassan Solomon (1941-2009), who was then officiating at the 
Claremont Main Road Mosque (CMRM). This mosque would become my and my 
family’s resident mosque. I came across Imam Hassan when I decided one Friday to 
attend his jumuʿah congregational service. I remembered that he spoke at the UDF 
launch rally, but hearing him speak from the mimbar (pulpit) was a galvanising 
moment. Erudite, passionate and rousing, his sermons were infused with 
anti-apartheid rhetoric delivered in the language of Islam. He presented a critique 
of apartheid and passionately argued for racial equality, fairness and democracy in 
an Islamic idiom. 
Imam Hassan was for me the first Imam to make an explicit connection between 
Islam and racial justice. This simple, yet profound connection ran counter to the 
lack of political content that was the staple at the majority of mosques in the city. 
The Muslim leadership in the city had practised a type of acquiescence, some even 
say an accepting attitude, in response to apartheid repression. Mainstream Muslim 
discourses were by and large ceremonial and inward looking. Imam Hassan was 
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an example of the younger generation of students and professionals who began to 
develop a type of political Islam that attempted to mobilise people to take up an 
anti-apartheid stance.
Imam Hassan’s political Islamic discourses provided us with the motivation and 
energy to tie our leftist protest commitments to an Islamic language. While still in 
autodidactic mode, we began experimenting with our own readings of religious 
texts, including reading the Qur’an, and a range of books on Islam written in English 
that found their way to Cape Town. Voracious reading was key to experimenting 
with anti-apartheid politics from an Islamic perspective. We were fashioning our 
youthful activist identity via a set of novel conceptual repertoires based on reading 
and mapping Islamic concepts onto debates associated with the anti-apartheid 
struggle addressing questions such as social justice, human rights and gender 
equality. Many of these themes run through the chapters in this text. 
This approach accompanied me through my student years at UWC and my years 
of teaching at Parkwood High School, since renamed Lotus High School, where I 
returned in 1988 to teach. UWC was a key venue for my intellectual becoming, first 
as an undergraduate, then part-time graduate student during the 1980s and 1990s, 
and then as academic from the mid-1990s. I practised my activist politics while 
participating in a range of educational, youth, religious, sport and civic organisations, 
often as a project leader of sorts or member of the leadership of these organisations. 
These were exhilarating times for young adults. We had loads of energy and clarity 
of purpose that galvanised our anti-apartheid politics. As the 1990s stretched into 
the 2000s and beyond, this clarity was reoriented to deal with the realpolitik and 
complexities associated with democratic governance, unmet expectations and the 
faltering nature of the emerging post-apartheid state. 
As my personal political path began to merge with my academic becoming, 
eventually being dominated by my immersion in academia and the need to conform 
to the professional expectations of academic work, I managed to sustain a Muslim 
public commitment through my work as a consultant editor of the Al-Qalam 
newspaper, teaching an Islamic Studies class at the CMRM Saturday madrasa, 
periodic appearances on various radio programmes on Islamic radio, and in later 
years as a board member of the International Peace College South Africa (IPSA). 
I also did some research work on the sociology of Muslim education, aspects of 
which appear in various chapters of this collection. CMRM remained a ubiquitous 
presence as a venue for the expression of my voice as an engaged Muslim. 
While my first association with the mosque was through exposure to Imam Hassan 
Solomon’s sermons in the 1984/5 period, it was, however, under the leadership of 
Imam Rashied Omar, who became the Imam of the mosque in 1986, that the mosque 
became the key venue in South Africa for practising and conceptually elaborating 
progressive Islamic commitments in the context of the struggle against apartheid 
and as an exemplary and courageous vehicle for a socially just expression of Islam. 
The mosque established institutional infrastructure and an accompanying Islamic 
progressive language under Imam Rashied’s leadership. This was informed by 
pluralistic and human rights commitments in the unfolding democratic terrain, 
and a robust social justice platform from where the mosque exercises its Islamic 
commitments to the poor, needy and socially marginalised communities of 
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Cape Town. These commitments are exemplified by its various development projects 
in a number of communities across the city. 
I became a mosque congregant by way of the mosque’s informal links with the 
Muslim Students Association (MSA) and the Muslim Youth Movement of South 
Africa (MYMSA), to which I belonged. The latter two organisations had an active 
organisational presence in the Western Cape, with branches in many suburbs and 
townships. While serving as the mosque’s Imam, Rashied Omar was also the national 
president of the MYMSA until he left the latter position in 1989. Led by Omar and its 
national director, Mawlānā Ebrahim Moosa, the MYMSA entered a period of what 
was labelled as the search for ‘Islamic localisation’ or ‘contextualism’. I joined the 
MYMSA in 1987, eventually becoming its national Deputy President in 1991. The 
MYMSA grappled intensively with the need to move away from Islamist frames 
imported from the Muslim heartlands, especially from the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and the Jamā`at-i-Islāmī in Pakistan. 
I experienced this contextualisation experiment as exhilarating, especially the many 
arguments that some of us had with the MYM old guard, who remained committed 
to the notion of an ‘Islamic Movement’. This latter perspective can be summed up as 
a type of idealistic commitment to normative Islam based on the ideals of striving 
for the perfect Islamic society. In practice, the Islamic Movement perspective too 
easily translated into a political stance that prevented the MYMSA from taking up 
an active anti-apartheid role. As a newbie in the MYMSA, not tied to the idea of 
an Islamic Movement, I participated in the search for a local and relevant Islamic 
discourse tied to a commitment to democracy and human rights. 
This was the period when the MYMSA advanced an Islamic discourse in respect of 
anti-racism, gender equality, religious pluralism and productive co-existence in a 
secular democracy. We began to read a range of texts other than the usual Islamic 
Movement type of books written by authors such as Abū-l`Alā Mawdūdī, (1903-1979) 
Sayyid Sābiq (1915-2000), Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (1926), and Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966). 
The MYMSA members in Cape Town began to read texts that concentrated on 
Islam and its application in modern contexts. I, for example, attended and later 
coordinated a set of critical reading groups where we read texts by Islamic scholars 
such as Fazlur Raḥmān (1919-1988), Mohamed Arkoun (1928-2010) and Fāṭima 
Mernissi (1940-2015). I fondly remember reading and discussing a set of three books 
by Fazlur Raḥmān in Saturday afternoon tutorial sessions. Led by Ebrahim Moosa, 
these sessions were free-wheeling and dialogical as we endeavoured to create a safe, 
yet challenging, pedagogical space. We questioned and criticised freely, read the 
texts carefully, and developed theoretical tools to help us work out how to pursue 
a generative reading of the Islamic scriptures in the light of modern and everyday 
local challenges. 
While we have moved on from the modernist frames of Fazlur Raḥmān, his 
intellectual methodology of interpreting the Qur’ān and other sources in the light 
of contemporary circumstances (see Raḥmān 1982) stayed with me. And while we 
adopted what has been called ‘critical traditional’ Islamic lenses that emphasise 
methodical historicised readings of the entire Islamic legacy and its application 
through rigorous social scientifically inspired understandings of the contemporary 
world, I still dip into some of Raḥmān’s texts to refresh and reinvigorate my own 
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interpretive methodological approaches. Raḥmān’s emphasis on novel contextual 
readings of the Qur’an was formative and his influence on me in this regard is 
apparent in this book, especially its responsiveness to local contextual challenges. 
My commitment to a contextual reading, as exemplified in this text, can be said to be 
an outflow of my intellectual socialisation in the MYMSA’s experiment from the mid-
1980s with ‘contextual Islam’, its rehearsal in the intellectually engaged space of the 
Claremont Main Road Mosque, and reading scholarly Islamic texts that provided me 
with a methodology to substantively develop a socially relevant Islamic discourse. 
It is no coincidence that half of the chapters in this book are sermons delivered at the 
mosque. In one way or the other, our attempt to tie Islam to democracy, pluralism 
and justice informs all the chapters in the book. 
The chapters in the anthology are organised in chronological order. The first chapter 
is a khuṭbah that I delivered at CMRM in 1994 and the final chapter is one delivered 
at the mosque on 31 May, Ramaḍān, 2019. As indicated earlier, the first chapters are 
based on a somewhat optimistic reading of the political imperative and the need for 
Muslims to actively participate in the post-apartheid development of the country. 
The book can thus be regarded as nation-state-centric; in other words, it proffers the 
nation as the basis for its cultural and religious reflections. It stands to reason that 
our apartheid-devastated country would require a serious national programme to 
rebuild its governmental infrastructure and provide houses, hospitals and schools. 
The activist stance that I favoured is to contribute to this project, and it is this nation-
building vision that animates my activist-intellectual orientation in this book.
This optimistic nation-building perspective is attenuated by the end of the book. Socio-
economic decline, faltering governmental infrastructure and systemic collapse were 
exacerbated by widespread state corruption during the last ten years. Governmental 
politics were ‘overdetermined’ by the politics of the belly. State capture became the 
dominant raison d’être, compromising governmental capacity to build a functional 
developmental state. The last ten wasted years spawned corrosive dynamics in the 
body politic. The majority of the country’s citizens foundered in a context where 
basic service delivery became neglected, which left them exposed to unremittingly 
harsh living conditions. 
From around 2009 a series of chapters in the book offers a critique of governmental 
politics and Muslims’ adherence to an easy accommodation and support of the ruling 
party. It makes a plea for the Muslim leadership and civic organisations to develop 
a critical distance from the ruling government, at times to offer constructive critique 
when required, and at other times denounce and call out the government and ruling 
party on its corruption and anti-poor policies. I argued that the qur’anic requirement 
of bearing witness to injustice, of calling out corruption and state infrastructural 
collapse made it necessary for Muslim civil society to develop a critical distance 
from government. Alignment with broader civic social justice struggles in support 
of pro-poor development would be the preferred ethical path. Cosying up to the 
ruling party would compromise Muslims and other communities in walking such 
a path. 
Regarding the emerging socio-cultural landscape after the first elections in 1994, the 
book turns its attention very early to at least two dimensions that emerged quickly 
and dramatically on the democratic landscape: the first is the complex socio-economic 
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landscape and Muslims’ adaptations to this landscape, and the second is the rapid 
impact of global flows on local Muslims’ discursive orientations. The first aspect refers 
to the complex and diverse social and educational landscape that emerged after 1994. 
The book, for example, offers a number of chapters on Muslim educational patterns 
in Cape Town. The aim here was to develop a descriptive language that would help 
the community engage with the educational spaces and circumstances in which 
children now accomplish their schooling. These chapters point to a range of cultural 
and identification adaptations that Muslim communities have been making to secure 
quality schooling. The larger purpose of this theme is to illuminate the complexities 
involved in living in a post-apartheid city generally, and the specific manifestation 
of these newer realities for Muslims in their endeavours to establish worthwhile 
lives. A key dimension of this situation is the increasing poverty experienced by 
people, including Muslims. While the growing middle class has accessed wealth 
through the opening up of greater educational and professional opportunities, the 
chasm between rich and poor has widened, and impoverished livelihoods are the 
majority experience in the city. Tying one’s communal and religious commitments 
to the systemic alleviation of poverty and hardship is presented in the book as a core 
ethical and social justice priority. 
The second aspect refers to the diversification of local Muslim discourses through 
the global Muslim networks and influences that flowed into the city after the end of 
apartheid. Transnational flows of ideas and meanings by way of Muslim refugees 
and migrants from Africa and the rest of the world, accompanied by information 
technological connectivity, enriched the Sufi mystical scene. A greater range of 
credal expressions associated with maximalist and austere readings of Islam also 
found popular resonance in the city and country. This enriched and broadened 
the diversity of Islamic expressions, while at the same time eliciting anxieties that 
translated, for example, into expressions of vigilante forms of protection to respond 
to the upsurge in drugs and crime. I particularly address this anxiety in two chapters 
written in the early 2000s in which I invoke the historical Islamicate figure of Abū 
Jahl, an inveterate opponent of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), to 
point to the unproductiveness of violence-prone articulations of grievances to deal 
with complex social problems. 
The increasingly heterodox expression of Islamic discourses also led to periodic 
skirmishes which threatened Muslims’ communal cohesion. The Salafi-Sufi clashes 
of the early 2000s were a local inflection with latent roots in Cape Muslim history. 
Proponents of a purist, austere brand of (Salafi) Islam hit out at the increase in mystical 
(Sufi) Muslim trends, whose growth was spurred by an infusion of ‘spiritual energy’ 
supplied by various transnational networks that found a home in Cape Town. And 
the Shi`a community’s growth in some cities in South Africa initially led to low-level 
recriminations and culminated in a fatal attack by an unknown group on a Shi`a 
mosque in Verulam, Durban in May 2018. In a chapter in the book that was written 
after the attack I call on Muslims to join attempts to take decisive action in order to 
stymy sectarian tendencies in the community, and for them to properly embrace 
intra-religious pluralism and dialogue as a means of establishing social cohesion 
through concerted concentration on social justice issues in the community. 
This book is an attempt to define and occupy the middle ground and build a 
conversational space that would avoid framing the community as adversarial and 
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lacking a shared language. The book attempts to impel an inclusive dialogue and 
to create common ground. Generating such common ground would afford the 
community a space to begin to figure out how discourses enter into, and play out, in 
our everyday lives and regulate our behaviour. Understanding some of these tropes 
will provide a basis to more adequately respond to the challenges that confront 
the community. Commitment to justice, openness, intra-religious tolerance, and 
developing complex Islamic literacies are essential. The urgency of developing 
spaces of engagement and deliberation is unquestionable. Walking a dialogical path 
to build social spaces and institutions of engagement will be tough and even appear 
to be counter-intuitive to some. This book is a call for the careful and deliberative 
generation of dialogical spaces, especially in the myriad Muslim educational 
institutions that have emerged in the country since 1994, for nurturing respectful 
and inclusive dialogue across historically ossified boundaries. It is only through 
building a society on the basis of the qur’anic imperative of mutual and inclusive 
dialogue and engagement that Muslims in our beloved country would be able to 
secure our future and contribute to the future of fellow citizens. 
REFERENCES
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2. ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME1
This khuṭbah aims at provoking debate on the imperative of active participation by 
Muslims in the development of South Africa. It specifically considers a framework 
for participation, and makes concrete proposals for active Muslim involvement. 
It attempts to answer the vexing question: How do ordinary Muslims become 
involved in the reconstruction and development of an apartheid-ravaged South 
Africa in which the overwhelming majority of people live in inhuman conditions?
During the dark years of apartheid many sectors of society, including some Muslim 
organisations, vigorously opposed the injustice and oppression of the apartheid 
state. Organisations such as the Call of Islam, Muslim Youth Movement, Qibla 
and the Muslim Students Association actively organised against state policies. 
These organisations and others were giving concrete expression to the principle of 
establishing justice as they are exhorted to do in the Qur’an:
O you who believe, Stand out firmly for justice as witness-bearers to Allah 
(Q. 4:V135)
Thus, the epitome of ‘striving for justice’ during the apartheid era was the 
expression of opposition to apartheid and to demand the establishment of a 
democratic and legitimate state. To be concerned with justice meant to oppose 
apartheid. One could say that the logical possibilities of our actions were limited to 
fervent and passionate opposition, for which some were persecuted and incarcerated 
in prison.
Today in a post-apartheid South Africa, having accomplished political democracy, 
‘standing out firmly for justice’ has come to acquire a different shade of meaning. In 
the pursuit of the goal of socio-economic justice – an ideal which Islam shares with 
other freedom-loving people – the challenge is to move from oppositional modes of 
action to a development mode.
Muslims, like the rest of society, are now confronted with the more difficult task of 
socio-economic reconstruction. The supply of housing, health care and sanitation 
presents enormous challenges of delivery to the democratic state. This process will 
require the active participation of all sectors of society including Muslims. 
Muslim participation (or non-participation) is part of the broader issue about what 
type of citizens we want to be. Many still see themselves as Indian or Malay, or as 
belonging to some other ethnic group. We are struggling to imbibe attitudes reflective 
of people living in and committed to black African South Africa. The reluctance 
by some to see ourselves as South African citizens prevents us from adopting 
attitudes that will facilitate commitment to our country and full participation in 
its development. 
1 Khuṭbah delivered at CMRM, published in a mosque-issued booklet titled, The role of 
Muslims in the RDP, 1994.
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We have, in some respects, misappropriated and overplayed our apparent 
Malaysian, Indonesian or Indian connections. Instead of using Malaysia’s example 
of development and affirmative inclusivity for the benefit of all South Africans, we 
choose to use the ethicised connection to enhance a specific ‘ethnic’ identity, which 
places Muslims in isolation from others. The same applies to some Muslims’ use of 
their Indian ethnic origins to set themselves apart from others. This runs contrary to 
the principles of non-racialism and nation-building in the post-apartheid era.
The example of reconstruction and development in Malaysia should inspire us, not 
our imagined ethnic connection to the country, as some have done recently. This can 
only occur if we speak about Malaysia’s affirmative action experiences and its stable 
economic environment, which is based on creativity and a healthy relationship 
between labour, capital and the state. 
The economic success of Malaysia is based on low profit margins, reasonable wages, 
consensual development priorities and technological capability. Their pluralistic 
political system is human-rights friendly and is based on consensus-building. These 
are the qualities and elements that our (tenuous) Malaysian connection should 
highlight as this would aid reconstruction and development for the benefit of all. 
The basis of Muslim participation is provided by the dynamic institution of zakāh 
(wealth-sharing). Allah (SWT) declares in the Qur’an in Sūrah (Chapter) al-Ḥajj 
(The pilgrimage);
(They are) those who, if we establish them in the land, they establish regular 
prayer and give regular charity (zakāh), enjoin the right and forbid the wrong. 
With Allah rests the end of all affairs. (Q. 22:V41)
In the words of Sayyid Sābiq in his book Zakāh: The Third Pillar (1994), “zakāh is the 
pivotal institution for national development and providing for the social welfare 
needs of the community”.
Sābiq mentions the category of māl al-birr – giving of one’s wealth (other than the 
obligatory Zakāh) – as an act of righteousness – to indicate the necessity of funding 
development.
The problem with our expression of zakāh is that we have collapsed it into a welfare 
focus. A challenge for our zakāh institutions is to insert the development dimension 
in such a manner that it could contribute to the RDP. Also, the polemics around 
whether zakāh can be given to non-Muslims has prevented us from responding 
positively to the demands of the masses. The time has come to resolve these and 
other problems that might impede our participation in the RDP.
Proposals for Muslim participation in the RDP
1. Individuals could participate at a community level in the local civics and 
various projects such as relief work, primary health care, library groups and 
educational projects.
2. We could make available our institutions such as masājid (mosques) and madāris 
(religious schools) to meet the social welfare needs of the entire community. 
Why, for example, can a medical clinic staffed by volunteers not be attached to 
a masjid?
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3. Youths could become involved in youth development through the Western Cape 
Youth Forum and the Regional Youth Development Committee. These bodies 
focus on youth development in under-resourced and deprived areas. 
4. Muslims have been blessed with expertise in various fields. This expertise could 
be made available to development projects.
5. We should incorporate into our madrasa syllabus a component on social studies 
to engender in our children an empathetic approach to the needy and poor.
6. The development of an appropriate investment ethic should be generated. If we 
argue that International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-sponsored loans 
and international aid will impact negatively on change, then we would have 
to come up with alternative financial strategies. Muslim businessmen would 
have to consider investing in empowerment and development, and funding 
of prospective black entrepreneurs. We need to loosen up the concentration of 
money within Muslim circles. 
7. And finally, mosques could consider how, as institutions, they can contribute to 
the RDP.  An RDP fund, financed by congregants, could possibly be administered 
from the Masjid.
In conclusion, the khuṭbah emphasises that Islam prescribes active participation in 
establishing justice and proscribes passivity. Participation in reconstruction and 
development for the benefit of all South Africans, in terms of the arguments outlined 
in this khuṭbah, is a highly commendable act. This is emphasised and corroborated by 
Allah (SWT) in Ṣūrah al-Nisā (The women);
Not equal are those Believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, And those 
who strive and fight in the path of God with their goods and their persons …
(Q. 4:V95)
REFERENCE
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3. MUSLIM SCHOOLING PATTERNS IN 
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA1
Demographic profiles in the South African schooling system have been changing 
rapidly over the last few years subsequent to the deracialisation of public life. New 
patterns of school interaction have been established. While the quest for quality 
education has undergirded these new patterns, factors such as the preservation 
of community identity have also played a role. Moreover, community schooling 
patterns are developing in the context of fragile nation-building processes.
This chapter focuses on schooling patterns that have emerged in the Muslim 
community over the last few years. Contrary to the popular perception of Muslims 
as an undifferentiated mass, their schooling patterns show a diversity of interactions 
with the education system. The basis of the Muslim community’s diverse interactions 
with schooling is determined by an interplay of a number of elements, which include 
race, class, identity and prior educational patterns. These interactions have taken 
place against the backdrop of the larger canvas of educational reform over the last 
few years in South Africa.
NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL REFORM
Schooling patterns that have emerged recently are directly related to the educational 
policy environment put in place by the state. Education policy has thus far been 
ambivalent about the two contesting aims of equity and growth. On the one hand, 
the state has shown a commitment to eradicating educational inequality through 
its insistence on an equity-driven policy environment. One the other hand, the 
achievement of equity is constrained by the cautionary discourse of economic growth, 
a position that holds that nations such as South Africa ought to cut their education 
budgets if they want to grow and become part of the global political economy. Thus, 
policy ambivalence has manifested because of the equalisation of education taking 
place within the limits of a financially austere budgetary framework.
A number of reform policies have been adopted and are now being enacted. These 
policies have been constructing – and in many cases entrenching – a public schooling 
system which provides the backdrop for community interaction. The Schools Act 
adopted in 1996 (Department of Education 1996) is the most important piece of 
legislation currently determining school attendance patterns.
It permits a financial arrangement in which parental fees play a crucial role in the 
quality of schooling and this has led to the entrenchment of a dual schooling pattern.
Middle-class parents who can afford to pay fees are opting to send their children 
to former white schools in search of quality education. The children of working-
class parents who are unable to contribute to schools financially continue to attend 
low-quality schools in their neighbourhoods. Ironically, the teacher rationalisation 
1 Published in Annual Review of Islam in South Africa, Centre for Contemporary Islam, UCT, 
1998, Vol. 1.
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process, which purported to be aimed at achieving equity across the system, had led 
to the further deterioration of schooling in the ‘coloured’ areas of the Western Cape.
A minority of South African children acquire an internationally competitive 
quality education, which guarantees exposure to a sophisticated curriculum that 
will enable them to work in the service and information industries. Working-class 
children, by contrast, are exposed to low-quality education in which the allure 
of youth subcultures is often more powerful than the school. It is in this context 
that community schools, such as the recently established Muslim schools on the 
Cape Flats, attempt to engender a qualitative educational culture by employing an 
identity discourse to counter the perceived ‘moral corruption’ that characterises 
township life.
MUSLIMS AND THE MODEL C EXPERIENCE
Muslim attendance at former Model C white schools has increased exponentially 
over the last five years and particularly after the 1994 election. While some of these 
children now live in the former white neighbourhoods in which these schools are 
located, most Muslim children travel more than five kilometres to attend these 
schools. They come from lower-middle-class and middle-class families who are able 
to afford the school fees and travelling costs necessary to gain access. These families 
realise the value of quality education in positioning their children advantageously 
for later life.
Muslim children at these schools come under enormous pressure to assimilate into 
the dominant liberal culture. They are exposed to the Eurocentric cultural world 
of their white counterparts. While multi-cultural in orientation, offering multi-faith 
religious education, for example, their curriculum supports secular values and is 
disposed towards engendering a liberal detachment from developmental concerns.
Muslim children, together with other black children at these schools, also suffer 
subtle forms of racism. In such an environment, they have difficulty in finding 
acceptability as full members of the dominant school culture. Moreover, their 
attendance at these schools results in alienation from their own cultural world. This 
double alienation has profound implications for issues of identity.
However, Muslim children at Model C schools are not simply victims of the 
hegemonic liberal culture. They are showing tenacity in the way they confront 
the homogenising culture of the schools. One example is offered by Muslim boys 
at one of the Cape’s top Southern Suburbs boys’ schools who formed themselves 
into a protection unit after being physically attacked by white boys at the school. 
Collectively they come to the aid of individuals who are attacked and they target the 
perpetrators for physical retribution. In an interview with me they used concepts 
such as “jihād” (personal struggle), “qiṭāl” (fighting) and “ummah” (community of 
the faithful) to justify taking action to protect their right to be at the school and to 
command respect.
The establishment of Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) at Model C schools is 
another example of Muslim students’ resistance to cultural domination. Historically, 
MSAs operated in coloured and Indian schools during the 1970s and 1980s. They 
supported a non-racial discourse in their opposition to apartheid. The MSAs at 
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Model C schools, however, were established as a means for nurturing religious 
identity and as an organisational vehicle for empowering Muslim students to interact 
with the dominant culture at their schools. The MSA provides students with a sense 
of place and significance under circumstances in which they are at risk of being 
usurped culturally. Muslim students have been able, through the MSA, to lay claim to 
recognition and respect that they might have struggled to claim as individuals. Thus, 
while they were able to access Model C schools that secured them quality education, 
such access also exposed them to a complex cultural context. Muslims and other 
black children are victims of daily cultural and racial insensitivity, which prevents 
them from becoming part of the dominant cultural identity. However, Muslim 
students have shown a willingness to engage this domination by appropriating their 
own religious symbols, which allows them to stake a claim to equal recognition and 
worth in Model C schools.
THE RISE OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ON THE CAPE FLATS
Three Muslim high schools have been established on the Cape Flats over the 
last five years. A fourth school, a primary school, was established by means of a 
partnership between Egypt’s al-Azhar University and the Muslim Judicial Council, 
the main theological body in the Western Cape. These schools are funded through a 
combination of parental fees (a nominal amount), community fund-raising and donor 
money from the business sector. The schools were established with the primary aim 
of providing an Islam-centred religious and moral education. They follow the core 
state curriculum and are registered with the Western Cape Education Department. 
They provide ancillary subjects in Islamic Studies, Arabic and Islamic law (fiqh).
The location of the schools on the Cape Flats is indicative of their broader purpose 
and social function. They are found in largely working- and lower-middle-class 
environments, where a perception of the diminished worth of public schooling is 
becoming widespread. The public schools in the township are perceived to suffer 
from what has nebulously been termed a ‘lack of a culture of learning’. Youth 
subcultures, influenced by a violent gang underworld and the general instability 
of township life, have a detrimental effect on the functioning of such schools. A real 
and perceived collapse of morality amongst young people has become a perpetual 
lament from religious structures. The Muslim community school stepped into this 
breach with the promise of a morally sound educational programme based on strong 
religious principles.
Parents send their children to these schools to give them access to an education 
that is intended to generate moral and religious propriety. Parents hope that this 
will act as a bulwark against the corrupting culture that is pervasive in township 
life. However, these children are caught between the moral culture of the Muslim 
community school and the prevailing norms of their townships. They often flit 
between two identities: the narrow one of the school during school hours and a less 
constrained leisure identity over the weekend. While some do this skilfully, most 
children are not adept at marshalling a coherent identity to govern their school and 
extracurricular lives. The success of Muslim community schools will depend on their 
willingness and ability to provide a framework for adaptation in terms of which 
their students can develop a coherent identity to function with moral propriety and 
flexibility in township life. 
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MUSLIM MISSION PRIMARY SCHOOLS
The first mission primary school in Cape Town was established in 1913. Although 
these schools receive a state grant that pays for their teachers’ wages, all of them 
were built and are sustained by the community. All consumable items are paid 
for by community fundraising. They follow a state syllabus and provide basic 
Islamic Studies.
They were established in the first half of the twentieth century as counterparts to the 
Christian missionary schools that sprang up in coloured areas. As Cape Muslims’ 
first contact with formal schooling, Muslim primary schools served as an instrument 
of modernisation and adaptation to a changing Cape Town. These schools are 
different from the Muslim community schools, discussed in the previous section, in 
that they have always been firmly located in the mainstream bureaucratic structures 
of government.
They are attracting many children from the surrounding working-class 
neighbourhoods and many students are transported to them daily from all over the 
Cape Flats. As in the case of Muslim community high schools, parents send their 
children to these schools in a quest for a religious and moral education. Parents also 
tap into a rich Cape Muslim identity and sense of community cultivated by these 
schools over a few decades. They have a moral culture that is much less stringent but 
no less visible than at the community high schools, enabling their students to relate 
more coherently to their extracurricular cultural world.
However, these schools have come under pressure to improve their quality in the 
face of competition from Model C schools, to which they have lost many of their 
best students. Moreover, the teaching culture is under the same threat of erosion 
that other public schools are experiencing. The teacher cutbacks and multiple layers 
of educational change in ill-prepared contexts have a disorientating effect on school 
learning programmes.
These schools face the challenge of improving their educational quality and so 
affording an equitable learning experience for their students. While their problems 
are not dissimilar to those of other working-class schools, they have a supportive 
community and alumni. If properly mobilised, financial and infrastructural 
support from these sources would enable Muslim primary schools to flourish in the 
new context.
CONCLUSION
Muslim patterns of schooling show a diversity which belies their popular image of 
homogeneity. The different Muslim responses are the result of an interplay of racial, 
class, cultural and historical forces, which are mediated in a material reality. The 
common denominator is the role played by religious and cultural considerations 
in shaping Muslim responses and interactions. Lack of space has not allowed 
this chapter to focus on the schooling experiences of Muslim children who attend 
working-class secular schools or the many “cram colleges” that have sprung up in 
Cape Town. 
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4. BREAKING FROM ABŪ JAHL’S SHADOW: 
SOUTH AFRICAN MUSLIMS' SEARCH FOR 
A ‘THEOLOGY OF SOFTNESS’1 
South African Muslims are currently affected by very crucial adaptation processes. 
This is illustrated by our response to the Palestinian crisis, certain Muslims’ reaction 
to the proposed anti-terror laws, and our attitudes to accusations of complicity in the 
recent bombings in Cape Town. We have sent mixed signals about our willingness 
to develop an identity that connects with, and is part of, a broader productive 
South Africanness.
Often the most audible Muslim responses are produced by those we hear in the 
media and on public platforms, but not necessarily from the silent majority. These 
responses reflect an ambivalent narrow identity that is disconnected from broader 
social processes. Muslim isolationism, I believe, is at its root driven by the urge to 
invent relatively comfortable lifestyles in a ‘sea of chaos’ caused by the disruptive 
impact of social transformation.
Our current religious and theological discourses are informed by a stance that 
prevents us from interacting productively with our social context. Words of anger 
and hostility come from many community leaders. Verbal posturing can often be 
heard on some of our radios and manābir (pulpits). The world is presented in stark, 
almost conspiratorial terms. This discourse is intensified in crisis periods when the 
heat is turned up, producing a siege mentality. Most Muslims maintain a kind of 
antagonistic lack of interest. 
ABŪ JAHL’S TRAGIC MISRECOGNITION
Reflecting on the iconic figure of Amr bin Ḥishām, more famously known as Abū Jahl 
(father of the ignorant), allows us to understand how a community or individuals 
can get trapped by their words and actions. Abū Jahl features strongly in the sīrah 
(historical accounts of the of Prophet Muhammad’s life (peace be upon him). Abū Jahl 
represented the views of all those in Makkah who opposed the Prophet’s message of 
tawḥīd (God’s unicity) and social justice. The message of Islam came to threaten the 
social organisation of hierarchy, power and privilege of pre-Islamic Makkah.
During the early years of the Islamic community in Makkah, Abū Jahl conspired to 
hound out and persecute the Prophet. Negotiating the social and tribal hierarchy 
of Makkan society, Abū Jahl tried various ways to isolate the Prophet, but without 
success. The Prophet, enjoying the protection of his uncle Abū Ṭālib, through 
the latter’s elevated tribal status, forged ahead with his mission with fortitude 
and commitment. Desperate, Abū Jahl even tried to kill the Prophet, but he 
was unsuccessful.
1 CMRM khuṭbah, published in Al-Qalam, December 2000.
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What is remarkable about Abū Jahl’s story is that despite his vehemence against 
the Prophet’s work, he also recognised the veracity of the Prophet’s mission. But 
his recognition was partial. Biographers of the Prophet note that on at least three 
occasions, under cover of darkness. Abū Jahl was caught outside the Prophet’s 
house listening to the latter reciting passages from the Qur’an. He was overcome by 
the persuasiveness of their logic.
Abū Jahl’s recognition was partial because he could not take the next step, that is, to 
make the necessary psycho-social adjustments, which would involve cultivating a 
fundamentally new orientation and outlook, become Muslim, and consequently join 
the fight against the power elites of Makkah. Tragically, Abū Jahl was compromised 
by his anti-Prophet words and rhetoric. Over many years he became a master in 
vilifying the Prophet, arousing passions and spreading an atmosphere of high 
tension. He acquired an identity and a reputation as a rabble-rouser, an identity that 
precluded him from cultivating the skills to make a fundamental conceptual switch 
into a different, empowering and just life world. Abū Jahl was a victim of his own 
words and actions. Alas, he died an enemy of Islam at the battle of Badr.
ESCAPING FROM ABŪ JAHL’S SHADOW
I want to venture that, like Abū Jahl, we Muslims in South Africa may also suffer from 
an inability to recognise the complexity of our community-in-making processes. 
Instead, we remain at the level of verbal discourse, embroiled in peripheral 
issues, responding to and connecting with social issues only at the level of surface 
appearances, never able to move beyond the superficial or symptomatic. We might 
struggle to ask deeper questions, trapped by our words and deeds in a counter-
productive logic. This has negated our ability to develop a constructive praxis that 
connects self and community to broader social purposes.
This truncated discourse, furthermore, prevents the community from engaging 
critically and in a mature way with the surrounding complexities. Here one could 
quite accurately speak about an entrapped theology, i.e. a religious response that is 
trapped in anger and verbal posturing. The community is held to ransom by having 
to view life through black/white frames. Think here about the antinomies of our 
public discourse: we speak of Islam / kufr (unbelief), ḥaq (truth) / bāṭil (falsehood), 
and munkar (evil) / maʿrūf (good). This reveals an either/or approach. The grey 
areas in between – where life’s complexities really play out – are never given any 
conceptual weight. Those who do not conform are positioned as the ‘evil other’ at 
the extreme end of the theological spectrum.
Our religious language fails to provide a space for productive co-existence or the 
conceptual skills to deal with our interlocking identities. The fact is that we are 
constructed daily in and by a broad range of identity influences. As a community 
in flux, exposed to an open society, engulfed by the Aids pandemic, overtaken by 
nagging consumerism, we are in need of relating our religious lives coherently to 
the challenges that our varied daily relationships and interaction throw up. Alas! 
Our theological approach misrecognises the complications brought on by living in 
a complex world.
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Many Muslims, recognising the limitations of this religious language as presented 
by the verbal controllers of ‘dīn’, under the cover of darkness, almost like Abū 
Jahl, unexposed and under cover, find other ways and resources to deal with this 
complexity. They step outside of the limiting theological parameters and find solace 
and conceptual resources elsewhere.
More tragically, many young people, as a means of coping with the void, 
experiment with alternative consumer-driven lifestyles that thrive on images and 
cosmetic significations. They experiment with ‘designer drugs’, strive for an elusive 
yuppie lifestyle, and connect to people for whom competitiveness and individual 
achievement have become an all-conquering illusion. They fail to realise that the 
acquisitive spirit is never fulfilled, based as it is on an insatiable quest to obtain ever 
more and better material status.
THE UPSURGE IN POPULAR SUFISM
The current upsurge in popular Sufism (mysticism) in the Cape is an indication 
of the search for meaning and something tangible to mediate what is perceived 
as a confusing and harsh world without any fixedness. Sufism has throughout the 
history of Islam provided a galvanising function whenever Muslim communities 
have found themselves in crisis. It has become a social organiser in the absence of a 
unifying and direction-giving ethic.
Sufism operates as a kind of deficit mode, standing in for the absence of moral 
leadership and providing firm grounding in a context of great moral confusion. 
Sufism provides comfort and a sense of concrete attachment. Simple acts of 
remembering Allah provide people with a sense of certainty. This resonates with a 
human being’s natural yearning for belonging, recognition and acknowledgment.
I do not share the rationalistically-minded person’s dismissive attitude to Sufism. 
But I do acknowledge that Sufism can easily serve to dupe, as a palliative, to soothe 
the pain, while never addressing the core of the community’s crisis.
Sufism has to be challenged to move people beyond a dependence on the “Master” to 
personal and individual empowerment so that human beings can make autonomous 
and responsible decisions about how they relate to and interact with the world. Here 
we find an inherent tension in Sufism: that is, dependence on the Master Shaykh, 
on the one hand, and individual autonomy, on the other; this has been depicted as 
a relationship of mutual antagonism, with the one necessarily excluding the other.
We watch the direction of Sufism (participating in it) in order to understand whether 
the relationship between autonomy and dependence can be resolved in the interests 
of finding our proper place in this country.
TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF SOFTNESS
The task of developing what I term ‘a theology of softness’ is urgent. Here I am 
referring to developing an understanding of our religious resources that would 
enable engagement with social complexity. We are not one-dimensional beings, not 
just consumers or workers or producers. We are multidimensional and multifaceted 
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beings. We interact daily with information technology and with many different types 
of people. We are either bosses or workers or self-employed. Many are unemployed. 
The angry verbal language characterising our religious discourse has prevented us 
from acquiring the skills and competencies to engage with the myriad relationships 
we transact in our daily lives.
Our theology should provide the resources to deal coherently with our complex 
social world. Softness refers to an attitude of respect and wisdom in dealing with 
the social world, taking us beyond anger, labelling, stereotyping and negative 
resistance – and finding productive means to engage our limitations and transcend 
them for the greater common good.
We have to understand how a negative verbal discourse creates ‘pictures in our 
heads’, beyond which we cannot imagine a new, more productive form of existence. 
South African Muslims are captivated, and held to ransom, by such mental pictures. 
Currently, our religious discourses concentrate only on the elucidation of these 
pictures, without digging beneath the images and symbols which they reflect.
A theology of softness should be aimed at moving beyond our limited frames to 
dealing with the complex underpinnings of our everyday life. More importantly, 
it should help in the process of generating new pictures, new conceptual 
understandings of the way we ought to interact with our surroundings. Only then 
can we proceed with laying the basis for building a productive community identity 
in the service of all in this country.
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5. ADDRESSING THE BLIGHTED MUSLIM PSYCHE IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS1
INTRODUCTION 
We have been witnessing endless equivocation in response to the current world 
crisis that was brought on by the heinous attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York, followed by the unconscionable bombing of Afghanistan, whose people have 
endured decades of war. 
What has not been forthcoming is a coherent and thoughtful response by South 
African Muslims to the impact of unfolding world events on the Muslim psyche. 
This chapter attempts to focus on the terms upon which Muslims should respond to 
their blighted psychological and moral dispositions. 
It is based on two assumptions: the first is an admission that we are individually and 
collectively experiencing emptiness, conflicting emotions, stress, poor concentration 
and demotivation as a result of the confusion generated by world events, and 
the second is that our responses to these psychological deficits are inadequate, 
conflicting and even harmful to our ability to retain individual and communal 
cohesion and symmetry.
DEFENSIVENESS AND ‘TURNING UP THE HEAT AND CANT’ 
A number of general responses have been forthcoming from Muslims. These have 
been marked by narrow defensiveness, which I contend is bereft of a vision and 
methodology to assist ordinary Muslims in this time of doubt and cynicism. 
While the public discourse in the media, the office, shop floor and the school has 
been one of support and even sympathy, Muslims may have come to doubt the 
sincerity of their colleagues and even the views of their fellow faith adherents. In the 
crude world of stereotyped identity projections, where an either/or logic rules, one is 
allowed only two choices: either to support the Taliban or the West, with apparently 
no place for complexity and doubt. 
Needless to say, in this climate Muslims have been experiencing difficulty in 
transacting normal and productive relations with others. We have generally 
been mediating the ramifications of the world crisis in silence without a network 
for support and comfort. We have not created a space to articulate our fears and 
concerns. We may have become less confident, more guarded and even confused 
about our role and purpose in our everyday business and civic lives. 
Moreover, active participation in the broader unfolding of a productive South African 
citizenship has been placed on the backburner. Another type of response has been 
coming from small but vociferous groups scattered throughout the country. They 
1 Published in the Annual Review of Islam in South Africa, 2001, Vol. 4, Centre for 
Contemporary Islam, UCT, based on a khuṭbah at CMRM, 26 October 2001.
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have been projecting an outward defensiveness. Armed with a set of conspiracy 
theories, they have set out to defend what they perceive to be the slighted image 
of Islam. Asserting an oppositional logic, they have set about bashing the West 
and have come out in support of Bin Laden, the Taliban and their pre-modern, 
austere brand of Islamism. They have taken to the streets, with simple slogans and 
bravado. Some have even signed up for jihād in Afghanistan. Despite moments of 
‘radical’ outpouring, they mostly carry on with their daily activities, oblivious of 
the contradiction in their continuing commitment to ‘Western’ consumer culture 
judging from their designer labels and gelled hair. Their opposition remains at the 
level of rhetoric, demonstrating a disjuncture between words and actions. In the face 
of confusion they have been turning up the ‘heat and cant’, where, instead of clarity, 
their reactions have caused confusion and disarray among ordinary Muslims. 
The Qur’an refers to this type of behaviour as imbued with the ‘fanaticism of 
ignorance’ (ḥamiyyah al-jāhiliyyah), where reaction in the face of extreme social 
turbulence is informed by emotionalism and sentiment. In other words, this is a 
discourse that is devoid of intellectual and affective engagement. Such a position, 
while never popular, feeds a sense of demoralisation, and results in individuals and 
communities suffering lapses in confidence and moral conviction. 
Another response has been forthcoming from the ʿulamā (Muslim religious 
leadership) and the pulpits. While a few have launched emotion-filled tirades, the 
responses of most of the imams have been muted and uncertain. Their hesitation 
could be attributed to a realisation that an emotional reaction on their part might 
lead to acts of indiscriminate violence by their younger congregants. 
Many Imams, in responding to the perceived media onslaught on the image of 
Islam and its raison d’être, have been asserting Islam as a supreme worldview 
with answers to all the world’s problems. While simplistic and unarticulated, this 
inverted triumphalism may be a natural psychological response, i.e. a re-assertion 
of one’s basic commitments and convictions when the basis of one’s faith seems to 
be undermined. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSIVENESS 
Defensiveness has, however, not provided Muslims with an adequate basis for 
counselling or pastoral care, based as it is on denial of our shortcomings and fault 
lines. It denies us the conceptual space to raise important and honest questions 
about the goings-on in the world and our complicity in them. Our suffering is never 
acknowledged and the pain of the community, the family and the individual is never 
spoken about or addressed directly. 
The Qur’an refers to this type of community and individual suffering described 
above as the ‘blaming soul’ (al-nafs al-lawwāmah). My argument is that our 
individual and communal psychological dispositions are generally characterised by 
unacknowledged hurt and upheaval. 
This disposition has been long in the making – at least 14 years – marked by the 
start of the first intifādah (uprising) in 1987, to the Gulf War in 1991 and the second 
Palestinian uprising in October 2000. During this period in South Africa we also 
witnessed brutal mass killings in the civil war between the United Democratic 
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Front and Inkatha, the Boipatong massacre in 1993, and Third Force train and other 
killings. The mass genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia have entangled us in a psychosis 
of violence and death. But it has been the brutal killing of hundreds of innocent 
Palestinians over the last year, coupled with the killing of innocents in Afghanistan, 
which have produced among Muslims intense feelings of helplessness and despair. 
The spectre of Muslims dying has been visited upon us daily in our homes. We are 
watching images of violence and death on our television screens. We have become 
vicarious observers of human suffering. A feeling of helplessness is engendered by our 
inability to do anything concrete to alleviate this distant suffering. This dissociation 
between what we see and our inability to act, a kind of ‘armchair suffering’, induces 
feelings of social impotence akin to sexual impotence, which often seems to carry 
social as well as individual consequences. Social impotence threatens our sense of 
humanity – disabling us from acting productively, producing latent influences that 
work subliminally on our individual and collective psyches. 
Our defensiveness is born out of a desire to retain a sense of dignity in the face of such 
helplessness. However, the denial about how we may be implicated in world events, 
or affected by their impact, prevents us from gaining a fresh perspective, making the 
necessary distinctions and identifying an adequate approach to this onslaught on 
our psyche. Denial produces a more perplexing and intractable situation. 
MOVING BEYOND OUR DEFENSIVENESS 
In a verse that captures at once the general ethos of the Qur’an, while directly 
addressing the ‘blaming soul’, Allah (SWT) declares: Say: O my servants who have 
transgressed against their souls! Despair not of the Mercy of God: for God forgives 
All sins: for He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful (Q. 39:V53). 
This verse points to the parameters of psychological and moral regeneration. It 
unequivocally declares that God’s mercy and forgiveness are available to those who 
have degenerated or followed a destructive path. Allah extends a hand of forgiveness 
to those who approach Him with humility and recompense. 
We should translate the ‘hand’ Allah extends to us into an honest examination of our 
weaknesses and fault lines. We should provide spaces for communal conversations 
and interaction, and offer each other support and comfort in a non-judgemental 
manner. While turning down the ‘heat and cant’ is an immediate necessity, building 
a culture of conversation and confidence requires long-term moral commitment. 
A counselling and pastoral approach involves a deeper struggle – jihād al-nafs 
(struggle over self) – conceptualised as a long-term project, which involves nurturing 
and support. 
Cultivating respectful, non-judgemental conversations and relationships is crucial 
in building sophisticated and complex communities. Performing our ʿibādāt (acts of 
ritual worship) with renewed vigour and reflection is a starting point for connecting 
the inner self with the outer social self. 
We have to cultivate the type of moral capacity (taklīf) that would enable us to 
distinguish between misguided responses to crises which fuel disorientation, and 
responses that attempt to creatively mediate the nuances of everyday life. 
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Finally, our task is to establish wholesome practices (ʿamal al-ṣāliḥāt) and institutions 
that will teach our children to function with creativity in a complex, multicultural 
world. Muslims are challenged to establish productive patterns of co-existence and 
interdependence, in the service of all, especially the poor, in South Africa. 
The inspirational poem below by Muhammad Iqbāl (in Ṭufayl 1966), the Indian 
philosopher-poet, points the way to such a dynamic and courageous existence: 
I will reveal to you a point, bright as a pearl 
That you may distinguish between the slave and the free! 
The slave is by nature repetitive 
His experiences are bereft of originality! 
The free man is always busily creative, 
His bowstring is vibrant with new melodies! 
His nature abhors repetition; 
His pain is not like the circle traced by a compass! 
To the slave, time is a chain, His lips speak only of Fate! 
The courage of the free becomes a counsellor of Fate. 
His is the hand that shapes the events! (Iqbāl, 1938) 
REFERENCE
Ṭufayl, M. 1966. Iqbāl’s Philosophy and Education. Bazm-I-Iqbāl, University of California.
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6. MUSLIM COMMUNITY SCHOOLS IN 
CAPE TOWN: EXEMPLIFYING ADAPTATION 
TO THE DEMOCRATIC LANDSCAPE1 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the establishment of schools by Muslim communities in 
Cape Town after 1994. The schools are registered with the Western Cape Education 
Department (WCED) as independent schools.2 They are part of a nationwide trend 
that has seen a mushrooming of such schools all over the country, especially in the 
northern provinces.
This chapter is based on interviews with principals, teachers and governing body 
members of six high schools. It discusses the discursive rationales for establishing 
these schools and the ways in which particular governance modes have laid down 
the schools’ operational parameters.3
These schools provide an apt focus for understanding the variegated ways in 
which Muslims in particular localities have been negotiating the unfolding post-
apartheid democratic landscape. They are an expression of a confluence of global 
and local Islamisation discourses, mediated by changing discursive and material 
circumstances. The schools illustrate the complex ways in which religious discourses 
are given meaning and expression within local contexts.
MORAL PROPRIETY AS DISCURSIVE MARKER
The schools illustrate how members of one community have been engaging with the 
new democratic terrain. The need to provide a better quality education was given 
as a key reason by the majority of interviewees for setting up the schools. They 
referred to the deteriorating quality of education in public schools. They specifically 
emphasised the negative impact on poor schools by the ill-fated cutback of teachers, 
which had its most pernicious effect on coloured schools in Cape Town. Three of the 
principals and some of the teachers were senior educators at public schools. They 
took the handsome early retirement packages that were made available to entice 
1 This chapter appeared in Annual Review of Islam in South Africa, Centre for 
Contemporary Islam, UCT, 2003, 6: 17-23.
2 The twelve schools established since 1994 are: Primary Schools: Al-Azhar (Township: 
Lotus River), Ambassador’s College (Bridgetown), Sayyidina Bilal School (Khayelitsha), 
Hidayatul Islam (Kensington); High Schools: Belhar Education Centre (Belhar), 
Madrassatur Rajaa (Strand), Mitchells Plain Islamic High School (Rocklands); Schools 
from Grade One to Twelve: Darul Islam (Greenhaven), Ieglaasi Niyah (Beacon Valley), 
Islamia (primary school campus in Rylands and high school campus in Lansdowne), 
Maddrassatut Tarbiyah (Lotus River, girls and Parkwood, boys); SAMA (Sybrand Park, 
Grade 1, 2, 3 and 8, 9 and 10). 
3 This chapter is part of a larger study I have done on these schools that focused on the 
hybrid mix of dynamics and discourses that constitutes meaning making and identity-
construction processes in these schools. 
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teachers to leave the public sector. The majority of the teachers at these Muslim 
schools, though, are recently qualified teacher education graduates who were unable 
to find jobs in a shrunken teacher-employment market in public schools.
Perceptions about the collapse of quality education at public schools thus converged 
with teacher education market trends to give impetus for establishing the Muslim 
schools. The perceived breakdown of morality in townships and public schools 
provided the primary justification for establishing these schools. The interviewees 
voiced their concerns about the moral propriety of the students. Moral decay 
in townships was spoken about in negative terms as a sign of the overall moral 
relativism associated with secular democracy, as an apocalyptic sign of the nearing 
of qiyāmah (the Day of Reckoning). The government was variously referred to by one 
principal as “amoral” and as “aiding the work of the devil”.
Public schools were described as breeding grounds for sin and vice, where children 
were socialised into sexual permissiveness, drug abuse and gang violence. It was 
particularly the governing body members’ views about the adverse moral influence 
of the public schools that played a key role in producing negative perceptions about 
them. Being in direct competition with public schools, the Muslim community 
schools, in providing a moral alternative, also siphon off students from those public 
schools with which they are in direct competition.
During the interviews the negative perceptions of public schools and the weakening 
moral condition of society presented an opportunity to provide an education that 
would aim to nurture Islam-centred personalities. One principal reflected on the 
constitutional position “to place choices over morality in the hands of citizens. This 
is very threatening to people not used to this.” Those interviewed indicated that in 
a country where morality had been strictly policed under apartheid, being given 
moral choice has had a disorienting impact. Muslim schools are expected to act as 
a bulwark against the creeping immorality of township life. The schools would be 
expected to provide their students with the attributes of an Islamic personality to 
withstand the onslaught against morality.
The schools were set up in an attempt to produce Islamic personalities in relative 
isolation from the perceived negative impact of their surrounding contexts. The 
schools can be regarded as a response to moral anxieties experienced by communities 
after 1994. The proponents of these schools have chosen ‘splendid isolation’ as a 
means of cultivating moral propriety among the students. The assumption is that 
these disengaged moral production processes would lay the foundation for children 
to interact with broader society.
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AS A CHANNEL FOR BROADER COMMUNITY 
ADAPTATION PROCESSES
The mode of governance at each school indicates the ways broader community 
processes are relayed within these schools. Four governance types can be discerned, 
each constituted by a specific mode of community involvement.
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Mosque-based governance
Three of the high schools can be described as mosque-based community schools. They 
are located within working-class to lower-middle-class coloured communities and 
are run by mosque-based community structures. A spirit of self-help, ideologically 
produced during mosque sermons, through the mobilising role of the shaykh or 
imām, and media resources such as pamphlets and community radio, serves to 
galvanise members around the need to retain communal cohesion and support. 
The schools’ governing structures are made up of mosque-going, public-spirited 
community members who are active in fundraising and organisational activities. 
These schools were set up as part of a number of other social welfare activities, 
including burial services, financial assistance and afternoon religious classes for 
children who attend the public schools.
They help socialise the children into a communally-generated moral comportment 
and are crucial in reproducing the community’s internal cohesion and adaptive 
vibrancy. The interviewees indicated a general reluctance to interact with other 
religious and civic groups in their environment. The internal cohesiveness of these 
communities seemed to be juxtaposed against the perceived negative influences of 
the external non-Muslim world. This lack of engagement also extended to their lack 
of enthusiasm for relating their organisational activities and discourses to broader 
civic and national citizenship processes. Few of the interviewees were attuned to the 
need to make linkages with the broader community and other faith and race groups. 
These mosque-based schools play a central role in reproducing a discourse that 
distances their adherents from the surrounding community. Their school governance 
mode is thus based on a desire to establish a relatively isolated identity insulated 
from external influences and processes.
Governance as expatriate belonging
The second governance type is provided by the school that was set up by a number 
of Turkish expatriates who settled in Cape Town over the last decade. They are 
mostly professionals and business people. The principal of this school provided 
a dual rationale for establishing the school. He pointed out that the school was 
established because they wanted to provide their own children with a modern 
Muslim and Turkish-inspired education, on the one hand, while at the same time 
wanting to “share our educational resources with the people of this country”, on 
the other. About seventy percent of the 134 children at the school are coloured 
Muslim, ten percent from the Cape Indian community, and twenty percent from 
the Turkish expatriate community. The school’s governing body is made up of 
Turkish expatriates.
The school’s operational discourse is framed around a constructive and progressive 
interaction with the secular democracy in South Africa. The school’s symbolic 
environment, unlike that of the three mosque-based schools, indicates an eagerness 
to co-exist and interact with other communities. From my interviews, it seemed that 
this school is an example of an educational space where this expatriate community 
can socialise their children into a democratic South African environment.
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This school’s governance discourse could be said to represent an amalgam of three 
types of allegiance, i.e. sustaining a social network among Turkish expatriates in 
Cape Town, a demonstration of loyalty to their adopted country, and a display of 
religious solidarity with Muslims in Cape Town. 
Governance as ideological closure 
A school in an impoverished working-class area of the Cape Flats run by a group 
called the Tablīgh Jamāt provides the third governance type. Its governing body is 
made up of members of this group, teachers at the school, and a number of Tablīghī 
businessmen. Strict ideological control in line with the dictates of the group is 
achieved by the closed manner in which the school is governed. 
The balance of control within the governing structure rests with the businessmen 
whose financial leverage gives them enormous sway in the running of the affairs of 
the Tablīgh group and the school. The businessmen, however, mostly reside in the 
northern province of Gauteng and in KwaZulu-Natal. This suggests that they have 
a ‘remote control’ type of governing influence. This influence is achieved relatively 
easily in the light of the group’s strict ideological control, which provides very 
little scope for the principal and teachers to exercise autonomy in the running of 
the school. 
This school is firmly framed by the generation of a distinct, narrow and disengaging 
ideological attitude among its students. They are socialised into adopting a narrow 
moral behavioural range that, according to the principal, is meant to insulate them 
from the corrupting influences of the modern world. 
Governance as ethnicised identity production 
A school that caters for middle-class to upper-middle-class children illustrates the 
fourth governance type. Its governing body is made up of mostly Indian professionals 
and business people. The children at the school come in more or less equal numbers 
from Indian and coloured Muslim families, who pay school fees of R8 000 per year. 
This compares with R6 500 paid at the ‘Turkish expatriate’ school, between R2 000 
and R3 000 at the three mosque-based schools, and R1 200 at the Tablīghī school. 
While all the schools in the study depend on community fundraising efforts such as 
big walks, food festivals and dinners to help fund expenses, the Indian-controlled 
school is able to depend on generous donations from its business community 
benefactors. Its expansive and modern campus, located in a middle-class suburb, 
is an example of the school’s relatively easy access to financial support. The school 
is thus favourably positioned to compete in the student market with former white, 
now desegregated, public schools. 
The school acts as a conduit for strong, though informal, business networks for 
members of the Indian business community. Business ties are sustained through the 
circulation of activities in and around the governance of the school. The interviewees 
spoke about the strategic ways in which people are included in and/or excluded 
from these networks. They aver that the networks are important in protecting access 
to certain markets and business opportunities. 
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The networks are restricted to certain carefully selected Indian business people 
and are relatively closed to their coloured Muslim counterparts, despite the large 
number of children from the coloured Muslim community at the school. This leads 
to intermittent, though muted, clashes between the governing body and the school’s 
management and teachers involved in the internal processes in the school. The 
governing body was accused of standing in the way of having the school develop 
a flexible and mediated school environment. Teachers complained about not being 
supported to develop a curriculum and pedagogy that would enable the students 
to develop cross-cultural competence. Recognition of the cultural specificity of 
groups, instead of fluid cultural interaction, marks the governance discourse. One 
teacher suggested that this emphasis on “protecting the identity of the group may 
be motivated by the need to keep Indian and coloured students from fraternising 
too closely.” 
More generally, the governing body’s subtle surveillance to discourage crossing 
group boundaries is informed by the need to protect its particular adaptive strategy 
in the new terrain. Reproducing a relatively closed Indian ethnic identity, kept 
in place by exclusive business networks, has placed particular limitations on the 
everyday operations at the school. 
CONCLUSION
The governance modes of these schools are representative of broader adaptive 
strategies in the new democratic environment. The ways the different school 
governance types operate indicate how these schools are set up as a conduit 
of broader communal processes. Whether they are organised to serve narrow 
ideological purposes, community cohesiveness, expatriate belonging, or ethnic 
business interests (as described in each of the four types above), the schools’ modes 
of governance play a key role in marking the discursive terrain within which these 
communal forms are being reproduced. The different governance types have 
structured the discursive terrain within schools in various ways. They have placed 
different constraints on local school processes, which have led to different in-school 
responses by principals and teachers. 
The Muslim community schools are an example of the multiple ways in which 
religious communities adapt to the changing discursive environment, of the 
ways they read contexts strategically, and of how they adjust their symbolic 
and communal repertoires to invent new ways of existing in a changing context. 
Concerns about morality and quality have been appropriated to provide a rationale 
for the schools’ establishment. The schools each represent different ways of adapting 
to their local environments. People as formative agents within local contexts interact 
with the discursive environment of the school to construct religious and social 
meanings. While the governance modes place certain parameters on the schools, the 
principals and teachers are actively involved in giving shape to the curriculum and 
pedagogical practices. The religious and educational meanings generated at these 
schools are thus the outcome of complex and fluid processes that are playing out 
within particular localities. 
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7. EDUCATIONAL REFLEXIVITY IN THE AGE 
OF DISCURSIVE CLOSURE1
The title I have given this presentation is Educational reflexivity in the age of 
discursive closure, which is intended to suggest that our educational activities, our 
intellectualism and our critical questions ought to be underpinned conceptually by 
the cultivation of educational and intellectual capacity and scholarship that would 
challenge the intellectual closure that characterises our religious discourses.
I suggest that our social practices as a community can only be fundamentally changed 
if we ask hard and careful questions about how religious power and practices are 
reproduced. The farḍ kifāyah – community responsibility – of a university such as 
IPSA is to provide a scholarly platform to cultivate new understandings and an 
intellectual base upon which new and invigorated social practices can emerge. 
This presentation is therefore focused on the conceptual basis that I believe an 
institution such as an Islamic university should be founded on in generating 
educational reflexivity and conceptual capacity among its students. The students 
who train at this institution must be responsible, courageous and critical interlocutors 
in the social discourses and practices of the day.
When they leave IPSA, they must be able, in their various community roles, to 
guide their charges, their communities and their organisations in establishing 
appropriate and productive practices that can bring the Muslim community into 
greater alignment with broader local community processes in this city, this province 
and our country.
Towards the end of last year, when the establishment of this university was still 
being discussed, I sent an email to IPSA’s principal, Shaykh Ighsaan Taliep, in which 
I expressed my scepticism about the idea to him. I suggested that the rationale for 
such a move must be based primarily on intellectualism and scholarship. I suggested 
to him that the foundations of a university should be the subject of vigorous debate. 
My concern was based on my own experience as an academic at a higher education 
institution, the University of the Western Cape (UWC), where I did all my studies 
and am currently lecturing (until June 2009). South African higher education has 
been undergoing very fundamental transformative processes which I believe are 
threatening the system at its very core. Universities have been merged, they have 
to conform to equity profiles, their funding has been decreased, and they have to 
respond to a myriad of quality assurance and surveillance mechanisms.
UWC is experiencing somewhat of an identity crisis. The government’s funding 
formula suggests all universities should be equally proficient in research and 
scholarship, on the one hand, and teaching and learning, on the other. On this view, 
UWC should become a world-class university and while we take this ambition 
1 This chapter is based on a paper presented in 2005 at the International Peace College 
South Africa (IPSA) and published in the 2005 edition of the IPSA journal.
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seriously, we do realise that we may never achieve it. Instead, I fear that we may end 
up becoming a poor carbon copy of a fully research-led university.
To resolve this impasse I suggested that UWC should actively set out to become a 
top-class undergraduate teaching university with excellent teaching and academic 
support and development programmes for working-class students in the Western 
Cape. Providing access to poor students for academic training in technology, 
economics, law, science, the humanities and education would form the basis of our 
academic project.
In addition, we should then build research expertise at Masters and doctoral level 
in recognised niche areas in which we have top-flight academic infrastructure 
and expertise. These niche areas can only operate if the academics in them have 
sustainable research programmes and are publishing in national and international 
journals. UWC has a number of these niche academics. But we should ask hard 
questions about the balance between teaching and research, cut where appropriate 
and strengthen where needed. There are at the moment important intellectual 
debates going on all over the campus to determine the direction we might follow in 
the coming years.
How would these kinds of debates play themselves out at a newly functioning, 
privately funded university in the Cape such as IPSA? I was concerned that if this 
university was to go down, if it must close, we would not only have wasted valued 
resources and intellectual energy, but it would have a very demoralising effect on 
our community psyche. Our confidence about our place in Cape Town and the 
world may suffer, and our intellectual boldness may diminish as a result.
What started out as scepticism has for me suddenly become a question of necessity. 
How do people like me who are based at public universities engage with IPSA in a 
responsible and critical manner in order to play a role in strengthening and directing 
it along a productive academic path? How do we become inclusive of attempts to 
build IPSA as an intellectual project, instead of sniping dismissively, like armchair 
Trotskyites, from the sidelines?
It has been indicated to me that IPSA’s series of seminars will ask important 
questions about Islam and Muslim practices in our growing democracy. This is an 
important intellectual initiative, acting as a catalyst for this university to substantiate 
its scholarly agenda.
Where are our young community intellectuals in the Muslim community currently 
being produced? By community intellectuals I mean those young people who 
establish their activism and their moral capacity in thoughtful, critical and new ways 
of community struggle. Are we reproducing these types of young people, or are our 
institutions producing people more interested in the necessary, but not sufficient, 
ceremonial or salvation side of their community engagement?
The Cape Muslim community has produced two types of community activists, both 
the outcome of our intellectual modernisation during the twentieth century: one is 
what I’ll call the intellectual community Imam and the other the Muslim activist 
intellectual. Shaykh Ismail Ganief (died 1958) is an example of the intellectual 
community Imam. As Hoosain Ebrahim’s (2004) fascinating book on the life of the 
Shaykh illustrates, he was very well versed in the traditional disciplines of Islam. 
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He became an inspiring teacher, author and community leader of note. He was also 
an inheritor of a long line of religious leaders, ‘ulamā’, in Cape Town.
He produced many other imams, including Imam Abdullah Haron and Imam Ismail 
Johnstone (1935-1993). Imam Haron was an ordinary Imam-about-town, a snappy 
dresser and a rugby and cricket supporter. He was propelled into political struggle 
because of his moral sensitivity in response to the injustices of apartheid, and in 
no small part also by his interaction with the young Muslim college and university 
graduates of Claremont during the 1950s and 1960s. Imam Haron has without 
any question and deservedly become the face of the Muslim resistance against the 
oppression of apartheid.
Imam Johnstone, about whom a book surely must be written, inspired many people 
with his leadership, educational activities and his Arabic teaching. He taught many 
young people who went on to attend both secular and Islamic universities. Many of 
them have become leading community figures all over Cape Town.
The Muslim activist intellectual tradition emerged in the 1940s and 1950s. A number of 
first-generation Muslim young people graduated from higher education institutions 
during these decades. As my project on Muslim teachers shows, most of them were 
politicised by the stringent anti-collaborationist tradition of the Non-European Unity 
Movement. They were thus heavily politicised, but unlike my grand-uncle Ali Fataar 
(see Wieder and Fataar 2003), and his contemporary comrades Cissie Gool and 
Goolam Gool, this newer generation of Muslim intellectuals of the 1950s attempted 
a synthesis between their radical anti-state politics and their Islamic commitments. 
These young people were reading important modern Islamic literature such as the 
works of Ḥassan al-Banna (1906-1949), Mawdūdī and Quṭb.
They began to develop a critique of the Muslim community, its dominant discourses, 
its intellectual complacency, but most of all its political quiescence. They were 
impatient with the compliant attitude of the ‘ulamā’ to the politics of apartheid 
that were unfolding in the 1950s. They established the District Six Muslim Youth 
Movement and the Claremont Muslim Youth Association with the express purpose 
of politicising the community.
They were targeted by some ʿulamā from the mimbar (pulpit) for ‘mixing Islam with 
politics’. They were man-handled [sic] and thrown out of mosques, vilified and called 
donkeys. They struggled to establish a foothold in the community. Abu Bakr Fakir 
(1938-2002), a young Claremont resident in the 1950s and a secularly trained person 
who was mostly self-taught in Fiqh and Arabic, was an example of these young 
people’s attempts to operate on the terrain of the ʿulamā. He wrote, printed and 
published the acclaimed Manual of Prayer and Fasting (Fakir 1978) in the mid-1970s.
One of the most important contributions these young people made was to establish 
a new discourse, ask new questions, and postulate new ways of imagining their 
community. Their legacy only became concretised in the mid-1980s, when a younger 
generation of Muslim activists in the Call of Islam, the Muslim Students Association, 
Muslim Youth Movement and Qibla emerged out of the cauldron of the student 
and youth uprisings of the time. They too asked challenging new questions of this 
community, built organisational infrastructure, entered into alliances with other 
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community organisations, and generally dragged the community, kicking and 
screaming, into the broader anti-apartheid Cape Town body politic.
The current Premier, Ebrahim Rasool, who was a Muslim activist in the Call of 
Islam and the United Democratic Front, was part of a group of young people who 
contributed enormously towards shifting the community’s discourse. This was 
based on a number of strategic considerations that guided the political mobilisation 
of Muslims to join the mass democratic struggles of the 1980s and 1990s. The 1980s 
activists learnt from the mistakes of the radicals of the 1950s. They did not alienate 
the ʿulamā, instead choosing to build the ʿulamā’s confidence in their own leadership 
role, while bringing them into the anti-apartheid movement.
In highlighting the various developments around Muslim community activism, I 
want to suggest that the young people’s intellectual courage was part of a different 
social context, which emerged under apartheid, the reaction to it, the community’s 
modernisation, the radical politics of the 1950s and beyond. This was a different 
world. Islamic universities in South Africa were not on the horizon. Our adaptive 
reflexivity in the 1980s and 1990s emerged out of this milieu, shaping our discourses, 
informing our community responses, and ultimately conditioning our complex and 
ambiguous stances within the broader anti-apartheid context.
The question that confronts us today revolves around what our reflexivity should be 
based on. The prior questions are: How should we understand the challenges that 
confront us today? What role should a university or any of our other educational 
institutions play in building this reflexivity?
It is in this light that IPSA’s choice to become a university is instructive and 
courageous, signalling clearly that its establishment is an attempt to provide a 
platform to interrogate these types of issues2. Why do I say so? IPSA could 
very easily have chosen to be a Dār al-ʿulūm (a theological seminary), where 
the production of ʿulamā would have been primary. I would suggest that while 
IPSA will be producing ʿulamā, the notion of a university is clearly suggestive 
of the desire to establish a broad and open-ended intellectual platform for its 
intellectual position.
The following question therefore has to be asked: How and on what conceptual 
basis can a four-year Bachelor of Theology degree be accomplished based on this 
open-ended intellectual platform? And while I believe this question will primarily 
be asked in curriculum development committees of the university, i.e. what content 
should be covered, whether the four Sunni Fiqh schools will be taught, or whether the 
other minority schools of thought will be introduced in the 3rd and 4th year, whether 
Fiqh will be taught in Arabic to facilitate Arabic language acquisition, which may 
result in a lower level of intellectual substance?
Other curriculum and pedagogical questions will revolve around whether a 
doctrinaire approach to madhāhib (schools of Islamic jurisprudence) will be followed, 
whether the students will be encouraged to do their own research, and whether they 
will be expected to present formulaic and rote answers, or whether students will 
2 IPSA subsequently registered as a college on the South African Higher Education 
Qualifications Framework, although the idea of becoming a university is still 
being pursued. 
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be rewarded for independent thinking and the ability to develop their own voices 
and opinions.
IPSA will also be confronted with the challenges posed by the academic capacity 
of the first-year students, whether the academic development (AD) and intellectual 
preparation of the students should be a part of the curriculum, whether AD should 
be offered just to under-prepared students, or whether, because of the widespread 
lack of academic preparation, AD should be mainstreamed.
Given all these important curriculum questions that the university would face day 
to day in the lecture theatres and in the curriculum meetings, the key conceptual 
issue for me is how IPSA will respond over the next few years to the question: What 
type of intellectual or scholarly identity should a university such as IPSA assume in 
this critical period in the life of Cape Town and South Africa?
In my attempt to provide a conceptual map in response to this question, I would like 
to suggest the university should aim to cultivate, in a creative and an intellectually 
substantiated and patient manner, a discourse that will help us break through our 
normal everyday existence, one that will allow us to view the world in a different 
and more enabling light, that will move this community from intellectual and social 
complacency to an intense grappling with the complex world that we are living 
in, and to develop the capacity to encounter that world with fortitude, intellectual 
openness and creativity.
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8. DEVELOPING A CRITICAL MUSLIM POLITICAL 
ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICAN REALITIES1
I approach this topic with some trepidation and a heightened sense of responsibility. 
I suspect I was asked to talk today because I publicly commented on radio in the 
negative about whether it is wise for ʿulamā (religious leaders) groups to support 
political parties. I will come to that directly later in the presentation.
The main argument I will make today is based on my view that Muslims in this 
country must now act ‘counter-intuitively’ against our historically defined Cape 
Sunnah, our public discourses, to establish our relevance to the complex challenges 
of the post-apartheid period. Acting counter-intuitively means we should act 
contrary to what common sense suggests. But it has another meaning: ‘to act on 
impulse against better judgement’. I want to suggest that our ‘better judgement’ or 
our ‘common sense’ should now perhaps be challenged fundamentally.
My approach to this presentation is based on the qur’anic notion of shūrā, which 
is interpreted as inter-subjective and inclusive dialogue. Such dialogue, I believe, 
is defined by an intellectual disposition, an adab (ethics) based on inclusion and 
respect for heterodox and diverse opinions. Shūrā, or inter-subjective dialogue and 
engagement, is also my conceptual framework for today’s presentation, a way of 
thinking about, and engaging in the politics of the day.
I will suggest that Muslim life and its political expressions are formulated in the 
context of a swirl of discourses, both from inside and outside the Muslim community. 
I will also argue against viewing the political positions we take in oppositional and 
exclusive terms. Our discourse must not be adversarial, as simply the outcome of 
us-them contests, set up in victim or perpetrator terms with the labels of ‘modernist’, 
‘radical’ or ‘sell-out’ merely intended to shut down debate. This leaves no space for 
productive engagement. 
I am interested in a reading of Cape Muslim history that engages with its continuities 
and discontinuities, its internally defining struggles, its cross-cutting influences, and 
the diverse currents that make up Muslim public discourse.
LIVING IN COMPLEX TIMES
Let me start by saying that we now live in complex times. The dual features 
of globalisation and constitutional democracy now work together to construct 
the outlines of our lives. It affects what we become as a community, how we see 
ourselves, how we communicate, how we do business, whom we marry, where our 
kids work, whether in South Africa, Europe, Australasia or the Middle East.
1 This chapter is based on a presentation delivered at the International Peace 
College South Africa in March 2009. It was published as a chapter in Fataar, A. and 
Esack, F. eds. 2009, After the Honeymoon: Muslim Religious Leadership and Political 
Engagement in a Post-Apartheid South Africa. Cape Town, Centre for Progressive Islam. 
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We have been joined by fellow Muslims and others from the African continent and 
beyond, who have come to enrich our religious tapestry, even if they have not quite 
assimilated into the mainstream of the community. Many families have settled in 
Cape Town from South Africa’s northern provinces. Many diverse and heterodox 
Islamic influences have entered the city and solidified their presence. For example, 
the Naqshabandi Tarīqah (Sufī order) has found fertile soil in Cape Town, the 
Tijāniyyah Tarīqah has established a presence, people aligned to the Murābiṭūn 
bought a famous church in a prominent location in downtown Cape Town and 
turned it into a mosque, and the Ahl al-Bayt Shi`a community now has an organised 
presence in Cape Town. The increasing number of African Muslims challenges us 
to become less race-obsessed and more inclusive. And the influx of refugees and 
migrants from African countries and beyond have turned Cape Town into a social 
and cultural melting pot.
One way of understanding the Muslim community of Cape Town is through its 
multiple accommodations within the broader South African contexts over the 
centuries. As a community we have always endeavoured, as other communities 
do, to establish the best situation for our survival and acculturation in Cape Town. 
These accommodations, of finding a level of relative social and political comfort, 
were disrupted from time to time.
The community, however, managed to remain fairly cohesive, if marginal to the 
travails of the other oppressed groups in the city. But perhaps this picture is too 
simple. It hides from view the fissures and fractures that form part of our community’s 
co-existence with the rest of the city. It hides the fact that the community has found 
an accommodation that has enabled us in general to adopt a politically quiescent 
attitude towards the apartheid state. I think here of the example of the collusion 
between I.D. du Plessis, the apartheid ideologue, in charge of Coloured Affairs and 
some Cape Muslims who attempted to construct an ethnic Malay identity from the 
1940s through the 1950s. It did not come as a surprise that the pall bearers at Du 
Plessis’s funeral were suitably attired ‘Malay’ men who carried his coffin into church.
That was the Cape Town that was, and is still; made up of a diverse Muslim polity; 
culturally hybrid, exciting, politically accommodating, and in some instances quietly 
complicit, while at other times politically courageous.
ACTING COUNTER-INTUITIVELY
Let me be clear. The presentation of Cape Town’s Muslims as active opponents of 
the apartheid state is a post-apartheid construction, a myth. The young people in the 
Claremont Muslim Youth Association and the District Six Muslim Youth Movement 
during the 1950s would have disagreed with such a construction, and so would the 
youth of the 1970s and the 1980s in the Qibla Mass Movement, the Call of Islam, the 
Muslim Student Association and the Muslim Youth Movement.
The main point I want to make today is that we should as a community proceed 
counter-intuitively. We should challenge our historical ties to seeking accommodation 
with those who hold power in our city, province and country. In other words, we 
should also be open to critically questioning the accommodations that we have been 
making as a community in the past and into the post-apartheid period. 
39
SEARCHING FOR ISLAMIC ETHICAL AGENCY IN POST-APARTHEID CAPE TOWN
Our mainstream political responses have not sought to pose problems or trouble 
our historically framed accommodations with reference to those in power. We have 
sought instead to accommodate ourselves to the new political situation, related to 
it somewhat as a minority and not as a key constituent part of this city. I, therefore, 
want to suggest that the way we have responded is probably consistent with our 
historical search for accommodation to context, geography and power, instead of 
challenging power and thereby helping to define the political temper in the city and 
the country.
Acting counter-intuitively against aspects of our Cape Town Sunnah (tradition), 
means that we now have to figure out what matters most to ordinary people 
struggling to make ends meet as they endure daily hardships in their attempts to 
establish dignified livelihoods. 
This struggle is located in the realm of ijtihād, which is intellectual exertion, based 
on research scholarship into the ways we live in the city. This could be pursued 
by students and researchers at IPSA, and programmes in Islamic studies at Cape 
Town’s universities. The search for new modes of existence should also be based 
on jihād, which in this case refers to moral struggle or praxis that connects us to the 
material, political and symbolic challenges of the time. We have to think and act 
outside of our predefined boxes. But we have to interrogate and challenge how these 
boxes have acquired their shape and intellectual substance.
We have perhaps become comfortable with our consorting with power. We have 
never been the leading partner in this dance with power. We are not even sometimes 
sure whether we are actually dancing or maybe jogging, or running backwards. Our 
accommodations or political responses may have been driven by elite class interests, 
the interests of those people who are visible, who make themselves visible, and 
perhaps not by the real interests of the poor and marginal in the city. Elite interests, 
whether driven by prominent families, business, well-positioned mosques, prominent 
murīd (congregants) and religious institutions, have determined this accommodation 
to find a narrow comfort zone, relatively insulated from broader struggles.
The tight connection between some religious actors, business and politics over the 
last few years exemplifies how this accommodation works. One could mention a 
few interesting examples of this connection in the Muslim community. The post-
apartheid period has ushered in space for greater mobility and material acquisition. 
The increase in material wealth in the middle-class sectors of the community has been 
quite spectacular. One simply has to stand on Kromboom Road running through the 
Athlone-Rondebosch East belt to observe the ‘wealth on wheels’ on display, those 
Muslims in their expensive brand new SUVS and luxury vehicles who pass by. 
The middle classes and the religious elites are probably most invested in political 
accommodation and therefore will lobby hard for the conditions necessary to access 
contracts, prominent jobs and black economic empowerment deals. Politicians are 
implicated in this and some religious actors chase the same ideals. Islamic financing, 
for example, has never been in a more vibrant space. Most financial institutions, with 
their Islamic advisors in tow, and their latest halal-friendly investment products on 
offer, are competing for a piece of the large Muslim financial pie.
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It stands to reason that these elites do not want a political climate that paints 
Muslims in a bad light as opponents of democracy and the ruling government. 
It would simply be bad for business. However, the increase in the material poverty 
of at least 30% of the Muslim community in this city has been staggering. Many 
Muslims live in increasing hardship, struggling to make ends meet. I observed this 
in my ethnographic research in a prominent township, where I witnessed Muslims, 
like other township dwellers, having to adapt to conditions of unemployment, the 
hold of the criminal economy, and a surge in single-parent homes. 
What does the Fiqh al-Aqaliyyāt (a legal discourse alert to minority contexts) mean 
in this context? A fiqh of minorities currently focuses too narrowly on questions of 
identity, based as it is on the experiences of the Muslims who migrated to the first 
world, in London, Amsterdam, Paris and Barcelona. The key difference between 
minorities in Europe and South Africa is that we do not have an identity problem in 
South Africa, at least not yet. Muslims in Europe are regarded as third-class citizens. 
They are neither accepted as properly European, nor are they accepted in their 
countries of origin as properly Middle Eastern Muslim. They struggle with an in-
between identity. Muslims in South Africa are as old as the first colonial settlements 
in this country. I disavow a minority identity which requires preferential treatment 
with special narrow concerns and fears. I prefer a fiqh that is responsive to the plight 
of the marginalised and the poor, concerned with political critique and challenge, a 
fiqh committed to the everyday battles to survive and adapt in contexts of material 
brutalisation.
SECURING A NEW POLITICS
But how do we secure a new politics? The accommodation that we have sought in 
the post-apartheid era is not benign. The alignment between politics, business and 
religious elites is governed by self-interest as much as by the concern for the public 
good. I am not so naïve as to suggest that we should rail against this alignment or 
oppose it with all our might. That would be a sort of ‘political fundamentalism of a 
special type’, the type that says we should not get involved in business or politics, or 
deny the linkages that exist between politics, religion and business. These linkages 
are the life-blood of any community. What I am suggesting is that Islam demands 
that we privilege a confrontation with the bigger ethical challenges of the moment. 
Self-interest has to be trumped by broader commitments: by an incorruptible politics 
tied to the interests of the most marginal in society.
But the question remains: How do we develop different political responses as a 
community informed by concerns with the needs of the marginalised. These include 
persons living with HIV and AIDS inside and outside the Muslim community, those 
who sleep in shacks, those who fast involuntarily every day, not just during the 
month of Ramaḍān, those children who now grow up in single families or with 
parents who are under- or unemployed, who attend deprived schools, young people 
who grow up on their own, without the cultural codes and regulative order that 
older people normally provide.
How then do we as a community ‘speak truth to power’ in the face of these dramatic 
challenges? How do we develop inter-subjective dialogue, spaces for critique that 
questions our internal responses and challenges those in power? How do we criticise 
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and built alternative pictures and possibilities of a better life for all? I assume that 
these are the questions that we now have to confront courageously, critically and 
inclusively. The challenge of leadership is to create the conditions for such an 
active dialogue.
But let us get to the heart of the matter. What is the problem that we are addressing 
here today?
Fourteen years into the democratic period our country begs for answers to some very 
fundamental questions: Have we lost our political compass? Are we violating our 
country’s Constitution? Are we reneging on the expectation to deliver a socially just 
country for all who live in it? Following from these questions, have our communities 
and religious structures been playing a critical and constructive role in the quest for 
a better life for all? And are our religious and civic formations playing a watchdog 
role in keeping government accountable?
The question about whether ʿulamā groups should support political parties is for me 
a reflection of the heightened sensitivity about both government failure and our own 
neglect to keep those in power accountable.
Let me list some government and party political failures: 
• The current mobilisation against the National Prosecution Authority and the 
Scorpions;
• The raping of the justice system by elements in the ruling party;
• The rising rates of tuberculosis in the Western Cape;
• The corrupt ties to the arms deal and corruption generally;
• Failure in the areas of housing, health, safety, security and education. 
Have we spoken against these failures? Have we challenged those in power and 
kept them accountable? Have we held ourselves accountable by way of a proper 
developmental response to these challenges? I would like to suggest that being too 
close to power has prevented us from speaking ‘truth to power’ and from doing what 
matters to alleviate the plight of our people. The question is whether we are fulfilling 
our Allah-ordained role, whether we even recognise our prophetic responsibility. 
Finding very few answers inside the house of Islam for these questions, let me reach 
to the outside for some indication of what this prophetic role might be.
Dr Allan Boesak recently provided a critique of the government. His language was 
reminiscent of a United Democratic Front (UDF) mass rally in the 1980s. Many 
people related to the speech with nostalgia, remembering the vision of hope we had 
for the new South Africa, and how this vision has been betrayed. But Boesak did 
not go far enough. He spoke in very general terms about the abuse of power by the 
ruling elite, calling for a return to mass mobilisation. Boesak’s critique never went 
beyond generalities.
Let me turn to the critique of the abuse of political power by Prof. Sam Maluleke, 
the President of the South African Council of Churches when he recently delivered 
the annual Desmond Tutu lecture at the University of the Western Cape. Maluleke 
probed into the heart of power. He criticised the church for shirking its responsibility 
by failing to speak truth to power. He was particularly harsh about the role of the 
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church in post-apartheid South Africa. He pointed out that “church leaders spend 
their time waiting for that call – not the call from heaven, but the call from the 
Union Buildings or Luthuli House”. He suggested that the church “was in danger 
of becoming not merely a training ground, but a playground of politicians … the 
church was now available for politicians to use and abuse, to command and to call. 
This is the reason the church is often silent, when it should be speaking, absent 
where it should be present, tongue-tied when the nation is hungry for words”.
Does this also apply to us in the Muslim community? Are we also absent where we 
should be present, tongue-tied when the nation is hungry for our words? If Maluleke 
suggests that the church has become the state at prayer, maybe we have become 
the state at duʿa (supplication)? Where are our critical voices? Are we too close to 
power? Have those in power out-manoeuvred us, provided us jobs, contracts and 
BEE deals? Have we chosen to remain silent for fear of jeopardising our access to 
these goodies? Have we externalised our voices towards faraway places where 
Muslim are oppressed? There can be no doubt that Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Iran 
and Afghanistan need our support. But have we used the plight of these people far 
away as a proxy, a stand-in, for ignoring the oppression nearby, on our doorsteps?
CONCLUSION – SPEAKING TRUTH IN CLEAR TERMS TO POWER
In conclusion, let me return to the main theme of this presentation. Muslims have to 
seriously challenge their comfortable accommodation to power. This is now a farḍ 
kifāyah (communal obligation), an urgent community responsibility.
IPSA’s role in organising these critical seminars is one necessary step. Its research 
agenda could be based on understanding how Muslims now live in the post-
apartheid period. Such research would be valuable for understanding how religious 
institutions, teachers and Imams could go about addressing the needs of their 
students and congregants.
I have suggested that our Cape Sunnah, our public discourses, run deep. It will require 
deep intellectual and practical engagement for us to act differently. We should not 
deny the burden of history, but we should not simply live in its image.
Needless to say, I find support for political parties ‘sanctified’ by religious groupings 
unacceptable. People ought to make their political choices politically, not influenced 
by ʿulamā groupings. We should counsel to all our people across the widest range of 
political opinions.
But we cannot be neutral about the broader ethical issues. To act counter-intuitively 
now requires us to develop the ability to speak truth to power, in blunt and clear 
ways when the situation demands it, and at other times in nuanced and constructive 
ways. As I have suggested, this should be done inter-subjectively, in rigorous, on-
going and inclusive dialogue. This requires that we protect each other’s right to hold 
heterodox views, without name-calling or labelling.
My bias is towards a dialogue governed by an imagination that imagines our city, 
our country and the world differently, based on the qur’anic principles of truth 
(ḥaqq) and justice (ʿadl).
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9. EDUCATIONAL ADAPTATION IN A CHANGING CITY1
In the brutal apartheid years, our educational initiatives galvanised a public-
spiritedness that saw the emergence of viable Islamic communities and educational 
institutions all over the Cape Flats. 
The post-apartheid city has unleashed enormous destabilising and creative 
energies as people search for appropriate schools, madrasas and educational 
experiences for their children. It is now a fact that most of the city’s children, across 
the class spectrum, are severely affected by what is perceived to be a faltering 
public school system. 
Apartheid education has bequeathed us an enormously uneven legacy and the 
post-apartheid dispensation has failed to produce a unified education system of 
quality. This has had enormous consequences for where our children go to school, 
the educational experiences they have while attending their schools of choice, and 
the implications for family and community functioning. 
Children with educational aspirations move across the city to access their schools 
of choice. This leads to the severance of the crucial link between school-going 
and community living, making children less rooted and less committed to their 
community, neighbourhoods and religious or traditional commitments. This 
phenomenon expresses itself, for example, in the Muslim community by way of the 
burgeoning Muslim private and community school sector in the city, the growth of 
Qur’an memorisation (ḥifẓ) schools and home schooling options. 
People are in search of an elusive good education, which they imagine will serve 
as a moral bulwark against the encroaching secular order and its implied moral 
corruption. While growth in the diversity of schools has been one outcome, we 
seem to struggle to tie schooling to the common socialisation of all of our country’s 
children into a cohesive public culture. Educational arrangements are now 
institutional purveyors of group identity, ethnocentricity, religious parochialism 
and even racism. 
Our madrasa system has also been re-arranged. It is now largely accepted that 
madrasa education no longer plays the strong socialising role that it once did, having 
to compete with the time-consuming activities that our children are involved in 
at their schools, as well as with children’s immersion in information technologies, 
social media and peer associations that stretch across the city, beyond the immediate 
neighbourhood.
In other words, the coordinates of our children’s educational processes have been 
rearranged, often in the absence of an awareness of the precariousness involved in 
these processes. There is now increased anxiety about our children’s educational 
future. We have noticed the creeping unemployment prospects of uneducated young 
people, and we have calculated that getting our children into the right schools is 
1 Published in Al-Mizan, Newsletter of the Claremont Main Road Mosque, ʿİd al-Fitr 
edition, August 2012 / 1433. 2(1): p. 12.
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now one of our most important preoccupations. We invest large sums of money in 
school fees, extramural activities and tutorial support. We travel long distances to 
get our children to school, sports practice, matches and cultural events in the hope 
of providing them with a positional advantage, entry to the right university, and 
middle-class jobs.
Most of this is done on credit, loan and onerous debt arrangements with educational 
institutions. We have to contend with newer and harsher levels of survival and 
adaptation as the impact of multiple economic crises kick in and unemployment 
rises. We now live our lives in a context of rising domestic poverty and unstable 
domestic arrangements. 
Life is now experienced on the basis of generalised anxiety, greater worry and stress, 
amid increased levels of material deprivation. Our children exercise their educational 
aspirations in a harsh material world with great expectations and precariousness, in 
the hope of accessing a successful life. 
And we struggle as a community to engage in civic-minded conversations about 
common productive living. Absent from our educational discourses are deliberations 
about socially just lifestyles, anti-racist and anti-sexist practices, and environmental 
justice. There are very few spaces for meaningful deliberation about Islamically 
prescribed values of neighbourliness and respect for diversity. And, because of 
increasing individualism and the striving to enter middle-class lifestyles, we have 
not been responding productively as a Muslim community to the poverty that besets 
our city. 
Where do we cultivate the necessary values and dispositions for a pro-poor 
sensibility, anti-racist and anti-sexist living, and a commitment to sustainable 
futures, if not in our schools, our mosques and madrasas? It seems then that we 
are now challenged to redirect our intellectual energies away from an ethnocentric 
focus on our individual preoccupations, or a narrow focus on our selves or exclusive 
group preservation. 
We do not have to succumb to the often elusive scramble for a middle-class lifestyle, 
at the expense of greater concern for the wellbeing of all. We now have to develop an 
intellectual and educational platform that will mitigate some of the negative features 
of our atomistic, ego-driven lifestyles. 
More importantly, we have to ignite a conversation about ethical living in this city, 
and what better place to start than in respect of our educational endeavours. We have 
to force a more responsive conversation about the nature of our ethical responses, in 
our mosques, public media and educational institutions. 
At the family and personal level, we have to establish productive family routines 
and conversations about productive living. At the madrasa level, it would mean 
augmenting and supplementing our rote-learning pedagogies with critical, 
interactive ones. Children have to cultivate the ability to interpret and adapt to the 
challenges of contemporary times. 
This is not a time for anti-intellectualism or a retreat into intellectual laziness. 
Countering individualism and ego-driven behaviour can only be done by cultivating 
a responsive intellectual orientation that addresses the complexity of our times.
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10. MUSLIM ELITES, THE ʿULAMĀ AND AMBIGUOUS 
ACCOMMODATION IN DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA1
In March 2009 I wrote a paper based on a presentation at IPSA in which I called 
for a politics of critique and critical dialogue among Muslims in South Africa (see 
Chapter 8 in this book). I responded to what I described as the easy accommodation 
to the prevailing political situation that was established by dominant Muslim 
groupings in democratic South Africa. I decried the lack of critical internal dialogue.
The paper elicited some interesting responses. Prof. Farid Esack and I eventually 
produced a book which included responses to my paper by a range of social actors 
in the Muslim community.
The call for a debate on a critical attitude to current-day politics fell on fertile ground. 
There was much to question about the direction of our democratic politics, and the 
uneven and difficult terrains of social justice, specifically how our government’s 
politics seemed to compromise on social justice commitments.
My 2009 paper seemed to find resonance in calling for a politics of challenge 
instead of acquiescence and simple acceptance among Muslims. A politics of 
acquiescence often manifested in the service of newly aligned class interests in the 
Muslim community.
What left me exasperated is what I have now come to understand as my lack of proper 
characterisation of the nature and specific outlines of the politically accommodating 
attitude among Muslims. From the perspective of my then somewhat trenchant but 
fairly simplistic call for ‘speaking truth to power’ the world looked very simple.
There are deeper questions to consider: Why have Muslim publics, by and large, 
come to adopt such an accommodating attitude to our politics? How does one 
understand the make-up of our civic politics?
How and on what conceptual basis do we understand and engage in productive 
processes aimed at a politics of critical challenge informed by social justice?
These are my framing concerns, although I won’t address them directly. Instead, 
I’ll take you through a set of conceptual stances that may enable us to understand 
aspects of Muslim democratic imaginaries in South Africa.
1 This chapter is based on a presentation that I gave at the University of Johannesburg, in 
July 2014. It draws on an article that I co-authored with Prof. Sindre Bangstad, entitled 
‘Cape Muslims and Post-Apartheid Politics’, published in the Journal of Southern African 
Studies, Vol. 36, No.4, 2010. I also drew liberally, and with permission from the author, 
on an unpublished article by Imām al-Ustādh Prof. Ebrahim Moosa entitled ‘Genealogy 
of Muslim Religious Discourse and Constitutional Democracy: The Case of South 
Africa’s Muslim Minority’ (unpublished, 2010).
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Let me start out with a simple set of juxtapositions:
1. In 1882 Abdol Burns (born c.1838), a Muslim leader, told the Cape Town city 
council that if he was forced to choose between the prescriptions of his religion 
and the secular municipal laws of the coloniser, he would submit to the claims 
of his religion. “My religion,” Burns proclaimed, “is superior to the law.” 
2. In 1969 Imam Haron was killed in detention by the South African police. An 
ʿulamā group declared, “If Imam Haron died because of Islam, we stand fully 
by him.” Here the signifier ‘if’ signals this group’s probable lack of support for 
Imam Haron if he had been killed because of politics.
3. On 25 June 2008 Mawlānā Ighsaan Hendricks (1964-2018), the President of the 
largest and most influential ʿulamā organisation in South Africa, the Muslim 
Judicial Council (MJC), asserted after a meeting with the African National 
Congress’s President, Jacob Zuma, that “MJC members would welcome Zuma 
as president of our country”.
These three statements are varied expressions of one theme, i.e. the relationship 
between religious conscience and secular political arrangements. The first two 
portend some kind of separation between religion and politics, while the third seems 
to collapse religious conscientiousness into political support. Here we see conscience 
juxtaposed or intertwined with personal law or secular constitutionalism.
Notre Dame University Professor of Islam, Ebrahim Moosa, suggests that while 
conscience does have a place within a constitutional order, there are always concerns 
that the arbitrary exercise of conscientiousness could undermine the rule of law. 
The rule of law, in turn, requires strong enforcement measures. In the context of 
the outbreak of a smallpox epidemic, the colonial authorities wanted to pursue a 
policy of universal vaccination, which Burns rejected from a purported religious 
perspective. He concocted the view that ‘vaccination was against the sharia’.
While we can only speculate as to Burns’s motives, Moosa’s analysis inspires 
one to ask several questions, such as: Was Burns’s statement emblematic of the 
incommensurability of competing norms where secular norms are pitted against 
religious norms? Would he have opposed the municipal law with a similar vehemence 
if it were derived from the sharia? Is it wise for government to force citizens to make 
a choice between their religious values and their civic commitments?
Burns raised the central question in matters of constitutionalism: What are the 
limits of the authority and powers of the government? 
What I want to point out is that Burns’s position was not a mere rejection of 
constitutionalism or the secular colonial dispensation. It can be read more as a 
specific articulation and deployment of the dance between religious conscience and 
secular law.
After all, very soon after he led a mini-rebellion – the so-called cemetery uprisings 
in the 1880s – for which he was jailed, he attempted to run, unsuccessfully, for 
municipal elections on the basis of his newly acquired acclaim.
Similarly, the mainstream’s reaction to Imam Haron’s death was an expression of 
the depth of political apathy and fear that prevailed among Cape Muslims and their 
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leadership as much as it was a rejection of Haron’s politics or the need to guard 
against the conflation of religion and politics.
The current MJC president’s support for Zuma represents a drift across the religion-
politics line, i.e. the discursive line between religion and politics that was drawn in 
the sand during the apartheid years. 
This line always seemed to exist. During apartheid, the dividing line was maintained 
as a means of justifying some kind of accommodation of the apartheid state.
This did not mean that this line was not crossed in all sorts of ways. An example of 
such a crossing was the collaboration by some Cape Town shaykhs with apartheid 
Coloured Affairs arrangements. 
In 2008, though, Mawlānā Hendricks crossed the line emphatically. In so doing, 
the leader of a religious body which had more or less consistently defined itself as 
apolitical and concerned largely with religious matters throughout the apartheid 
period seemed to indicate that the MJC would tie its flag to the ANC mast – even if 
its own members and Muslim constituencies in the Western Cape remained sharply 
divided over such a stance. 
Hendricks’s stance, however, was not met with the same vehemence as the outcry 
that met then MJC president Shaykh Nazeem Mohamed’s (d. 2000) momentary 
flirtation with the United Democratic Front in the 1980s.
What is therefore clear is that certain Muslim actors subtly or overtly aspired to 
acknowledge notions of constitutionalism by crafting a distinct political tradition: 
think of Ahmad Effendi, who unsuccessfully tried to run for the colonial parliament 
in the 1890s; Abdullah Abdurahman (1872-1940), the leader of the African People’s 
Organisation and renowned Cape Town city councillor between 1910 and 1940; 
Imam Achmad Cassiem, the Qibla leader, who recently became a city councillor 
despite his earlier rejection of secular democratic participation; and Ebrahim Rasool, 
the former Western Cape Premier, who has been a leading political interlocutor for 
Muslim political participation in a secular democracy.
My account is aimed at showing how Muslims come to terms with the intersection 
of religion, law, identity and modern social realities in complex ways.
It is a story of how Muslims take on board ideas such as the rule of law, engaging 
with modern notions of equality and democracy in order to realign these ideas with 
their views of the sharia (see Moosa 2010).
My examples show this: Abdol Burns's religious and political discourses were 
shaped in the context of colonial Cape Town and the formation of nascent Muslim 
communities in colonial space; and the reaction to Imām Haron’s radical politics 
was shaped by the political accommodations and quiescence of Muslims generally 
during the apartheid years.
The ʿulamā bodies of South Africa were reluctant to criticise the system of racial 
discrimination because their theology preferred stability and conformity, instead of 
agitation or revolution. Criticism and resistance came from younger generations of 
students and youths and some religiously trained ʿulamā.
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These younger Muslims managed to convince some ʿulamā to address racial 
discrimination and political disenfranchisement, but on the whole one could say 
that the mainstream ʿulamā groups were primarily concerned with their class and 
ethnic interests.
From evidence gleaned from other international contexts, it seems that Muslim 
minorities have always been mainly concerned with finding some form of 
accommodation with the hegemonic or dominant interests.
So, it seems as if my normative political position – that is, to understand how 
Muslims can play a much more critical role in the transformation of their own 
internal traditions as well as challenging the prevailing corrosive politics of the 
day – is politically untenable. And a resistance politics and internal reform remain 
historically unimagined, save for some marginal attempts at critical reforms.
Mawlānā Hendricks’s open support for President Zuma in 2008 should be understood 
in the light of a complex set of discourses that informed and constituted the political 
and discursive field of the MJC in the post-1994 period.
I would say that Muslim subjectivity – how Muslims go about establishing their 
discursive responses in a modern secular context – is fashioned out of active and 
creative engagement with the state and the instruments of governance.
According to Moosa (2010), what is palpable is that these encounters among a 
variety of discourses – Islamic and non-Islamic – produce new formations of law, 
self and society.
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11. THE ḤIKMAH (WISDOM) OF ADVOCATE 
THULI MADONSELA, PUBLIC PROTECTOR, 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA1 
SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMITMENTS FASHIONED IN THE CAULDRON OF THE 
ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE
Today is our country’s 20th annual celebration of Human Rights Day. We have 
chosen a secular democratic dispensation as the political path by which we build 
this country into a unified, non-racial, non-sexist dispensation. We have done this 
in fidelity to addressing our country’s legacy of racial exclusion and social closure. 
Our ethical commitments are informed by the ideals of social justice, inclusion and 
transformation.
Steve Biko (1946-1977), Solomon Mahlangu (1956-1979), Neil Aggett (1953-1982), 
Imam Abdullah Haron and many others paid the price of martyrdom as the 
ultimate expression of their commitment to justice. They were motivated by a social 
imaginary based on justice and equality for all. It was an imaginary that inspired a 
broad movement across the length and breadth of our country in order to secure our 
country’s democratic foundations. This, we believe, would provide a platform for 
achieving human dignity and equality for all.
While apartheid intended to block off human life through racial exclusion, we were 
able to establish flourishing counter-commitments. People, young and old, of all faith 
and ideological persuasions, committed themselves to social justice. We refused to 
be cowered by the limitations that apartheid imposed on our minds, social practices 
and ethical commitments. 
Muslim participation in the struggle was galvanised by the qur’anic injunction in 
Ṣūrah al-Qaṣaṣ (The narration), where Allah (SWT) declares: 
And We wished to be gracious to those who were being oppressed in the 
land, to make them leaders (in faith) and make them heirs (Q. 28:V5).
The commitments we established during the anti-apartheid years were informed by 
a radical view of change meant to create the social conditions for human flourishing, 
especially for the most downtrodden. Our democratic commitments were meant to 
unleash our human ingenuity and creativity to redress the devastation of apartheid.
THE MESSINESS OF DEMOCRACY
Over the last 20 years, the messiness associated with our country’s commitment to a 
democratic dispensation has been surprising and unexpected. The idea of achieving 
1 Jumuʿah khuṭbah – Claremont Main Road Masjid, Human Rights Day, 21 March 2014.
50
The Ḥikmah (wisdom) of Advocate Thuli Madonsela
an egalitarian society as something inevitable and easily attained simply because we 
lived by certain high-sounding ideological commitments was very quickly dispelled.
We were brought to the realisation that human rights are a deeply contested terrain. 
For example, in the Muslim community we still have not, and probably will not in the 
foreseeable future, achieve recognition for Muslim Family Law under a democratic 
dispensation. Contestation within the Muslim community meant that we could not 
find a human rights basis to resolve this matter. Women and children have to endure 
the worst consequences of an inequitable family law dispensation that is loosely 
regulated in our communities. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was an example of a productive political 
resolution of this country’s striving for reconciliation and truth. But it has struggled 
to deal adequately with demands by victims for proper recompense. Our country 
has had to address demands for social transformation at the very same time that 
reductive economic arrangements worldwide have impacted on the ability of our 
state to deliver on its social mandate. Trying to ride the tiger of neoliberal capitalism, 
the macro-economic choices that this country made had a fundamentally reductive 
impact on our ability to undo the legacy of apartheid.
The consequence is nevertheless a remarkable, yet uneven, set of developmental 
achievements. We achieved full educational access, but we are struggling to achieve 
a quality schooling system. We built houses and provided sanitation, but did not 
secure widespread sustainable living conditions for our country’s poor. 
Black economic empowerment has seen the emergence of a black business class and 
a burgeoning middle class who are disconnected geographically and materially 
from their places of origin. 
We witnessed an increase in violence against women, children and the elderly. Our 
criminal justice system struggles to function optimally, and our policing services are 
unable to maintain competence and capacity.
In this light, the middle classes have increasingly exercised private options: private 
and ex-Model C schooling, private health care, and private security services. The 
overwhelming majority of working-class people have to access public options that 
provide services of variable quality.
There is an exemplary story to tell about the ability of rights-based social movements 
such as the Aids activist group, Treatment Action Campaign; the shack dwellers 
movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo; and the now disestablished HIV activist group, 
Positive Muslims, to pressure government and communities to become responsive 
to specific social delivery issues.
This is the uneven state of our country’s democracy within which we have to 
find our human agency, and our individual and collective voices. This is where 
the Claremont Main Road Masjid (CMRM), with its range of social welfare and 
development activities, education and literacy campaigns, and interfaith work, 
among other things, has been exemplary. The mosque is playing a leading role as a 
Muslim institution in the city. It has moved way beyond the ceremonial, recitation 
and pietistic culture that has come to dominate Muslim practice in Cape Town. 
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This culture seemed to have turned inward, to an exclusive focus on the individual 
and communal ‘self,’ which has prevented the city’s Muslims from making 
productive outward connections to broader social challenges. In contrast, CMRM 
has responded over many decades now to the challenge of connecting its internal 
religious commitments to external commitments to the wider community.
MOVING BEYOND CYNICISM
In response to the chequered and uneven record of delivery during the democratic 
period, we are aware that cynicism comes very easily. Cynicism might even be 
justifiable. We can ill afford to develop political stances that cut us loose from the 
unfolding drama of our country. However, to suggest that we should not adopt a 
cynical attitude towards our civic participation is not to deny that people have real 
grievances and even a sense of dread at the directions our country has taken. It is 
understandable that many have lost hope in our ability to live in a spirit of devotion 
to progressive and productive commitments.
I would venture to say that the uneven development legacy of the past twenty years 
is not the main cause of our despair. But it is a contributing factor. I think there 
is understanding of our country’s halting development orientations in the face of 
a legacy of historical underdevelopment and the difficulty of having to provide 
infrastructure for all our people. 
The despair and disappointment, however, are the outcome of observing what has 
begun to amount to a culture of corruption in our society, and most importantly in 
government, the bureaucracy and in the business community where many of the 
drivers of corruption originate. 
These are the very instruments by which our society is meant to deliver on its 
transformation objectives. Corruption in government and the public and private 
sectors are deeply troubling and unjust. 
There are many hardworking governmental officials and bureaucrats who do 
important work under difficult conditions. But, as Minister Ebrahim Patel explained 
in a khuṭbah at this mosque about 15 months ago: 
If we allow corruption to become endemic, affecting day-to-day conduct 
of the business of the state, we create a dysfunctional system in which 
the state no longer serves the interests of the people, but is simply a 
means to the accumulation of wealth by a few.
There is now precisely a generalised sense, correct or not, that the depth of 
corruption in the public sector is endemic and has begun to eat away at the fabric of 
our constitutional democracy.
Disappointment and cynicism have emerged in the light of the realisation that 
our capacity to deliver basic human rights is being compromised by corruption. 
This view has led Imam Rashied Omar, in an ʿĪd khuṭbah in 2012, to exhort that, 
“We can no longer remain mute in the face of endemic corruption. Our silence and 
indifference render us accomplices in the crime of corruption. We need to muster the 
courage to speak out unequivocally and in unison against the growing corruption 
trend in South Africa”.
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Imam Rashied is correct; Perhaps we have become mute, voiceless, devoid of agency 
to act, as he suggests, in the face of corruption. Perhaps we have become indifferent, 
fearful, lazy or too comfortable.
THE ḤIKMAH OF ADVOCATE THULI MADONSELA
I want to suggest that we have recently seen a moral beacon shining brightly in the 
darkness that accompanies our apathy and indifference.
I am reminded of the ḥadīth (saying of Prophet Muhammad) in which Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) was reported to have said: “Wisdom is the lost 
property of the believer. Wherever believers find such wisdom they are most 
deserving of it” (narrated by al-Tirmidhī).
This ḥikmah (wisdom) has presented itself in the person of Advocate Thuli 
Madonsela and the office of the Public Protector. My view is that we would do well 
as a community and nation to embrace the ḥikmah of the Public Protector.
The office of Public Protector is a constitutionally provided Chapter 9 institution 
charged with the mission of investigating corruption in government and the 
public sphere. 
Our Constitutional architects deemed it vital for this institution to keep government 
in check on the assumption that, when bureaucrats and government officials 
encounter large sums of money in the daily execution of their duties, they would 
be tempted. 
Corruption (fasād), bribery (rishwah) and nepotism (wasṭah) are common occurrences 
in and around governments the world over.
In 2013 the Public Protector received 37 770 charges of corruption in the public 
service. This is astonishing, especially since we only get to hear about the high profile 
cases. What is even more astounding is that the Public Protector’s Office was able to 
finalise 22 400 (60%) of its cases during 2013, with a budget of a meagre R200 million.
Clearly, this is a case where we as civil society have to fight to have this Office 
strengthened on the basis that our country must be in a position to more effectively 
address the increase in corruption. 
Increasing the Office’s effectiveness is in our country’s best interest – in Fiqh (legal 
jurisprudential) terms this is regarded as a maslaḥah (in service of the public interest).
Under enormous stress created by delays and political stonewalling, insults and 
abuse, the Office of the Public Protector was able to clearly and without drama or 
fanfare lift the lid on corruption, irregular tendering, overspending and the general 
abuse of public money to fund, for example, opulence at the President’s Nkandla 
residence. Based on painstaking work over a four-year period, her Office implicated 
ministers, bureaucrats, contractors and the President himself.
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The Public Protector’s work and findings are a ḥikmah worth embracing. Allah, the 
sublime, explains in Ṣūrah al-Baqarah (The cow):
When they are told; ‘Do not spread corruption in the land’, they 
respond by saying; ‘We are true social reformers’. But in reality they are 
purveyors of corruption though they realise it not (Q. 2:V11 and V12).
Governments are meant to be the political vehicle for bringing about social reform. 
However, when (as has happened in the Nkandla case) governance is used as a ruse 
for fraudulent spending of taxpayers money, then a great fasād or ethical misconduct 
has been committed.
The Public Protector’s wisdom is a shining light. She and her Office are inspirational. 
They have shown the way back to a politics tied to ethical conduct. Her example is 
an inspiration to us all, an uswatun ḥasanah (a good example). 
I agree with the Institute for Security Studies, which points out that “The Public 
Protector’s investigation into excessive spending on Nkandla has been an important 
moment in South Africa’s constitutional democracy. It sends a clear signal that 
where there are allegations of impropriety in public administration, all individuals – 
regardless of political or socio-economic standing – will be investigated. The purpose 
is to ensure that every endeavour will be made to protect the interest of the public”.
We should be galvanised to recommit ourselves to ethical conduct in our relations 
and transactions, whether big or small, in our workplaces, our business transactions, 
and the conduct of our families.
We should support efforts in the legal/constitutional realm to give the Public 
Protector’s Office more teeth so that the consequences of malfeasance are more 
clearly defined.
We should clamour for a legal provision to prevent a sitting President from 
determining action in cases in which he or she is implicated.
And we should form part of a lobby to advocate for the expansion of the budget of 
the Public Protector’s Office. Democracy can only be secured if we drastically reduce 
the levels of endemic poverty in our country. This Office has a crucial role to play in 
this endeavour.
It is in actively securing our democracy against corruption that we are able to provide 
a bulwark against indifference and cynicism.
Such activity would lay the basis for reclaiming our country’s political imaginary 
from those who are abusing our democracy. We have to boldly declare that this 
abuse will not happen in our name. 
It is to a politics of engaged democratic citizenship in service of social justice to 
which we recommit ourselves on this 20th anniversary of Human Rights Day. 
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12. DISCOVERING THE PURPOSE OF RAMAḌĀN IN 
THE TIME OF LOAD SHEDDING1
Time is a powerful conceptual organiser in Islamic discourse. The Qur’an commands 
believers to establish concrete righteous practices to give time a productive quality.
I suggest in this chapter that the time we are currently living in is largely out of joint; 
in other words, we are living in a time of disorientation, which the Qur’an refers to 
as a state of khusr (a state of loss or flight – Q. 94:V1). 
LOAD SHEDDING AS TIME OUT OF JOINT
This time out of joint is characterised by people struggling to survive amid precarious 
economic infrastructure, collapsed labour markets and crumbling social welfare 
systems. 
The majority of our country’s poor live from hand to mouth. We see people 
increasingly trying to make their livelihoods in the informal, illicit and service 
sectors of our society. Few people have decent jobs with decent wages, medical and 
pension benefits. Lifestyles are thus precarious and unstable. 
This situation manifests itself in increases in disease, ill health and early mortality. 
Single-parent families and rates of divorce are skyrocketing. An increase in 
the number of children growing up in broken homes is one tragic outcome of 
this situation.
It is clear that load shedding has exacerbated this situation. It has, for example, 
impacted quite dramatically on the sensate experiences of fasting Muslims. Load 
shedding has changed how and when we prepare our food and organise our daily 
ritual practice schedules. 
Our bodily experience of this year’s fast has been affected, for the worse, forcing us 
to make adaptations to the way we experience our days of ʿibādah (acts of worship). 
In other words, figuratively speaking, as a result of the impact of load shedding, 
fasting has come to ‘taste’ different. 
My aunt in Mitchells Plain spoke of having to get used to the taste of cold soup and 
daltjies, but quickly adds that “it’s Allah’s will and we learn to ṣabr (persevere)”. Her 
son is less sanguine, murmuring about the horror of a “pwaasa sonder ligte” (fasting 
without electricity). 
On the other hand, the Imam in Parkwood speaks about the beauty of sharing a 
flask of boiling water with his Muslim neighbour for his tea at ifṭār (break of fast). 
And we are encouraged by the muṣallī (the mosque congregant) who cautions us to 
appreciate what we have compared to those less fortunate. 
1 First published in Muslim Views, Ramaḍān, 2015.
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Clearly people are not paralysed by their poverty or hardships. They draw on the 
best of their cultural and religious traditions, community value systems and human 
connectedness to invent new modes of support, survival and getting by.
‘PROPER RECOGNITION’ AS A BASIS FOR NON-JUDGEMENTAL 
MORAL ENGAGEMENT
Times like these require us to step back and allow the ‘ground’ of people’s harsh 
lives and experiences to speak for themselves. Political brokers, religious leaders 
and advice-givers would be forced to listen to the pain and suffering of lives lived 
largely out of sight of formal religious and social institutions. 
If we become properly attuned to the acuteness of people’s struggles and pain, we 
would be able to place ourselves in a position to respond with ethical clarity and 
wise counsel. However, hearing people’s pain is only a necessary first step.
We would hear the stories of people all over Cape Town relating their struggles for 
subsistence and making productive lives. We would understand how the demands 
of bare survival are now wired into people’s material and mental make-up as they 
struggle to make ends meet. 
We would get to understand how hunger and desperation are forcing people to clutch 
at whatever they can to keep body and soul together. We would also understand 
why people become involved in the illicit economy, through the sale of illegal goods, 
drug running and the use of their bodies to make money. 
Proper recognition of one’s role in mitigating these circumstances requires 
abandoning the knee-jerk response to moralise about such choices or to judge people 
who are desperate. Instead, a response of non-judgmentalism would grant us some 
legitimacy to offer counsel and support. 
The question arises as to the meaning of the core lesson of fasting, that is, how we 
come to understand our connections and commitments to the confounding poverty 
that characterises our lives and those of the majority in the city? 
We would try to understand the small (and large) precarious adaptations that 
Muslims and other people are now making in the light of having to live in conditions 
of poverty and collapsing social structures. 
What I believe ought to emerge is political and religious ethics that could speak with 
clarity to our human drama. My deeper issue is with the inability of our political and 
religious discourses to understand and properly connect with this situation, in effect 
offering very little by way of direction for ethical living in complex times. 
The reorganising impact of load shedding on our sensate experiences – how people 
experience their daily struggles on their bodies and in their souls – should cause us 
to pause for reflection. The struggles of ordinary folk to survive poor schooling, food 
insecurity and rising unemployment and crime should force us to establish practices 
that ameliorate the plight of struggling folk.
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THE SYSTEMIC PROVENANCE OF SOCIAL SUFFERING
These personal experiences, however, have a broader, more systemic, provenance 
which we ignore at our peril. Load shedding, for example, represents larger fault 
lines in our body politic. 
It is clear that our political system has been deeply affected by neoliberal economic 
principles. The current government, at all levels, has demonstrably favoured a 
politics of withdrawal from its commitments to the social welfare and development 
needs of the citizenry. 
The nightmare of Marikana, the corruption of Nkandla and flouting of the Al-Bashir 
arrest warrant are clear signs of our politicians’ unwillingness to legitimise their 
politics through socially just responses to the plight of the poor. 
They are also incontrovertible proof of the current government’s lack of commitment 
to securing a political platform to help poor people mitigate their poverty, let alone 
providing a platform for promoting social cohesion and stability. 
Our neoliberal politics does not just shape public policy. It literally changes us 
and the world around us in a very physical way. The narratives inherent in this 
doctrine shape the way we move and care and look and feel. The consequences of 
neoliberalism are now being written on the bodies of us ordinary people. Depression, 
anxiety, eating disorders and social isolation are all symptoms of a society crippled 
from the inside out by declining standards of living. 
These, I believe, are the terms and terrain on which religious, civic and other 
institutions now have to engage their flock. Struggling people do not require dollops 
of rhetoric and posturing. They require full recognition of their worthwhile lives as 
they figure out ways of adapting, surviving and even flourishing. 
SHARED LOCALISED SOCIAL PRACTICES TO AMELIORATE 
LIVELIHOODS ‘IN JOINT’
Muslims who come to full recognition, through their reflexive practices in Ramaḍān, 
will commit themselves to activities in their own communities by co-living, sharing 
and struggle. Our life’s activities will be time/space-bound and ‘in joint’, in other 
words always productive and shared.
One such example could be a targeted campaign to arrest the early dropping 
out of young children from school, a trend that is increasing at an alarming rate 
in townships. As my involvement in one local school community in Cape Town’s 
northern suburbs shows, mitigating school drop-out involves mobilising various 
community structures including mosques, churches, the local counsellor, police 
services and social welfare officers to provide safe educational spaces for children. 
Helping, for example, with the children’s homework, organising sport and having 
them eat something nourishing would persuade children to invest in their learning. 
It also means engaging families to support their children’s education.
And, crucially, local activism should be brought to bear on the school and 
governmental structures. This is based on a politics of making the government 
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responsive to people’s needs. Where Muslims participate in targeted civic 
activity, together with others, they will be able to help leverage a more productive 
governmental response. 
This example of creative local co-producing activities could also apply to efforts 
to obtain a better health and welfare dispensation or more responsive policing in 
neighbourhoods. 
CONCLUSION
The time of load shedding is a time out of joint. It signifies the gap between people’s 
everyday struggles to survive in poor contexts and their collapsing social and 
economic infrastructure. The survivalist responses of ordinary folk have stepped 
into the breach, mitigating the worst consequences of impoverished livelihoods.
Ramaḍān places an obligation on Muslims to develop a full connectedness to 
boosting the quality and nature of our lives in our communities. We would have to 
recognise the vitality and depth of the survivalist practices of people who struggle 
to make ends meet. 
Recognition and connectedness, however, require a further step; we have to involve 
ourselves in local practices to secure better living arrangements, through productive 
practices (al-aʿmāl al-ṣālihāt), in community and through co-creation. Such practices 
would stand a chance of fashioning opportunities for advancing healthy living 
conditions in our neighbourhoods. As the Qur’an instructs, the productive generation 
of viable times in joint now depends on ordinary people’s local practices aimed at 
securing sustainable livelihoods.
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13. CULTIVATING RECOGNITION TO ADVANCE 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE1 
This khuṭbah focuses on environmental justice and sustainability in the light of the 
threat of climate change, global warming, environmental pollution and ecological 
imbalances all over the world. 
These are affecting quality of life, threatening to destroy the very material basis 
necessary for human existence. We see this in rising temperatures, melting ice caps 
and rising sea levels. 
Humans are being affected on a daily basis with an increase in diseases related to air 
pollution, and dwindling food resources as a result of desertification of agricultural 
land and marine resources that are becoming rapidly exhausted. 
This issue now confronts us as Muslims as a matter of urgency. We have to persuade 
ourselves of the need for an appropriate response, based on proper recognition of 
the nature, depth and extent of the crisis. 
This khuṭbah is an attempt to lay out the terms of such recognition. I start out with an 
admission that such recognition will not come easily, and it is my suggestion that we 
have to confront our ecological fragility at multiple levels. 
No one is apparently going to die spectacularly, immediately and directly as a result 
of global warming. The issue does not seem to conjure enough alarm to get people 
focused. Unlike incurable diseases such as cancer, HIV and Aids, and even certain 
strains of tuberculosis, death by environmental pollution and climate change is 
not imminent. 
This lulls us into complacency, and yet the danger is imminent. The best we can 
say is that our grandchildren will have to survive in the light of earth’s diminishing 
resources in 50 years, all 7 billion or more of them, and that will lead to a scramble 
for resources that will affect the quality of life for all of the world’s people. People 
like Al Gore make movies such as An Inconvenient Truth to scare us out of our 
complacency, and activists warn us about the impending disaster. 
THE NEED FOR URGENCY
But we seem not to understand the urgency, nor are we preparing to radically adapt 
our lifestyles to mitigate and address the sustainability of the dunyā’ (this world). My 
suggestion is thus that most people, communities and nations suffer from a failure to 
recognise the impending ecological disaster coursing its way into the very fabric of 
our lives, affecting how we now live and die, the quality of our existence, the scarcity 
of resources for human survival, where droughts and floods affect our livelihoods, 
causing famine, forced human migration and wars. 
1 Khuṭbah, Claremont Main Road Mosque, October 2015.
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What then should an Islamic response be in the face of such lack of recognition; 
what should the terms of our recognition be, and how should we make productive 
use of our Allah-given human ingenuity in responding to the many dimensions of 
this crisis?
In other words, once we have recognised the depth and extent of the crisis, how do we 
get going in addressing this crisis? We have to consider how we establish productive 
practices (ʿamāl al-ṣālihāt), how we engage in Allah’s call for us as humans to be his 
khalīfatullāhi fi`l- arḍ, God’s vicegerents or human agents for good on this earth.
THINGS ARE OUT OF PLACE (ẒULM)
With regard to recognition (ma’rifah), it is clear that something about our existence 
is profoundly ‘out of place’. Human practices in the pursuit of economic gain have 
over the last 200 years been based on the unbridled exploitation of Allah’s earth. 
Humans seemed to have behaved as if there is to be no ḥisāb (accountability), no 
reckoning with the impact of our behaviour, without any awareness that we will run 
out of material resources, or undermine ecological sustainability.
Let me illustrate this with an example: almost the whole of the Middle East has been 
totally immersed in its oil industry for over a hundred years. These countries’ entire 
livelihoods, their economic development, their educational, social and cultural 
modernisation have been founded on the relentless exploitation of a natural non-
renewable resource, a fossil fuel, the production of which gave these countries 
untold riches and prosperity. But it has also created the world’s dirtiest air per 
square kilometre, leading to many diseases and health challenges.
What is not in place is responsible and forward-looking economic development 
sensitive to the surrounding ecological systems, clean air technologies, etc. These 
countries have only now awoken to the impending disaster on their shores, in their 
water and on their agricultural lands. Food security is a major challenge
Multinational petroleum companies have been deeply complicit in this degeneration. 
We remind ourselves of the role of BP in the Mexican Gulf last year when an oil 
leak on a rig led to a massive ecological disaster, not to speak of the horror that 
ordinary people in countries such as Nigeria and the Niger Delta undergo when oil 
companies, without a conscience, despoil the environment in the search for oil, or 
‘black gold’ as it has become known.
ẒULM AS HUMAN MALPRACTICE
The Qur’an uses the term ‘ẓulm’ or darkness to refer to such human malpractices. This 
term in exegetical terms means ‘to put something out of its rightful place’. ‘Ẓulm’ is 
a reference to the path trodden by people who deny the truth (ḥaq) of Allah, and his 
creation, who through their daily behaviour violate Allah’s mīzān (or balance). ‘Ẓulm’ 
is a qur'anic concept that captures human beings’ complicity in violating Allah’s 
creation, of putting the natural order of things out of alignment, of upsetting the 
balance. 
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Such ẓulm, or transgression, will incur Allah’s wrath. By insisting on transgressive 
practices, we jeopardise our long-term survival, as in the case of oil pollution 
for economic gain and material wealth, oblivious to the deleterious impact on 
the environment. 
I would like to suggest that such transgressive human actions are governed by a 
desire for immediate gratification and not a taqwa (God consciousness) based on the 
long view, the recognition that our behaviour has consequences beyond our lifespan. 
An environmentally aware consciousness, taqwa, now requires that we cultivate the 
ability to recognise the impact of our behaviour well into the future and cultivate 
the necessary capacity to adjust our behaviour accordingly. In Ṣūrah al-Zumar (The 
Groups) [Q. 39:V53], Allah, the Sublime, offers one of the key ways of laying the 
basis for responding to this human-induced ‘ẓulm’. Allah declares: 
Say: “O my Servants who have transgressed against their souls! Despair 
not of the Mercy of Allah. For Allah forgives all sins: for He is Oft-
Forgiving, Most Merciful”. 
The emphasis in this āyāt (verse) is on recognising one’s ‘transgression against 
one’s own soul, against one’s own being, one’s own existence’, whether this is a 
recognition of one’s transgression against one’s body when one overeats, breaking 
traffic rules and putting oneself in danger, recognising one’s transgression against 
one’s partner, children, fellow workers, or neighbour for not honouring them as 
people with their own rights over us. 
We transgress our own nafs (soul) in our consumption choices, in acquiring fuel-
guzzling cars, overspending on weekly groceries, and the failure to cut down on our 
electricity use. More broadly, as a nation, we transgress our nafs when we do not 
use cheaper, cleaner energy sources, when we do not become a nation that recycles 
garbage, or conserves water, or promotes hardy indigenous plants that do not need 
much water. 
At the smaller, individual and communal level, we transgress against our nafs 
when we provide too much food at our gaajats (liturgies), our seventh, fortieth and 
hundredth commemorations of our dead. We transgress when we load our food 
with fat and sugar, and when we are unable to change our diets to mitigate the 
common diseases among us such as diabetes, high cholesterol levels and heart 
failure. And we transgress, committing what the fiqh (legal jurisprudence) calls a 
‘makrūh’ (an abominable and disapproved act) when we are unable to address our 
addiction to smoking, causing illnesses such as lung cancer and emphysema, which 
are an enormous drain on our health system.
REDRESSING OUR TRANSGRESSIONS
The Qur’an’s view is that it is only when we redress these transgressions, big and 
small, that we place ourselves in the position to obtain Allah’s raḥmah, his infinite 
mercy. We then place ourselves in a position to address our myriad environmental 
and ecological challenges to restore the balance through our human conduct, based 
on environmentally aware taqwa or God consciousness.
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We would then be able to restore the natural balance established by Allah, who 
declares in the holy Qur’an in Ṣūrah Āli-ʿImrān (The Family of Imran, Q. 3:V190-1): 
Behold! in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation 
of night and day – there are indeed Signs for people of understanding 
who celebrate the praises of God, standing, sitting, and lying down on 
their sides, and contemplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens 
and the earth (with the thought): Our Lord! not for nothing have 
You created (all) this! Glory be to You! Grant us salvation from the 
torment of fire.
Let me end off with a comment on the importance of water in Islam, which emphasises 
the importance of a responsible and responsive approach to our environment and 
our contemporary challenges to restore an ecological balance and to establish 
sustainable livelihoods. A beautiful ḥadīth (saying of Prophet Muhammad) recorded 
in Ibn Mājah, emphasises this environmental consciousness: Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him) passed by his companion Sa`ad, who was performing his wuḍū 
(ablutions) and said: 
“What is this wastage, O Sa`ad?”
“Is there wastage even in (such a sacred act as) washing for prayer?” 
asked Sa`ad; and he (the Prophet) said, “Yes, even if you are by a 
flowing river!” 
In a few words Muhammad (peace be upon him) provided a fundamental principle 
regarding environmental sustainability. That is, even if we supposedly have 
abundance, we are forbidden to waste resources. Water, of course plays an enormous 
part in human existence. The Qur’an affirms this when Allah declares in Sūrah al-
Anbiyā’ (The Prophets, Q. 21:V30): “We made from water every living thing”.
Water is so much more important in an arid desert context, where the early Muslims 
under Muhammad (peace be upon him) made their way in establishing Allah’s 
tawhīd (unicity). The early Muslims must have had an acute understanding of the 
limitations of their geography, the impact of desert conditions and the scarcity of 
water on their functioning as a community. No wonder that control over an oasis or 
well was such an important consideration. 
The early Muslims’ survival in the face of human, material and ecological adversity 
is a source of deep inspiration for present-day sustainable living. It provides a 
principled platform to guide us in our 21st-century quest for sustainable living in the 
light of our ecological challenges in a world fast running out of its ability to sustain 
its growing population. 
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14. LIVING IN FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION1
During the 1990s we as a country chose to regulate state governance, institution 
building and human relationships (muʿāmalāt) on the basis of a constitutional 
democracy. We succeeded in creating a constitutional platform, however imperfect, 
as a means of working toward becoming a common nation and shared citizenship. 
People from diverse backgrounds reconciled themselves to living in an inclusive and 
just society. 
We struggled as a nation with the deep and ugly divisions of the past. We committed 
ourselves as citizens to working towards a future based on equality, fairness and the 
rule of law. This was founded on a promise that a path of reconciliation (ṣulḥ) would 
secure the inclusion of all in our democratic polity and the rebuilding of our country. 
In Islamic terms, this position is based on the much quoted ḥadīth in which prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) was reported to have explained that a Muslim’s way 
of life is based on sound and productive human relations. Establishing productive 
human relations and practices in search of the common good is the defining feature 
of becoming fully human. 
Our constitutional democratic commitments were based on a promissory note: that 
democracy would provide us with the tools and material foundations to struggle 
for, and secure, a better life for all. Our patient commitment (ṣabr) to a fair and 
inclusive country was based on the realisation that change would be complex and 
difficult. 
The Constitution provided a basis for optimal inclusion, a place in the sun for 
all. Our constitutional dispensation was acceptable because it was founded on 
the necessity of actively conferring human dignity on the people of this country. 
It passed the qur’anic test of dignity, honour and equal worth as one of the key 
organising principles of Islam. Allah (SWT) declares in Ṣūrah al-Iṣrā (The Night 
Journey, Q. 17:V70):
Now, indeed, We have conferred dignity on the children of Adam, 
and dispersed them over land and sea, provided for them sustenance 
out of the good things of life, and favoured them far above most of 
our Creation.
This āyah (verse) establishes the raison d’être of the Islamic ethos for living worthy 
lives: equality among people irrespective of race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality 
and geographic origin. 
These values were enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution. And, as Muslims, 
we walked with other communities a contested, noisy and complex path towards 
reclaiming our dignity. A consensus emerged among different faith and ideological 
groupings about the rules of the game as laid out in the Constitution: the rule of 
1 Khuṭbah, Claremont Main Road Mosque, 22 April 2016.
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law, a commitment to counter corruption and ensure the equitable provision of 
social services. 
Our democracy allows contestation over the meaning and distribution of rights such 
as the right to housing, education and health. In the public domain we have seen 
protests on the street, strikes in the workplace, and policy contestation in think tanks 
and lobbies, parliament, the media and in the various courts of our land. 
Rights-bearing citizens have been using the instruments of our democracy 
to stake their claim for recognition. Poor policy choices in education, health, 
housing, policing, economic and industrial policy were severely contested. Many 
communities and organisations started organising around social welfare objectives 
such as quality schooling, the extension of grants, housing provision, and health 
systems improvement. 
South Africa is a vibrant, noisy and fractious democracy. And while the provision of 
viable livelihoods has been uneven, citizens at least have some skin in the political 
game. It is the promissory note of our democracy, the ideals of justice and equality, 
that keeps us in this contested political game. 
One lesson has been that powerful people, financially and organisationally, are the 
most visible and their opinions and policy preferences are taken seriously. People 
from older and newer privileged contexts make disproportionate demands on our 
polity and enjoy enormous privilege.
We have also learnt that those who resist, organise and push for their rights, are able 
to leverage responsiveness from the state. Those who do not organise are invisible 
to the political powers that be. They are ignored and continue to suffer the daily 
indignities associated with poverty and inequality.
The promise of our democracy remains wrapped up in the possibility of leveraging 
a type of politics at local, municipal, regional and national level that will render the 
state responsive to the demand for worthwhile livelihoods.
THE PERILS OF INFIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION
Our constitutional democracy is brought into question when our country fails to 
deliver on the promise of a fairer society. A democracy’s legitimacy is only secured 
when a country is able to deliver on people’s legitimate expectations. Defending 
the Constitution is therefore a defence of an inclusive and productive path towards 
securing sustainable livelihoods.
We keep ourselves in the democratic game only to the extent to which we are able to 
concretise the egalitarian vision of our democracy. It is in this light that we have to 
question two of the biggest infractions of our present-day politics: one is the flouting 
of the Constitution by the President in the light of the Nkandla debacle, and the 
other is the capture of the state by family interests.
The Nkandla debacle is part of a steady pattern of corruption and looting of the 
state’s resources over many years. The Nkandla matter brought corruption, 
tenderpreneurship and the impunity of patronage politics into the spotlight. 
Nkandla confirmed government corruption as a pivot of state functioning. 
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The blatant capture of the state by one family follows on from the history of state 
capture by the apartheid state: the state follows the same pattern of an oligarchy 
operating only for the benefit of those who have access to patronage networks. 
The outcome is the same: under apartheid corruption and state capture served as 
a proxy for white advancement. Current patronage politics serve to buttress the 
enrichment of the politically connected nouveau riche. 
In a khutbah that I presented in this mosque in March 2014, I called for embracing 
the Public Protector’s report on the Nkandla renovations in the light of the Head of 
State’s ethical misconduct in spending public funds on the renovations. 
The Public Protector’s findings were a ḥikmah worth embracing. About corruption 
and its purveyors, Allah, the sublime, explains in Sūrah al-Baqarah (The cow, V11 
and V12):
When they are told; ‘Do not spread corruption in the land’, they 
respond by saying; ‘We are true social reformers’. But in reality they 
are purveyors of corruption though they realise it not.
This mosque came out with an unequivocal statement hailing the Public Protector’s 
report, urging “our government to comply with the recommendations of the report” 
(CMRM statement, 23 March 2014).
The Public Protector’s report and recommendations were borne out by the recent 
Constitutional Court’s pronouncement against the President, who chose to 
challenge the ‘implementability’ of her recommendations. The Court ruled that the 
President was in violation of the Constitution when he refused to implement the 
Public Protector’s recommendations to repay a portion of the money for extending 
his home. 
The Court also found the National Assembly, our parliament, in violation of the 
Constitution when it chose to ignore the recommendations. The National Assembly 
erroneously established a subcommittee of parliament to consider the report. 
Similarly, the Minister of Police produced a report stating that the Constitutional 
Court ruling had no legal standing. In other words, instruments of the state – 
parliament, various committees and ministries – were abused in an attempt to 
undermine and invalidate the Public Protector’s recommendations. 
In the process a core constitutional principle was violated, which is the separation 
of powers between government as the executive arm of government policy, on the 
one hand, and the parliament as the legislative arm and overseer of the executive on 
the other. 
Constitutionally, these two arms of state must function independently. Alarmingly, 
this functional independence was violated in defence of the President; parliament 
was used to produce an unconstitutional outcome, i.e. absolving the President of 
guilt. It was left to the third arm of the state, the judiciary, to assert the supremacy of 
the Constitution. The Constitutional Court instructed the President to adhere to the 
stipulation of the Public Protector’s report, in other words, to pay back the money. 
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MU'ĀMALĀT (PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS) AS THE ROAD TO 
OUR HUMAN COMMITMENTS 
While we heaved a collective sigh of relief at the clarity provided by the Constitutional 
Court’s judgement, we must ask where this entire episode leaves our country. We 
have to consider where the impact of corruption, abuse of state resources, and the 
violation of the Constitution leave us as citizens.
There is no denying that people experienced this moment as deeply disorientating. 
Combined with rising crime, violence and fear, people choose to withdraw from the 
public sphere. People understandably tend to become anxious and inward looking 
under such circumstances. When we observe the government acting against the 
country’s interests, we as ordinary citizens opt to defend those closest to ourselves, 
providing for our own families, protecting our children and possessions. In such 
a context broader commitments to good neighbourliness, common courtesy and 
sharing begin to fritter away. People withdraw behind closed doors to protect 
themselves against rampant crime on the streets and the violence in our communities.
When the first citizen of the country is seen as flouting the Constitution, we become 
cynical about the very democracy that we live in. State corruption and patronage are 
read as signs of an uncaring state. And people have been making tenuous livelihoods 
in spite of, or in the absence of, a functioning state. Life is lived in twilight zones 
of poverty, hardship, and single-parent and child-headed households. People have 
to fend for themselves. They establish moral codes by which they figure out what 
is important, who should be respected, how cash is distributed, how relationships 
work, who should go to school or drop out, and who should eat.
It is clear that our chosen democratic path has been rendered ineffectual. State 
corruption and capture are symbolic of the way the democratic path has been 
compromised. And people are not stupid. They figure out very quickly how to step 
into the breach, how to go on with their lives. We as Muslims (and other communities) 
must now ask how we must intervene in this human drama. Going with the flow or 
opting out are not options.
The Prophet’s advice to engage in muʿāmalāt (productive human relations) must take 
centre stage. Inserting exemplary practices (ʿamāl al-ṣālihāt) into the body politic is 
crucial. We must continue to emphasise positive relationships in our workplaces 
and educational institutions. 
Our work colleagues, fellow students and friends are deserving of empathy, respect 
and decency. Advancing their aspirations is as important as being concerned about 
our own.
Getting involved in social welfare-oriented work takes our muʿāmalāt to the next 
level. Spending part of our wealth in the service of others builds fellowship. It also 
alleviates hardship and suffering.
Getting involved in social-justice-oriented work, whether in the delivery of 
better health services or educational opportunities, targets improvement of life 
circumstances. 
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The Prophet’s advice is now more important than ever: social relations are the 
terrain of our commitment to common moral values through our civic activities. 
Our survival as communities depends on our generosity at the very moment when 
our political leaders look the other way. 
The state might have left the game, yet we have no choice but to remain in the game. 
And part of remaining in the game is to claim a space to exercise our commitment to 
our democracy on our own terms.
This means participating in the type of politics that can force governmental 
accountability. We have to bring an accountable and responsive government back 
into the game through an assertion of common values and practices.
Our humanity depends on remaining in the game of human engagement, interaction 
and relationships based on beauty, patience, goodness and virtue. 
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15. FROM RESPONDING TO THE WATER CRISIS TO 
ACTIVELY ADDRESSING POVERTY AND HARDSHIP1
O You who have attained to faith! When the call to prayer is sounded on 
the day of congregation, hasten to the remembrance of God, and leave 
all worldly commerce: this is for your own good, if you but knew it. 
(Sūrah al-Jumuʿah, The Congregation, Q. 62:V9)
This āyah (verse) on the imperative of yawm al-jumuʿah (the day of congregational 
prayer) emphasises the need for us humans to come to rest, engage in personal 
contemplation and congregational prayer.
The jumuʿah is a time of submission to individual spiritual connection to Allah, and 
one’s co-existence with others in this world. The waqṭ (time) of jumuʿah is also a 
momentary pause from the challenges and afflictions of our daily life. 
Jumuʿah is a time when we are at one with Allah and higher moral purposes, where 
we reset or recharge our commitments to goodness and fellowship. This is a time 
when, as the Qur’an explains, the ‘heart is at peace’, as Allah declares in Sūrah al-
Shu`arā (The poets, Q. 26:V89) – “when he will only be happy when he comes before 
Allah with a peaceful heart”.
This is a time when we figure out how to approach Allah with a heart free of evil, 
with a sound heart, not only in the last moments of life, as the Qur’an exhorts in this 
āyah but also when one becomes aligned with life’s moral purposes. 
It is in moments such as our weekly congregational prayer that we are able to 
perceive clearly how we ought to live in the world, what our priorities are, and how 
we have to commit to a productive life in pursuit of peace and tranquillity. These 
moments offer an opportunity to develop and align ourselves with human practices 
that are responsive to eradicating need, difficulty and hardship. 
In this city we have been alerted to this moral purpose in our confrontation with 
one of the worst droughts to hit the city in living memory. Staring a water crisis in 
the face forced us to focus on our bare existence – how to make do without water 
as the most important resource for our survival. At its most basic level the crisis 
confronts us with our personal water consumption for making food, washing and 
even brushing our teeth. 
Water, of course, plays an enormous part in our existence. The Qur’an affirms this 
when Allah declares in Sūrah al-Anbiyā’ (The Prophets, Q. 21:V30): “We made from 
water every living thing”. 
A beautiful ḥadīth recorded in Ibn Mājah, emphasises a heightened water 
consciousness in Islam: It was reported that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon 
1 Khuṭbah, Claremont Main Road Mosque, 24 February 2017.
70
From responding to the water crisis to actively addressing poverty and hardship
him) passed by his companion Sa`ad, who was performing his wudu’ (ablutions), 
and said: 
“What is this wastage, O Sa`ad?” 
“Is there wastage even in (such a sacred act as) washing for prayer?” 
asked Sa`ad; and he (the Prophet) said, “Yes, even if you are by a 
flowing river!” 
In a few words Muhammad (peace be upon him) illustrated a fundamental principle 
regarding water and environmental sustainability, that is, even if we supposedly 
have abundance, we are forbidden to waste resources. 
But we do not have abundance. The water scarcity forced us to respond to this fact 
with urgency. As citizens of the city, we have been making the following simple du`ā 
(supplication): O Allah, send us rain.
The words of this prayer reverberate in our physical bodies, eliciting a response. 
Beseeching Allah for rain has accompanied our adaptation to the urgency of the 
crisis. It is clear that we are using much less water for our daily living. Mosques 
and our other social institutions have begun to limit their water consumption 
considerably, and we have curtailed water use for our ablutions. 
It has recently emerged that many businesses, hotels and industries are not complying 
with the water restrictions, incurring fines instead. If you are an employee in one of 
these non-complying industries, I want to urge you to pressurise those in your work 
environment to comply.
It is nonetheless in the face of adversity associated with the drought that ordinary 
people and communities have come to adapt to the practical imperative for drastic 
water reduction based on a simple and acute sense of moral and practical necessity.
It has in the process brought families, neighbours, religious leaders and other groups 
of people together, and opened us up to the possibility of fellowship and cooperation, 
as encouraged in the Qur’an (Sūrah al-Māʾidah, The Table Spread, Q. 5:V6), where 
Allah exhorts us to “help one another in furthering virtue and God-consciousness, 
and do not help one another in furthering evil and enmity”. 
The lesson here is that cooperation, when addressing a disaster (muṣībah), or in response 
to a need, provides us with a greater chance to redress our circumstances positively. 
The water crisis highlights a larger issue. While we have become alert to the 
centrality of water in our lives, we also have to properly understand and engage the 
human causes of the abnormal weather patterns globally. Climate change and global 
warming are incontrovertible scientifically proven realities. The earth is getting 
warmer at an exponential rate. If we do not change our consumption patterns, 
invest in science to discover and harvest clean energies, oppose nuclear energy and 
fracking, and develop technologies that can replace our reliance on coal and fossil 
fuel, we will destroy the ecological sustainability of this planet.
The sparing and wise use of water in the city ought to spur us towards greater 
awareness of our longer-term ecological sustainability. The poor on this earth and in 
our city will continue to bear the brunt of our ecological destruction. 
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The cooperation (ta`āwun) required to address this crisis will have to take the form 
of working with all human communities, with all our intellectual might and cutting-
edge research. 
We cannot keep on behaving with a short-term consciousness, oblivious to the 
longer-term human-made calamity that threatens our existence on the planet. 
But this requires more than our vigilance in addressing our current cycle of 
periodic droughts. 
This requires us to develop a type of īmān or consciousness, and activism or 
`amāl al-ṣālihāt (righteous deeds) that connect our spiritual commitments to a 
life in service to Allah, to the larger moral purpose of creating the conditions for 
sustainable livelihoods.
Belief in Allah disconnected from a social purpose can so easily lead to an empty and 
narrow religious formalism. Allah warns in Sūrah al-Mā`ūn (the Small Kindnesses) 
about this disconnect, when Allah asks: “Hast though ever considered [the kind of 
person] who gives the lie to all moral law?” (Q. 107:V1).
The appropriate qur’anic response is to connect our personal belief and ʿibādah (acts 
of worship) to the needs of the orphan, the needy and the refugee. 
Our ʿibādah must of necessity be a platform for making broader commitments to the 
earth’s sustainability and our common human survival. 
The Qur’an encourages us to be responsive to large-scale social changes. Allah 
declares in Sūrah al-Baqarah (The cow) (Q. 2:V155):
And most certainly shall We test you by means of danger, and hunger, 
and loss of wealth, of lives and of [labour’s] fruits. But give glad 
tidings unto those who are patient in adversity.
This is a crucial verse. It speaks to a number of major issues that afflict the human 
condition. This emphasis here is on how situations change, sometimes rapidly, and 
how these changes throw our livelihoods completely out of whack, putting our 
very survival as communities and a species under the spotlight. We are required to 
respond to: 
• danger associated with changing weather patterns, crime and violence; 
• hunger associated with poverty and inequality as experienced by more than 
50% of the city’s inhabitants in its townships and growing informal settlements; 
• the changing socio-economic status associated with unemployment, loss of 
income and wealth;
• and the displacement and suffering experienced by refugees when they search 
for a stable life in foreign circumstances. 
Positing these as a test, a trial or a challenge to human survival, Allah (SWT) exhorts 
us to display patience and forbearance in the face of adversity.
Ṣabr, patience in adversity, requires a human commitment that takes us out of our 
comfort zones. What is required in addressing these crises are personal commitment, 
strategic intent and unity in purpose and action. What is not productive is racist and 
xenophobic behaviour, narcissistic politics, protectionism and closing of borders.
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An acutely moral response is founded on a disposition of radical hospitality, the idea 
that we have to sacrifice part of our own comfort to ensure the solace and comfort of 
others. This is not easy, but this is what is now required of us.
We are required to respond. This is a farḍ kifāyah (a collective community 
responsibility), whether we participate in meeting the welfare needs of our 
neighbours, provide blankets and food for displaced refugees who are victims of 
xenophobic attacks, participate in local activism in the areas of social housing in the 
city, support schools to educate their children, provide safe health infrastructure 
for the disabled and psychiatrically afflicted, or organise in the workplace against 
exploitative conditions. 
The Qur’an requires us to develop a wide range of responses to address these 
challenges, and getting involved in one or more of them is now regarded as a 
recommended practice (mustaḥab). Herein lies the glad tidings that Allah promises 
in the āyah (verse) that I mentioned above: the glad tidings that would come to those 
who are patient, active and constructively engaged in radical hospitality towards 
ourselves and others in times of adversity. 
I end by making a plea for focusing on the task at hand, not sideshows, or things 
that will demoralise us. My point of departure is that we have to develop a maturity 
about first principles. The Qur’an requires nothing less. Eradicating poverty, disease 
and hardship is the primary organising frame emphasised in the Qur’an.
Managing our affairs in such a way that we honour our commitment to Allah is 
paramount. We simply have to, as a community, do better to manage our affairs 
in such a way that we do not become distracted. Strife among families, groups and 
communities must be managed in a constructive and productive way. 
We must avoid the temptation of engaging in petty sectarian battles or unnecessary 
destructive discourses that drain away the oxygen we need to focus on poverty 
alleviation and compassionate action. The skirmishes between Ḥanafis and Shāfis, 
open and closed mosques, Sunnis and Shi`as, and Sufis and Wahhabis, arise from a 
simple-minded immaturity. 
These doctrinal or sectarian struggles are borne of a propensity for fitnah (internecine 
strife), with reference to the use of words, language and deeds to deny people the 
right to believe. The early Muslims were the victim of the fitnah that the disbelievers 
visited on them, which led to hostility, expulsion and even death. 
The Qur’an suggests that a condition of fitnah poses a threat to society’s normal order 
in the āyah (Sūrah al-Baqarah, The Cow, Q. 2:V191), “and tumult and oppression 
(fitnah) are worse than killing.” Sectarian skirmishes concentrate on the symptoms of 
difficult situations, not their causes. The requirement is to identify the causes of our 
hardships and develop strategic action in response. Sectarianism prevents us from 
focusing on those issues that matter to communities and it is the call of this khuṭbah 
to develop such a strategic discipline and focus.
Addressing the plight of communities in a world out whack along a number of 
axes requires wisdom, non-judgmentalism, the exercise of one’s intellect, and 
commitment to address the plight of our communities.
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We must aim to establish practices that alleviate the pain of those who suffer from 
having to live undignified lives and to confer dignity on all God’s children through 
patience and perseverance. And, as Allah declares in Sūrah al-Iṣrā (The Night 
Journey, Q. 17:V70): 
And, now, We (Allah) have indeed conferred dignity on all the children 
of Adam.
Conferring karāmah or dignity on all of Allah’s creation is the primary organising 
frame of human existence, and it is to this pristine cause that we should now commit 
ourselves with clarity and unwavering purpose.
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16. MY IRAN TRIP REVEALS CULTURAL COMPLEXITIES: 
IMPRESSIONS OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE1
We have just returned from a visit to Iran. We visited three cities, spent time with 
ordinary folk, drove from city to city, participated in two lovely conferences, and 
saw lots of museums, markets and the country’s beautiful landscapes. 
We got to understand how this rich and enduring culture is the result of adding 
onto, never throwing out, their various layers of cultural inheritance, including 
Persian, Zoroastrian, Islamic, Safavid, (Shah) Pahlavian, socialist, nationalist and 
various other aspects. 
We were also exposed to various elements of the global consumer culture which 
we observed among young people. We spoke to many young people who taught us 
about their musical tastes, their love for Western and non-Western movies (which 
they download from the internet), fashion, clothing, their experiences with the world 
of work, and desire for travel. 
We also got to understand a little bit about how the contradictions between Iran’s 
rich and overlapping cultural inheritances are mediated by the current Islamist 
emphasis on a particular religious-political articulation. 
Some of these mediations are positive and productive, as shown by the country’s 
economic and political self-reliance, and its generally anti-imperial global political 
stance. Other mediations of the dominant Islamist political sphere seem to be 
constrained by the lack of opportunity for creativity and innovation, allegations of 
corruption, and constraints experienced in the areas of gender and class disparity 
and open political expression. 
I got the sense that ordinary folk have found interesting ways of establishing small 
freedoms in this context, in the way they dress (only a small number of women 
follow the strict dress code; most chose to wear a small colourful headscarf, make-up 
and the latest fashions), their adherence to their Persian history (one young female 
academic explained that she left the ‘religion of the mullahs’ behind and embraced 
her Persian identity in flexible ways), and their love of music and dance (done 
undercover and out of sight).
And some expressed a desire for a more egalitarian society in the areas of gender, 
criticism of elite domination, and calls for the adoption of minority rights and 
greater inclusion.
Iran has many minorities, especially in regions that are contiguous to other countries, 
such as the Kurds, Arabs, Persian Armenians, Lurs, Mazandaranis, Turkmen 
and religious minorities such as Jews, Christians and Bahais, some of whom 
have reported being persecuted. 
1 Published in Al-Qalam, December 2017.
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The religious culture is dominated by the Shi`a version of Islam. This means that the 
country’s formal public culture and semiotics are inflected by Shi`a symbolism and 
religious practices. 
What I found interesting, though, and probably in need of greater understanding, 
was that there was an absence of doctrinal rancour or polemics – in other words, no 
Sunni-Shi`a polemics, or Sunni vilification. This is instructive for people living in 
other contexts such as South Africa, and elsewhere, which have seen an increase in 
anti-Shi`a intolerance over the last five years.
Such intolerance is born of a larger geo-political battle in the Middle East between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran over expanding their respective spheres of dominance 
in countries such as Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. In this situation, the Shi`a-
Sunni polemics is a proxy for geopolitical contestation. Such polemics are clearly 
a manifestation of long-standing doctrinal disputation, mostly resolved, but now 
being mobilised in the service of political expansionism. 
Iranians get very worked up, almost to a person, by the Wahhabi takfīri creed, which 
is a strain of Islamic discourse that declares every other Islamic discourse anathema. 
I asked myself whether this reveals an anti-Sunni perspective? Perhaps, I thought. 
But not from what I could discern. Iranians had an entirely political reading of takfīri 
doctrine; they mention American influence in the Middle East, they were vehemently 
opposed to the austere literalist interpretation employed by the takfīris (those who 
declare that Muslims of other doctrinal orientations are disbelievers), and there is a 
geo-political dimension to their opinions, including their views on Saudi influence 
and expansionism in the Middle East. 
Of course, Iran’s support for groups in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen makes the country 
at the very least complicit as a player in ongoing sectarian politics and militarism in 
the Middle East. One has to ask the question whether their involvement in Middle 
Eastern conflicts is undertaken for better or worse for the region.
What is clear among all Iranians is that an anti-Israel position is a pillar of political 
faith, based on a very careful distinction between Zionism as the putative enemy of 
the region and Judaism as a proud and accepted Abrahamic religion. 
I participated in three sessions at two conferences in the cities of Khorramabad and 
Isfahan: presenting two papers and one four-hour workshop. The latter focused 
on ‘pluralities of knowledges in educational policy and practice’. The workshop 
elicited exceptionally sharp, critical questions and views which I found surprising. 
The Irianian participants wanted to know how their educational discourses could 
be pluralised in a context of such religious discursive dominance, and how to press 
beyond the limits imposed by such restrictions.
The connections we made were productive and thoughtful. We are pursuing the 
possibility of a university link with Isfahan University in the city of Isfahan, which 
is the cultural capital of Iran. This is one of Iran’s best universities, with 13 faculties, 
located on a beautiful campus, in a lovely part of the city.
And, of course, we visited Tehran. The capital city was an amazing mix of 
architecture, congestion, mad driving, vibrant culture, and people going about 
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their business, making viable lives. This was an important trip, life-affirming in an 
exciting, astonishing, productive and beautiful way.
Ordinary Iranians have worked out how to ‘stand on’ many different points of 
meaning and contradiction, giving expression to their humanness in the softest, 
gentlest and humblest ways imaginable. 
My impressions are indeed perfunctory, based on a short and superficial, yet quite 
intense, trip. What we observed and experienced gave us a wonderful sense of 
everyday Iranians and their dignified lives.
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17. RESPONDING TO THE DECOLONISATION 
IMPERATIVE: IMAGINING ISLAM FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE ‘WRETCHED OF THE EARTH’1
This khuṭbah offers an Islamic perspective in response to the call for decolonisation 
made by students at our country’s universities.
Decolonisation calls for an awareness of complex contradictions in our country and 
directs our attention to the demands of the poor for dignified living. 
It points up the ongoing legacy of colonialism and coloniality, and the humiliation 
that accompanies living in a world of colonial symbols, languages, images, texts, 
knowledge and practices. 
I ask the following: What is a decolonial Islamic approach, and how could such 
an approach empower marginalised communities to establish productive and 
viable lives?
A decolonial approach places the downtrodden at the centre of its imagination, not 
the interests of elites and the powerful. It acknowledges the struggles of slave girls 
who were forced to work in the master’s kitchen, and the labouring men and women 
who worked on farms and built Cape Town’s infrastructure, and were subjected to 
abuse, torture and sexual violence. 
A decolonial Islamic approach focuses on the everyday practices of these men and 
women who went about establishing viable lives on the edges of the colonial city; 
who built educational, social welfare and religious practices and institutions despite 
severe limitations. 
Muslims in Cape Town adopted religious and spiritual practices that secured their 
survival and adaptation. Imbued with a spirit of resistance, they vigorously practised 
their Sufi liturgies to strengthen their spiritual selves. 
They adopted complex literacy practices as can be seen by their kutub (religious texts) 
and handwritten texts in the Jawi-Arabic script, passed on through generations, 
giving rise to the first written Afrikaans as it was spoken among Cape Town’s 
slave communities. 
Their khalīfah / rātib displays based on body piercing accompanied by rhythmic dhikr 
(liturgies) chanting performances, regarded today by many as a bid`ah (innovation), 
were aimed at showing strength and confusing the colonial order. 
Their cultural practices such as the mawlid (birthday) celebrations in remembrance 
of the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) birth, name-giving ceremonies, 
and various rites of passage-related activities have been the cornerstones of Muslim 
community life.
1 Khuṭbah presented at Claremont Main Road Mosque, 19 January 2018.
80
Responding to the decolonisation imperative
The colonial order placed them in positions of wretchedness and subordination, 
and yet they employed their own rituals, literacies, knowledges and practices to 
establish viable, yet largely unacknowledged, lives.
Colonial oppression finds an analogy in the Qur’an’s depiction of Pharaoh’s 
oppression of his own people. Allah declares in Sūrah al-Qaṣaṣ (The narration):
Behold, Pharaoh exalted himself in the land and divided its people into 
castes. One group of them he deemed utterly low; he would slaughter 
their sons and spare (only) their women: for, behold, he was one of 
those who spread corruption [on earth] (Q. 28:V4).
Pharaoh visited violence and death on those he deemed as being from the lower 
echelons of society. He killed their male children for fear that they would rebel, and 
he visited unbounded tyranny on them. 
But Allah promises in the next verse that the oppressed shall be liberated from 
Pharaoh’s tyranny and inherit the earth. Allah, the sublime, declares: 
But it was Our will to bestow Our favour upon those [very people] who 
were deemed [so] utterly low in the land, and to make them forerunners 
in faith, and to make them heirs (Q. 28:V5).
It is these and other verses of the Quran, and supported by the history and practices 
that constituted Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) prophetic message, that 
established the focal point of Islam’s ethical vision: the downtrodden, the weak and 
oppressed at the heart of Islam. 
Social justice is what ought to be at the centre of our practices, as the Qur’an declares 
in Sūrah al-Māidah (The Table Spread, Q. 5:V8): “Be just: this is closest to being 
God-conscious”.
Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) message emphasised fairness and 
socially just lives, which threatened to upend the power and privilege of various 
elites. The early Makkan Muslims were met with hostility and persecution.
The Qur’an’s emphasis on justice and fairness is crystal clear: it zooms in on the 
power relations that sustain poverty and inequality, and it seeks to dismantle them 
in favour of a fair, just and inclusive dispensation.
We have to apply these ethical dimensions to contemporary life. Bringing the figure 
of the oppressed or wretched of the earth into full view is a necessary condition for 
our politics and practices.
We have to ask who the oppressed, the weak and the marginalised in our societies 
are. And we have to work hard to recognise the complexity of the lives of the 
downtrodden. 
Marginality is a majority experience in Cape Town, but marginal people remain 
largely hidden from view, from the language of politicians, and from the incredibly 
exclusionary economic structures of society. The plight of the poor, weak and 
differently-abled remains hidden from view. 
I offer you two examples of how exclusionary discourse work among us in the city of 
Cape Town. First, Cape Town has a vibrant carnival culture. Around the celebration 
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of the New Year, and in commemoration of freeing the slaves in 1834, the Christmas 
choirs, minstrels and Malay choirs take to the streets, dressed in carnival regalia, 
singing and marching through the streets of Cape Town.
The carnivals are an exuberant expression of joy and a symbolic take-over of the 
city. They have been a feature of Cape Town life for almost two centuries, making a 
renewed comeback during the last 15 years, as more and more youngsters become 
involved in the carnival. 
The participating groups are organised all over Cape Town’s poorer townships, in 
areas with enormous developmental and social welfare challenges, where schooling 
has largely broken down, and where a rise in school drop-out rates in lower grades 
is the order of the day. 
What the minstrel and Malay choir culture does is provide a creative outlet for 
young people, where they learn to socialise among themselves, build friendships 
and express themselves.
It is these and other cultural markers that allow our communities to retain a sense 
of cohesiveness in the face of collapsing social and physical infrastructures. This 
is a case of the wretched of the earth who, left without support, go on to invent 
community cultural practices to buffer their desperate lives in hard times. 
It is, however, no exaggeration to say that many elites among us frown upon these 
displays of bodily exuberance. There is a trope of respectability and distinction, 
especially among the upper classes, that is marked by a disdain for the carnivals. 
However, such a condescending perspective is borne of a larger marginalisation, 
which is that the lives of the wretched are never brought into view as worthy of 
dignity through the provision of good housing, proper education and healthcare. 
We may indeed quote from the Qur’an that Allah has dignified the lives of all 
humans, but disdainful dismissal of the poor serves to distance those respectability-
chasing elites from the struggles of the poor. 
This attitude segues into a middle class dominated by a politics that prevents the city 
from making social justice commitments to poor people, who simply become voting 
fodder to serve the interests of the powerful who live in other parts of the city.
The second example has a long history in Cape Town; it is what I call the ‘community 
to prison complex,’ something I observed from my time as a teacher on the Cape 
Flats. It involves children from broken families, often living off welfare, and going to 
school intermittently, drawn into the criminal justice system, and basically moving 
in and out of prison during their childhood and young adult life. 
They operate within the illicit economy, selling drugs and getting involved in petty 
crimes. They are sucked into prison gangs, from which it is almost impossible 
to escape.
The rise in the incarceration of boys and girls during the last decade has been 
earth-shattering. This is attributed to the exponential increase in the use of tik 
(methamphetamine), brought on by the collapse of family life, the lure of the criminal 
economy, the use of their bodies to earn easy money.
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According to reports, Pollsmoor prison looks like ‘Makkah in Ramaḍān’, in reference 
to the skyrocketing number of incarcerated Muslim males and females.
So even just by looking at basic development statistics, it is clear that the majority of 
Cape Town citizens are experiencing wretched lives. But coming to understand the 
practices of people will reveal the complexity of their lives. 
It would reveal that the impact of collapsed infrastructure services such as health, 
social welfare and education are abiding features of life, and that hunger and lack of 
food security are majority experiences in Cape Town.
While one might say that criminal behaviour represents personal and family failings 
to police the boundaries of children’s behaviour, this is not where the origins of the 
problem lie. 
Elite political interests are quick to moralise about causes, attributing blame to 
individuals and people, which, again, as in the case of their attitude to the carnivals, 
is a tactic that justifies them ‘looking away’, preventing them from making social 
justice commitments.
This is precisely the type of behaviour that Allah calls out in Sūrah al-Mā`ūn (The 
Small Kindnesses, Q. 107:V1-7) when Allah declares, 
Have you ever considered [the kind of person] who gives the lie to all 
moral law?
Behold, it is this [kind of person] that pushes the orphan away,
And feels no urge to feed the needy.
Woe, then, unto those praying ones whose hearts from their prayer 
are remote
Those who want only to be seen and praised, 
And, withal, deny all assistance [to their fellow-men]!
This surah (chapter) powerfully underscores the duplicitousness involved in leading 
an active outer religious life, while at the same time denying Islam’s higher moral 
commitments. The Qur’an condemns such duplicitousness, especially among those 
who employ tactics of deception and sharp turns of phrase to prevent them from 
imagining practices that would turn wretched lives into just lives.
The call of this khuṭbah is to place the ‘wretched of the earth’, in all their fulsome 
humanness, into the centre of our religious imagination, and to go on to establish big 
and small commitments and practices to build socially just lives for all in this city.
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18. GRATITUDE (SHUKR) AND FRIENDSHIP 
(ṢADAQAH) IN TRANSACTING A ‘METAPHYSICS OF 
ACTIVE PRESENCE’ IN THE CITY1
It is a truism that the weather plays an influential role in our daily lives; it directly 
affects our cleanliness and ablution habits, dress, daily commutes, domestic living 
arrangements, and our time schedules.
It also affects our senses and our aesthetic appreciation: what we eat and how we 
observe the world, its colours, sights, smells and sounds.
The weather, whether wind, sunshine, cold, drought or rain, affects our immersion in 
the ṣibghah (colouring) of Allah, in other words, the daily hues, colours or influences 
in which Allah’s overwhelming presence manifests in our lives. 
We are inspired by Allah’s influences, which shape the daily contours of our lives. 
Allah declares in Sūrah al-Baqarah (The Cow, Q. 2:V138):
[Say: “Our life takes its] hue (colour) from God! And who could give a 
better hue [to life] than God, if we but truly worship Him?”
This verse underlines the majestic influence of worshipping Allah, who is ever-
present in shaping our lives and destinies. Living in Allah’s presence means that we 
are repositories of Allah’s divine qualities. 
We are imbued with divine qualities such as beauty (jamāl), mercy (raḥmah), 
creativity (ibdāʿ) and excellence (iḥsān). Living in the presence of the divine means 
making these qualities an active part of our lives, in the big and small aspects of 
our lives, be it our relations with our body, our interactions with our families and 
neighbours, or in our educational institutions or working lives.
It is in the relationships that we establish with ourselves, others and the inanimate 
world that we attain Allah’s ṣibghah, God’s majestic impact on our being. The nature 
of our relations with each other is as important as the moral activity that we become 
involved in. In other words, it is how we do what we do, how we relate to other 
people and our environment, that defines our daily practices.
The prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) declares in a ḥadīth (saying of the 
prophet), that ‘the salvific quality of life lies in human transaction or relations’ with 
others and the world around us. 
Human fellowship, taking care of others and displaying compassion towards each 
other form the fulcrum of our projects in this world and our salvation in the hereafter.
This khuṭbah reminds us that showing gratitude (shukr) is one of the most important 
conditioning qualities of our muʿāmalāt, our relations and transactions.
Our experiences with the recent drought is an example of gratitude at work. Whereas 
just a few weeks ago we prayed for rain, today the dam levels are approaching 50%. 
1 Khuṭbah presented at Claremont Main Road Mosque, 6 July 2018.
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And now we are struggling with the devastating effects of flooding in the low-lying 
areas of the city. We are being challenged to extend our compassion to address a 
situation where the poorest of the poor are hit hardest by rains.
Our adaptations to the drought have taught us many lessons. The drought affected 
all classes of people of the city, forcing us to adapt to water scarcity, how to use 
water sparingly, how a city and its people rally together to address an impending 
human catastrophe. 
We refused to be demoralised by impending doom and gloom; instead, we adapted, 
developed new environmental norms, and importantly, we adopted new behaviours, 
which have now become lodged in our consciousness.
In addition to a greater awareness of the sustainable and sparing use of water, 
we have placed ourselves in a position to extend our ethical behaviour to broader 
ecological concerns, addressing poverty alleviation in the city, and developing 
fellowship and cooperation around ongoing spatial and other injustices in the city.
We thank Allah for blessing us with the current rains in full awareness of the need to 
put our gratitude to good use and moral repurposing. 
Allah declares in Sūrah Ibrahīm (Abraham, Q. 14:V7)
And when your Sustainer made this promise: “If you are grateful 
[to Me], I shall most certainly give you more and more; but if you are 
ungrateful, verily, My chastisement will be severe indeed! 
Gratitude for Allah’s ni`am (favours), being grateful, giving thanks and a disposition 
of thanksgiving are qualities that stand at the centre of Islam’s ethical vision. 
In the case of the drought, for us, being grateful to Allah as an ethical disposition has 
translated into life-affirming practical action. 
It is clear that accessing Allah’s ṣibghah, the hues, or Allah’s manifest qualities, lies 
in translating Allah-ordained dispositions such as mercy, gratitude, creativity and 
excellence into ethical practices, a`māl al-ṣālihāt, that advance the common good.
This khuṭbah emphasises the qur'anic view that shukr, or gratitude-inspired practices 
are a sign and expression of living in God’s presence.
A shākir, or one who is imbued with gratitude, engages in what I call in this khuṭbah 
a ‘metaphysics of active presence,’ which is an acute awareness of Allah’s divinity in 
our lives, in the way in which we are imbued with the Godly ordained values that 
manifest in our akhlāq, our behaviour and ethical conduct. 
The shākir (the grateful person) is actively present in life’s daily challenges, and 
responsive to the contingencies of time and place. Laying emphasis on gratitude as 
a condition of success, the verse cited above also juxtaposes shukr with kufr, gratitude 
with ingratitude. It establishes the proposition that kufr or ingratitude is the denial 
of the bounty of Allah.
Kufr or ingratitude is the seedbed of our destruction, negative living, and an ego-
centred existence. Kufr closes the door on humans’ capacity to manifest Allah’s 
mercy, love and compassion.
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A kāfir, an ingrate, is one who denies or refuses to acknowledge Allah’s truth, Allah’s 
manifest qualities, or the creative possibilities that inhere in these qualities. A kāfir 
is never productive, always part of the problem, the one who cuts off other people 
through rudeness with a negative turn of phrase or attitude, the one who cannot see 
the full humanness of others.
Kufr or ingratitude is a disposition of ẕulm (darkness), causing things to be out of 
whack, to become dark, or opaque, leading to confusion and demoralisation.
The mufassir (exegete) of the Qur’an, Muhammad Asad, eloquently defined the 
meaning of kufr in the Qur’an. Asad explains that the meaning of kufr as ingratitude 
is grasped when we bear in mind that its root verb is ‘kafara’, which means to cover 
up something, a reference to one who denies, or refuses to acknowledge the Truth.
The denial associated with kufr refers to denying the Truth in its widest, spiritual 
sense, whether relating to the existence of God, or to a moral injunction, or to a self-
evident moral proposition. Such denial fails to acknowledge and express gratitude 
for Allah’s bounty. 
Thus, it is clear that the qur'anic denotation of the word kufr means ‘denial of truth’ 
and ‘ingratitude’. The kuffār are all those who are ungrateful in response to the truth 
of Allah’s moral law, and refuse the necessity to establish healthy and productive 
human conduct.
Our religious and public discourses ought to actively counteract kufr. We should 
expose the ‘dead-end street’ that accompanies ingratitude, whether in dealing 
with our domestic circumstances, or with the myriad of social challenges that we 
confront daily.
The ungrateful drain our emotional energy. Ingratitude accompanies an ego-centred 
existence, placing the unsatisfied ‘self’ at the centre of our concerns. Kufr or ingratitude 
never resolves anything, never pushes towards alleviation or human flourishing. 
Ingratitude causes us to lapse into a vicious cycle of regret and refusal – refusal 
to connect ourselves to others or to connect the self to moral and ethical conduct. 
Kufr denies us access to Allah’s mercy, compassion and love. A condition of shukr, 
gratitude, in contrast, opens us up to a productive confrontation with humans’ 
earthly existence. At a very simple level, showing gratitude opens us to others, 
inviting an embrace.
It lays the basis for getting into the ‘face’ of the other, into the ‘face’ of strangers, of 
humans whom we discount, and the complexity and difficulty that we disavow. 
An Allah-imbued disposition of gratitude breaks down the veil behind which the 
‘other,’ our enemy, lurks. Gratitude allows us to see and touch the ‘face of the other’, 
as the philosopher Levinas explains. Gratitude is the key to an active presence in our 
interactions with others, whose concerns become our concerns. And gratitude also 
opens us up to embracing those who are hostile towards us. 
86
Gratitude (shukr) and friendship (ṣadaqah)
The Qur’an lays emphasis in numerous verses on touching the face of people, of 
identifying with their plight, by teaching us about the beauty of establishing 
friendship, Allah declares in Sūrah Fuṣṣilat (Explained in Detail);
Not equal are the good deed and the bad deed. Repel evil by that 
which is better, and then the one who is hostile to you will become as a 
devoted friend (Q. 41:V34).
A tafsīr (exegesis) of this verse explains that Allah commands the believers to be 
patient when we feel angry, to be forbearing when confronted with ignorance, and 
to forgive when we are mistreated. If we do this, Allah will save us from Satan and 
subdue our enemies until we become like close friends.
It is therefore the advice (nasīḥah) of this khuṭbah that we should work to access 
Allah’s mercy and compassion through our attitudes and behaviour towards those 
closest to us and those whom we may not even know. A disposition of gratitude 
in the face of challenge and adversity opens the door for us to establish healthy 
relations, alliances and friendships. Such relations are crucial for adaptation and 
flourishing. 
And our invitation is to place shukr or gratitude at the centre of an engaged life in the 
mercy of the divine. Such a life would allow our daily lives to be imbued with the 
hues and qualities of Allah’s divine grace.
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19. AFTER THE VERULAM MOSQUE ATTACK WE NEED 
TO URGENTLY COUNTER SECTARIAN DISCOURSE 
IN OUR COMMUNITIES1
Changing discourses and perspectives in communities is complex and tough. 
This is indeed the case with current-day sectarian discourses among Muslims. 
But discourse, or what and how we choose to talk, also kills.
This has been shown by the recent attack on a Shi`a mosque in Durban. Speculation 
is that this is a copycat local ISIS-inspired attack, in which case the severe brand of 
takfīri terror has now hit our local shores with devastating effect.
The killing could also be the result of the local anti-Shi`a diatribes that have 
characterised South African Muslim discourse since the 1980s. Such narcissistic 
polemics have increased in recent years to frame Shi`as as non-Muslim whose blood 
is literally ḥalāl, i.e. permissible to shed.
This bigotry is unconstitutional and anti-human rights, yet its roots are deep and 
complex.
It has been allowed to fester and feed Muslim public sentiment and has largely 
remained unchallenged. South Africa’s human rights regime has guaranteed the 
free existence of heterodox identities, expressed through intra-religious diversity.
However, many groups have found ways to violate such guarantees. These mostly 
happen in the semi- and informal institutional spaces of communities. And Muslims, 
like other groups, have been destabilised by such pockets of intolerance.
Hate and whispering campaigns have run freely on social media. Prominent imams 
and organisations have failed to condemn such anachronistic behaviour, while 
others have openly promoted hostility and hatred. Left unchecked, this whispering 
campaign lodges in the minds of people. This results in perpetrators coming to view 
Shi`as, for example, as less than human.
This plays a key mobilising role when people, who often act from their own complex 
and sometimes marginalised life perspectives, are persuaded to run a victimisation 
campaign against people who are framed as ‘non-’ or ‘lesser’ Muslims. The 
consequences, as we witnessed in Durban, are devastating.
What is required is to develop an internal Muslim dialogue that calls out hate speech 
and violence. Not tolerating hate-mongering and sectarianism is crucial. We have to 
change the discursive terms of acceptability among people. This must be informed 
by the politics of the long term, which requires challenging recalcitrant discourses.
It also requires active engagement processes in communities, schools, 
classrooms, mosque pulpits and our community organisations. This is where 
complex conversations have to be held, questions posed, and norms of civic 
cohesion generated.
1 First published in in the Daily Maverick, 28 May 2018.
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Condemning bad behaviour is important, and establishing practices in communities 
that promote well-rounded behaviour is crucial. But changing our community 
discourses is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for turning the tide.
This will take brave men and women, who singly and in unison are able to act 
principally and strategically to counteract the ransacking of our religion and lifestyles 
which are geared towards cultivating a capacious civilizational mindset. We need to 
respond now with fortitude, compassion and care lest we lose our children to the 
‘fanaticism of ignorance’ currently running rampant in our communities.
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20. REREADING THE LEGACY OF IMAM HARON IN THE 
50TH YEAR OF COMMEMORATING HIS MARTYRDOM1
As we enter the 50th year since the tragic passing of Imam Abdullah Haron, the 
question arises whether we dare to read the Imam’s legacy differently and put such 
a reading to productive work in our current times.
The seed for doing this was planted during the 11th annual Imam Haron Memorial 
Lecture, which was delivered this year by his son, Prof. Muhammed Haron at the 
Zohra Noor Auditorium, Islamia College, on 26 September. Muhammed pointed in 
this direction by offering a nuanced and contemporaneous reading of his father’s life.
In the lecture, Prof. Haron combined personal insights with a portrayal of key 
formative events in the Imam’s life. Haron, the son, called for a broader and 
more incisive range of scholarly work that would bring his father’s life into fuller, 
multidimensional view, which I believe would offer a robust ‘reading’ of the 
meaning of such a life for our complex contemporary moment.
Imam Abdullah Haron was born in Claremont on 8 February 1924 and brutally 
killed by the apartheid regime in prison on 27 September 1969. He was the Imam of 
the Al-Jaamia Mosque in Stegman Rd, Claremont from 1955 until his death. 
The political and broader discursive parameters have changed fundamentally since 
then, and the Imam’s legacy should be mined to allow us to work productively with 
a fuller and more complex set of human dynamics that characterise our lives in Cape 
Town and in the world. The impending 50th anniversary commemoration is an apt 
opportunity to begin this task.
Muhammed Haron correctly and courageously portrayed his father as a ‘man for all 
seasons’, a person with a multidimensional personality, a photogenic family man, 
a great dresser, a brother and father who was actively engaged in the lives of his 
siblings, who loved his dear wife Galima (nee Sadan), and played a formative role 
shaping the sensibilities of his three children, Fatiema, Muhammed and Shamila, the 
latter who settled in the United Kingdom, where she raised her own family. 
The Imam was an avid music lover. He had a piano in his house in Crawford and 
encouraged his children to appreciate music. He was involved in active inter-faith 
work and encouraged the reading of literature, religious and especially Islamic 
books, and the English translation of the Qur’an.
There are many photos of the Imam surrounded by his younger congregants. 
Muhammed Haron explained that his father loved children and young people. 
A powerful memory for Muhammed was his father’s constant recitation of the 
Qur’an – in other words, a memory of a person who was a Ḥāfiẓ al-Qurʿān (one who 
memorised the entire Qur’an) and had come to personify its ethical message.
1 In Cape Argus, October 2018
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The Imam’s life was thus accompanied by the Qur’an, and he was motivated in life 
by its exhortation to fairness and justice. And so, as Muhammed Haron explained, 
he was always wont to give testimony to the injustices, big and small, which he 
encountered. It was the injustices associated with racism and apartheid that became 
the Imam’s defining quality, the spiritual fuel that imbued his life with the clarity of 
moral purpose
The Imam for all seasons was above all a witness bearer for justice as exhorted by the 
Qur’an, in which his life was immersed. Bearing witness was what gave meaning to 
his life, and in displaying his commitments in an often questioning and conservative 
community his example shone like a very bright light.
He was a person ahead of his time, never fully supported by the broader Muslim 
community or its organisations. This community was mired in living its own 
accommodations with the brutal apartheid state, turning a blind eye to its repressive 
machinery, as it tried to maximise some advantage in dire circumstances. Arguably, 
some prominent people in the Muslim community were compliant supplicants of 
the apartheid state, collaborators seeking advantage.
Imam Haron’s legacy was picked up and celebrated prominently only later by 
young educated Muslim students and others from the late 1970s. They appropriated 
his legacy as one of their key mobilising platforms for their activism, in the process 
correctly emphasising his anti-apartheid legacy and martyrdom.
The other dimensions of his life, including art, reading, family, sport, interfaith 
solidarity, retail worker and snappy dresser – in other words, the more mundane 
aspects – may have been underplayed. Offering a reading of his legacy by 
emphasising these aspects would be a first step which, together with his political 
commitments, would offer a deeper understanding of Imam Haron’s legacy.
In asserting his multidimensional legacy, l believe we ought to have an important 
conversation about how such a legacy could be put to work in current times. Imam 
Haron has much to offer us in democratic times, of hopes dashed, a faltering and 
corrupt state, and multiple human rights tragedies occurring daily. 
The Imam’s legacy would have much to say about how we as citizens of this country 
and the world ought to go about establishing a caring, humane and inclusive 
society. But the route towards such a dispensation depends on us. The Imam’s life 
provides many important clues, but we have to step up to do the intellectual work 
and activism to make his legacy come alive in novel, inclusive, open-minded and 
exciting ways in our city, country and the world.
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21. SEARCHING FOR IMAM HARON: REFLECTIONS 
ON RECENT INTRA-MUSLIM POLEMICS IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE1
One has to embrace one’s history, one has to engage with it, and most importantly, 
one has to enter into a productive conversation with it in order to identify how to 
adapt to the present and future anticipated circumstances. One has to be willing 
to shed corrosive and redundant practices and go on to establish an engaged and 
responsive ethical presence in our local contexts.
The presentation today turns on a consideration of Muslims as civil society actors 
engaged in the public sphere, their place in this sphere and, most importantly, the 
terms on which they establish their practices in this sphere. 
I place the martyrological figure of al-Shahīd Imam Abdullah Haron at the centre 
of this presentation. I provide the following trope for my presentation; that is, 
Imam Abdullah Haron presents the impossible as a possibility through his Muslim-
inspired praxis during the 1950s and 1960s. And, I suggest that it is time that we 
place this impossible possibility, in the light of his example, at the centre of our 
ethical commitments. 
But for me the question is how do we do this? Who was Imam Haron? What is the 
nature of his ethically informed social and political praxis, in other words, how can 
the significance of his life best be understood and put to use in 2019?
I am using Imam Haron’s example as a way of considering what is key to the Cape 
and South African Muslim community-formation processes, their adaptation, 
development, co-dependent interaction with other communities, and with the state. 
I would like to start by offering a conceptual distinction between community 
discourse based on identity and community discourse based on ethics. These two 
concepts work together, sometimes relatively separately, and sometimes even at 
cross-purposes in community processes in the light of very specific circumstances. 
How identity and ethics come together and are given specific meaning is the outcome 
of the contingencies of histories and social actors. The relationship between ethics 
and identity expresses itself differently, for example, in the 1950s and 1960s in the 
time of Imam Haron, compared to how it works in 2019, in the now. 
Identity-based community responses refer to the internal discourses, dramas and 
the dynamics of the group, kept relatively insulated from the dramas of the outside 
world. The dramas of the outside world have an impact and play a role, but these 
are read through the prism of the need to maintain internal group identity cohesion. 
Language, metaphor and law are mobilised to justify, explain and mediate dynamics 
internal to the group. The logic of the identity response is always informed by 
internal argument and justification within the group, never to the outside world. 
1 This was a paper presented at the Islamic Peace College South Africa (IPSA), 
16 February 2019.
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The ethical, in turn, involves a broader commitment to the higher purposes of life. 
Not to be seen as separate from identity, an ethical stance is founded on the human 
impulse to act against one’s narrow interests, to act with and for others, and to 
engage in behaviour that secures life for all. Ethics is about the self always connected 
to others, and in the exigencies of the times connected to animals and inanimate 
objects, the earth and its survival. 
An ethical stance involves less calculation and entails more of a type of selfless 
behaviour. The ethical involves impulses for social justice such as commanded in 
the Qur’an’s exhortation to stand up for justice, even if against self or kin – another 
oft-quoted exhortation about Allah conferring dignity on all the progeny of Adam, 
or in another Quranic verse where Allah (SWT) confers dignity and leadership on 
the oppressed of the earth.
In the contemporary world, the impulse to the political often trades on and 
emphasises religion as conferring an identity, whether a primordial Islamic identity 
or Hindu identity or a Jewish identity, as the primary hallmark or raison d’être of 
one’s existence in the world. Here the focus is on the internal identity dynamics of 
belonging that constitute a religious or communal identity. 
For example, in our case, Islam’s public discourses and its credal dramas, whether 
through Wahhābi, Deobandi, Shāfiʿiyah, Sunni, Barelwi or Sufi credal authority, are 
the primary frames whereby most Muslims encounter and adapt to the world.
In such a situation the ethical commitment to mutual human interdependence, 
human rights, dignity, gender equality and our planetary existence in the face of 
increasing poverty, the impact of climate change, suffering families, collapsing 
educational infrastructures and food insecurity is a conceptual afterthought, or a 
secondary conceptual marker, not the primary framing in our conceptual schemata. 
These ethical commitments and issues of higher-order maslaḥah (common human 
interests) are either absent in our community repertoires, or we react and respond 
to them in a kneejerk and incoherent manner. In other words, our Muslim religious 
communities struggle to establish a meaningful articulation between higher-order 
ethical framings and narrower identity framings. I argue that we should carefully 
study history to find out when and under what circumstances greater ethical clarity 
and purpose overcame narrower religious identity operations and commitments in 
the community. 
And it is here that the martyrological figure of Imam Abdullah Haron is instructive. 
Imam Haron was an inheritor of the Muslim religious legacy of Shaykh Yusuf, Tuan 
Guru and Abdol Burns, Abdullah Abdurahman, Fatima Meer and Zainunisa ‘Cissie’ 
Gool. Imam Haron’s ʿulāmā contemporaries were people like his teacher Shaykh 
Ismail Ganief, and his friends Shaykh Abubakr Najaar, Shaykh Nazeem Mohamed, 
Dr Abu Bakr Fakir, Boeta Ismail Saban, Boeta Ali Fisher and others. 
He was a bearer of both identity and justice. He was a traditional Cape Town imam, 
young, well dressed, a music and sports lover, a multidimensional family man. He 
was a Ḥāfiẓ al-Qurʿān who loved to recite the Qur’an and he fasted twice a week. 
He was the chair of the Muslim Judicial Council from 1959 to 1960 and the honorary 
editor of the Muslim News, in addition to working for Wilson Rowntree. He was 
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a frequent visitor in black African townships, doing da`wah (missionary work), 
spreading the truth of his dīn.
And he was an internationalist, a global traveller and a connector of people. He was 
also part of the activist milieu that emerged in Claremont during the 1950s, where he 
interacted with young intellectuals during that period. This is where he developed 
an acute South African-centred ethical consciousness. 
He worked in the political underground providing material relief for families of 
detainees, among others. He was imprisoned for his political activism in May 1969 
and died 123 days later on 27 September 1969.
His ethical identification was pure. His refusal to capitulate to discomfort, 
humiliation and torture emanated from deep within his ethical commitment to the 
supreme values of love, dignity and justice. 
During the brutal repression of the 1960s the only political option available to 
respond to apartheid was an ethical option. It was a choice of either living a wretched 
oppressive life or a life in service of liberation which, as his chosen path, led to his 
death caused by the apartheid regime. 
Imam Haron’s ethical recognition (ma`rifah) led to his death, an apartheid killing 
to be re-inquested in our country’s legal system, hopefully soon. It was a glorious 
death that affirmed humanity’s beautiful existence and gave us life, 50 years after 
his death. We know that Imam Haron’s death was processed largely through the 
category of identity and the accommodations that Muslims of the time made with 
the apartheid dispensation. 
His funeral was an enormous symbolic statement that saluted the life of this man. 
But the community’s responses largely involved distancing themselves from his 
politics. The Muslim News, of which he was an editor, 5 days later distanced itself from 
the Imam in its pages, taking the view in writing that if he had died for his political 
and/or ethical views, the newspaper would distance itself from Imam Haron. 
My reading of his life and death is that for one moment in time the community was 
gifted with an ethical life, ethical clarity and that as a consequence the community 
for one brief moment shone brightly.
But then the community reverted back to an identity based on internal justification 
and accommodation to the apartheid dispensation. It was only later that Muslim 
youth groups picked up the baton from Imam Haron, mobilised in his memory, in 
an attempt to confer ethical content on their Islamic anti-apartheid commitments.
It is gratifying that recently a broad spectrum of organisations have committed to 
properly commemorating the 50th anniversary of Imam Haron’s death. In my view 
the challenge in this regard is to establish a proper relationship between identity and 
ethics, to mobilise religious identity in service of the ethical.
Don’t misunderstand me; religious identity is the sine qua non of Muslims’ community 
life in Cape Town, and of any religious community for that matter. A religiously 
inspired life is not by definition cut off from broader moral commitments. 
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But the proof of this is in the pudding: the proper relationship between the ethical 
and the political is the stuff of careful reflection on our everyday religious and 
community practices. 
In a previous paper, my colleague and I (see Bangstad and Fataar 2010) called 
this tussle between the ethical and the political, between broader commitments to 
humanity and narrower commitments to community and identity, an ‘ambiguous 
accommodation’. This is the idea that the Muslim community, with its many different 
social, class, gender, cultural, ethnic and transnational fragments, has established 
a kind of ambivalent identity, one that is powerfully framed by an inwardness, 
relatively doubtful of the outside secular world, and a strategic embrace of the 
democratic space, an assertion of our identity and place in the world. We could thus 
say that our community responses and practices fall between narrow commitments 
to self-preservation and the need for broader alliances and broader challenges.
Let me give you three current-day examples of this ambivalence, each example 
showing a particular manifestation of this ambiguous accommodation. My aim in 
purposefully offering these examples is to provoke debate. I want to show how the 
ethical might be obscured by narrow identity assertions.
The first example is the Bo-Kaap anti-gentrification campaign. This is highly 
laudable, courageous and timely. And we are all participating in it. This campaign 
has brought sharply to the fore the spatial injustice in the urban core and the suffering 
of historically located communities in their desperate attempts to retain this space as 
their cultural heritage. 
The Bo-Kaap campaign would manifest greater solidarity if connections were to be 
made conceptually and physically to spatial justice campaigns all over the country 
and to similar and different struggles in places such as Tafelsig, Witsand, Parkwood, 
Langa and Bonteheuwel to connect with refugee communities, black African spatial 
struggles, the homeless, and so on. Cultural preservation, informed by an assertion 
of identity, would form part of larger spatial justice struggles by people acting in 
solidarity with one another in the city, the country and the globe. 
The second example centres on the debacle generated largely by social media 
and populist responses over the ceremony that followed the marriage between 
two persons. 
My impression is that the proverbial shite hit the fan over two things, the one 
preceding the other; one was a shameful misunderstanding of the correctness of the 
marriage as a result of questioning the reversion to Islam of the bridegroom, and 
the second over the ceremony afterwards. Social media created and accentuated the 
‘fietnah’ (creating falsities via local grapevine-type gossip). 
This situation was provoked by crude populist responses circulating on Facebook. 
In my understanding, it was this vilification or ‘fietnah’ that provided the impetus for 
the Muslim Judiciary to step in. The MJC probably felt it had no option but to deal 
with the issue so as to bring clarity and sanity to the matter, instead of allowing the 
matter to run out of control. 
But actually, the matter, framed as it had been by populist fietnah on social media, 
had already run beyond control. What followed was reactive, and it is perhaps 
important to reflect on the responses.
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My comments here will not deal with the merits of the MJC’s ruling or position 
taken in response but will address some aspects of the methodology by which the 
response was made. 
I am particularly interested in how the two concepts of ethics and identity played 
themselves out in the management of this incident, and to draw a larger lesson about 
the way our Muslim civic responses are currently working. 
I suggest to you that the MJC’s response was resolved primarily through the lenses 
of intra-religious identity discourses, not through ethical lenses. 
I must insist that there is a history to any response; the nature of any response is 
partly but powerfully informed by the preceding discourses around the response. 
Am I suggesting that I could have guessed how this was going to play out once we 
understood how this issue became a religious problem? Perhaps. Although people, 
positions and arguments still had to be mobilised to dress up the response in a 
particular way. 
The religious language mobilised notions of shirk (idolatry), kufr (unbelief) and 
ḥarām (unlawful) as the conceptual window through which to process the incident. 
The judiciary found that the fire circulations during the ceremony were deemed to 
be haram. 
But let me put this to you; what was never in play in processing the response was 
the ethical dimension. The response was not arrived at through equal, proper and 
rigorous consideration of the potential impact of living in a plural multi-faith, multi-
cultural secular democracy. The ethics of coexistence and co-living might indeed 
have been in play during the processing. After all, we live in democratic South 
Africa. But this ethical stance is nowhere to be found in the actual position taken.
The position adopted and announced was entirely driven by narrow parochial 
religious interests. It is not as if an ethical position on this matter could not be 
sustained in a sharʿī (Islamic legal) argument. It was simply that the ethical may 
never properly have been brought into the deliberations. 
The judiciary’s position was produced from an identity-oriented perspective, not on 
the basis of an ethics of co-existence and mutual interdependence.
The response was provoked by the populism and rantings of people on social media. 
And my reading of the incident is that the judiciary’s response was an attempt to 
mollify this populism, in the process giving narrow identity concerns pride of place.
There was an attempt to put everyone on the backfoot, hence the call for an apology. 
But no one asked key ethically informed questions such as:
• What are the symbolic / religious meanings of these so-called Hindu practices? 
Can a religious ritual be emptied of its religious content and presented as simply 
ceremonial? Isn’t intention pivotal in action? 
• Has the Hindu-inspired rampies-sny ceremony at the celebration of the birth of 
the Prophet not been emptied of its Hindu religious symbolism? Ditto for the 
mendhi celebrations before an Indian Muslim wedding. Does a Hindu ritual’s 
appropriation into a wedding ceremony imply a religious / fiqh infraction, even 
shirk or ḥarām? It is commendable that the MJC distanced itself from calling the 
event shirk or kufr. 
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• What is shirk? What is the historically contingent context for shirk in 7th-century 
Arabia and how should the quranic position on shirk be understood in the 
contingent context of 7th-century Arabia?
• How has the doctrine of shirk emerged and developed in the Islamic intellectual 
tradition across 14 centuries? How, for example, have power and politics in 
places like India and Pakistan impacted on debates on shirk discourses in the 
context of the politics of Hindutva?
• What are the different forms of shirk and what does one think of shirk in the 
21st century?
• Is the concept of divinity in Hinduism tantamount to shirk? Why? Analogously, 
the Qur’an calls out Christian belief in the Trinity as a form of shirk, but Muslim 
relations with Christians, interestingly, are based on their status as ‘Ahl al-Kitāb’ 
(People of the Book).
• Should we not at the very least have given ourselves space to educate ourselves 
properly on these matters? Should we not have engaged directly with Hindu 
religious experts and academic specialists on these matters? Why did we all run 
to Mullah Google for answers to these complex and intricate matters? Should 
we not have attempted to mollify and educate the populists in our community?
In the logic of my presentation today, the adopted position was entirely processed 
through an assertion of the hermeneutics of identity. An educational, philosophical 
and research-orientated hermeneutic would have brought the ethical response 
informed by human existence into view, at the very least. By bringing ethics into 
the discussion, we would have given ourselves the opportunity to consider larger 
ethical questions related to our everyday lives in this city and the world.
The third example requires more time to explain, but let me give a truncated view 
of the call by our black African Muslim compatriots for identity recognition as 
authentically Muslim. This issue speaks to the nature of our religious identification. 
A group of black African Muslims is organising a blacks-only Muslim conference in 
Soweto in March 2019. 
Some are objecting, arguing that Islam does not condone racism and that organising 
a conference on the basis of race is in itself a violation of Islam. Really? In what 
world are we living?
The trope of African Muslims in this country being discriminated against by some in 
the Indian and coloured Muslim communities comes a long way. African Muslims 
experience racism in the workplace, in the organisation of mosques, about who can 
lead, who cleans, who controls the money, etc. They correctly feel violated when a 
mosque’s Trust deed says ‘only Indians can be trustees of this mosque’. 
Why can these mosques not change their Trust deeds to potentially and actually 
include anyone on its Trust, and concomitantly, also change exclusionary behaviour 
toward African Muslims? This is a clear case of negative religious identity still 
asserting itself in our community. Identity clearly trumps ethicality in this example. 
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In conclusion, Imam Haron’s exemplary life shows acutely the struggle between 
identity and ethics. Imam Haron seamlessly lived the identity of a proud Muslim 
imbued with an ethical rūḥ (spirit). This spirit accorded him the impulse to perfectly 
recognise his commitment to dignity, love and justice. This commitment led to his 
martyrdom, which gave beautiful life to all of us.
I argue that his life was imbued with the ethical, the ethics of the Qur’an, and it 
was through the ethical that he mobilised his religious identity in the service of the 
higher purposes of our human existence. This, I would argue, is what we should 
retrieve from Imam Haron’s martyrdom in the 50th year of its commemoration. 
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22. THE LIVING ROLE OF THOSE WHO DIED 
FOR US TO BE FREE1
And say not of those who are slain in the path of God’s cause. 
“They are dead”. Nay, they are alive though you perceive it not. 
(Surah al-Baqarah, The cow, Q. 2:154)
This qur'anic verse provides one very important way to productively work with the 
personal, social and political meanings of martyrdom. We should ask how is the 
martyr alive today?
First, we need to ask permission from the families to speak about their martyred sons 
and daughters, as these families are burdened by their ongoing search for justice.
The answer we give about the living martyrs among us, as the verse exhorts, is the 
suggestion that they live among us in the ethical sense, in the idea that their death 
gives life to the higher values and purposes of life: ḥurriyyah (freedom), ʿadl (justice), 
karāmah (dignity) and salām, which is the existential condition of peace.
The martyr is alive in the ethical content that we give to our human endeavours. 
Shuhadā or witness-bearing forces a productive conversation between the ethical, 
our commitment to justice, freedom and dignity, on the one hand, and our political 
behaviour in everyday life, on the other. 
The imperative to bear witness impels us to establish a political path towards justice. 
The political, legal and juridical are democracy’s instruments available for use 
towards establishing justice in the service of the greater good.
The political engages the contingencies of the here and the now – corruption, state 
capture, inequality and underdevelopment, and human indignities suffered in the 
context of large-scale poverty.
The political is the art of the possible, currently given expression in the fight over the 
vote, and considerations over which party to vote for. Voting is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition in a democracy, a way of calling in people’s hopes and desires, 
and thereby giving them a stake in our shared public futures and co-existence. 
Politics, however, is always informed by the ethical demands made on it by the 
figure of the martyr who lives among us and comes alive, to an even greater extent, 
in conditions of deprivation. 
Martyrdom forces our collective imaginary to search for and connect the political to 
a productive ethical path. The blood of the martyr nourishes us on such a journey 
and ties us firmly to our search for freedom and peace. This is the litmus test posed 
1 The piece is based on comments at the Freedom symposium, Spice Mecca Ramaḍān 
Expo, Cape Town Castle, 27 April 2019. These comments were made in response to 
presentations by family members of martyred heroes of the struggles, slain by the 
apartheid government, including Imam Abdullah Haron, Steve Biko, Ahmed Timol 
and Fort Calata.
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by the martyr; the blood of the martyr keeps our feet firmly to the fire. It is only those 
political expressions that can tie the political firmly, confidently and courageously to 
the ethical purposes of life that deserve our vote.
The deathly life of the martyr among us would be wasted on a politics tied to spatial 
injustice in this city and our country. This is particularly so in the context of this 
Castle from where colonialism and its burdens were spread, creating what was 
yesterday referred to by Ebrahim Rasool as a ‘dār al-la`nah, an accursed abode. 
The blood of the martyr would be wasted on those who support the Zionist state of 
Israel in its persecution of the Palestinians, on those who trample on the sovereignty 
of Venezuela, on those who fail to be hospitable to the refugee, on those who fail to 
challenge gender inequities and all other forms of discrimination, and on those who 
violate the dignity and human rights of the farmworker, the factory worker and the 
township dweller. 
`Adl or justice comes to fruition only when the political pathway is imbued with the 
crystal clarity of the martyr who is alive among us, though we perceive it not.
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23. FROM ABSTINENCE (IMSĀK) TO ELEVATION 
(RIFʿAH): REIMAGINING IMAM ABDULLAH HARON’S 
PATH OF SHAHĀDAH (BEARING WITNESS) 
IN THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE AND DIGNITY1
Imam Abdullah Haron’s life and martyrdom present the Muslim community of 
Cape Town with an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity resides in putting 
his example to proper use as an ethical inspiration for life in 2019 and beyond. 
The challenge lies in how we put the figure of Imam Haron to use and to what 
version of his life we choose to give prominence.
This is an urgent yet precarious task. In this khuṭbah today I present an engaged 
ethical reading based on advice that I take from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) which he gave when one of his companions came to him to ask about the 
path to righteousness. The Prophet replied,
Consult your heart. Righteousness is that about which your soul feels 
at ease and the heart feels tranquil (transmitted by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal 
and al-Dārimī). 
Reimagining the righteous life of Imam Haron, whose soul is at ease and whose 
heart is tranquil, is based on a reading of the literature on his life and his killing by 
the apartheid government.
Having absorbed the details, I have come to the conclusion that one has to render an 
understanding based on a type of heart reading, not simply rational readings. Such 
a rendition of a worthy life must account for all the dimensions that make up his life 
and martyrdom. 
Consulting your heart, as the Prophet suggests, is based on a reading in which 
Allah’s divine grace is at the centre of the righteous life of the martyr (shahīd). Such a 
rendition would bring us closer to what Allah explains to us in the Qur’an:
And say not of those who are slain in God’s cause, “They are dead”: 
nay, they are alive, but you perceive it not. (Q. 2:V154)
The martyr’s example comes to life in the ethical connections that we make as we 
attempt to imbue our lives with dignity, fairness and justice. 
Considering how to put Imam Haron's martyrdom to ethical use comes alive in a 
conversation with our community’s past, and the Imam’s story as a foundational 
part of this conversation. 
Imam Haron was an inheritor of a long line of men and women whose lineage is 
traced from all over the world, especially the Indonesian archipelago, West and East 
Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar and India, encompassing local Free Blacks, and 
1 Khutbah delivered at Claremont Main Road Mosque, 31 May 2019.
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various indigenous connections made under conditions of colonial harshness and 
brutality at the Cape. 
The impact of Allah’s divine intervention was at play when communities and 
families fashioned themselves out of the raw materials of a brutal existence under 
conditions of exile, banishment and slavery.
Imam `Abdullah ibn Qādī ‘Abd al-Salām, the celebrated imam known as ‘Tuan 
Guru’, who established the first madrasa in the Cape on land bequeathed as waqf 
(religious endowment) by the freed slave woman, Saartjie van der Kaap (1775-1847), 
described this city upon his banishment and imprisonment on Robben Island as a 
‘dār al- ḥuzn’, a depressive place of deprivation. 
The nascent community used its Islamically informed ethos to domesticate the 
harsh environment by deploying community-building processes that helped them 
establish a viable existence on the edges of the colonial city. 
Some of their inventiveness involved writing the Qur’an from memory and kutub 
(religious texts) in Afrikaans written in the Jawi-Arabic script, the linguistic form 
that they invented. The community was strengthened by spiritual ritual practices, 
celebrations and commemorations that gave it cohesion and an ethic of self-reliance.
Imam Abdullah Haron was formed by this community’s social and religious 
cohesiveness from the time he was born in 1924. He was immersed in its liturgical 
‘gadāt’ practices and the socio-cultural rhythms of his people. 
His God-consciousness was generated by intense personal commitment through 
participating in the spiritual cultivation of his community, which had practised 
the remembrance of Allah in the Rātibul Ḥadād liturgy from the earliest times of 
the settlement.
Their spiritual cultivation practices were based on an instruction to the faithful in 
the Qur’an, (Surah Al-Imran, The Family of Imrān, Q. 3:V73), when Allah declares, 
Human beings said to them: “A great army is gathering against you”: 
And frightened them: But it (only) increased their Faith: They said: 
“For us Allah is sufficient, and He is the best disposer of affairs.
True faith in and commitment to Allah, enacted through the bodily practices of 
the believer, through steadfast prayer and fasting, provided the biotechnologies 
or spiritual tools in respect of which the ḥuzn or the depressive colonial state 
was conquered.
It is no coincidence that Imam Haron fasted throughout his adult life on a Monday 
and Thursday, following the Prophet’s example, and as a Ḥāfiẓ al-Qurʿān (one who 
memorised the Qur’an) he constantly recited verses of the text, as a way of fortifying 
him on his life path. 
Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (1126-1214), the great Sufi mystic and scholar from Al 
Andalus, explains that fasting affords the one who fasts an elevation to Allah, what 
is called ‘rif`ah’, The fast, according to him is, 
… an abstinence (imsāk) whereby those who fast are granted an 
elevation (rif`ah) unto Allah the Most High, and are thus raised above 
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all those things from which they have been ordered by al-Haqq (the 
Divine Law) to distance their souls and limbs (Ibn ̀ Arabī, the translation 
by Gilis 1999).
Abstinence and elevation are the cornerstones of Imam Abdullah Haron’s life. 
His was a spiritual body cultivated in the disciplining practice of fasting, prayer, 
recitation and adhkār (practices of Divine remembrance) that infused him with a 
beautiful fearless quality. 
Fasting developed the Imam’s spiritual body into a body imbued with mental 
and physical strength, cultivated by his ongoing practices of spiritual elevation 
that would imbue the martyr, at the opportune moment, with a state of fiṭrah or 
human perfectibility. 
Rif`ah or spiritual elevation finds heightened expression in Imam Haron’s choice to 
fast during his imprisonment. We are told that the Imam consciously chose to fast 
during his incarceration. 
With his body, mind and spirit then already disciplined by years of personal 
tutorship, the relation between abstinence and elevation was now taken to an even 
higher state of spiritual perfectibility, bringing the time of his shahādah, his witness-
bearing, into stark reality. 
An elevated state of fasting accompanied Imam Haron through his path of 
imprisonment towards his state of shahādah, to finally enter Allah’s divine presence 
as a being who lived the ultimate principled commitment to a life in service 
of humanity.
Allah explains such an elevation in the Qur’an, Surah Ibrahīm (Abraham, Q. 14:V5) as 
the destination of those who are wholly patient and deeply grateful to God: 
Verily, in this (reminder) there are messages indeed for all who are 
wholly patient in adversity and deeply grateful [to God].
While suffering incarceration, Imam Haron drank from the spiritual fuel that his 
perfectible disposition, his fitrah, and his belief in Allah provided him. His state of 
elevation enabled him to remain entirely disciplined and focused on facing adversity 
in prison. 
Imam Haron was arrested on 28 May 1969, the annual day of the celebration of 
Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) birthday, after being hounded, spied on, 
followed around and intimidated by the security police for months. 
He was detained for his underground work in the struggle against apartheid. He did 
crucial relief work among the families of detainees and became centrally involved in 
the underground political activities of the liberation organisations that he was active 
in during the brutally repressive times of the 1960s.
Imam Haron turned his revulsion at racism into a cultivated anti-apartheid gaze 
expressed from the Islamic perspective of a traditionally trained Imam. 
Some of his writings, for example, used the story of Bilal, a son of a black Abyssinian 
slave woman, to illustrate the revulsion Islam had for divisions based on colour. 
Bilal’s elevation by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to the highest social rank was 
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proof of Islam’s attitude to non-discrimination. Imam Haron loved to use the story 
of Bilal in his lectures and sermons. 
He must have felt acutely the impact of apartheid’s laws on his congregants and 
their stunted life chances. He identified with the indignities visited upon families 
during their forced removals and the ongoing suffering of those who lived in the 
harsh living conditions of the city’s townships.
Unlike most other imams in Cape Town, he was politically influenced by the restless 
younger people in his congregation and the broader Claremont community, and it 
was in this context that he mapped his political and ethical commitments onto his 
Islamic identity. 
His was an Islamic ethical identity seamlessly imbued with clarity of purpose and 
uncompromising commitment, and it is this heightened attitude that accompanied 
him during his imprisonment.
Imam Haron was tortured relentlessly. Barney Desai and Cardiff Marley described 
in their book, The Killing of the Imam (1978), how he experienced various phases and 
forms of torture; softening up, keeping him in the Roeland Street goal and then 
at the Maitland police station, and then in mid-September 1969, brutally torturing 
him close to the point of death for three days and nights in a building somewhere 
in the Cape Town central business district, before returning him to the Maitland 
police station. 
Imam Haron was prevented from changing his clothes, and from getting 
proper medical treatment. Alas, he gave nothing away. The record shows that 
he did not give his torturers a single name and no information about any of his 
underground activities. 
Imam Haron had been in a state of heightened elevation during his incarceration, a 
path for which he had prepared his entire life, mapped as it was onto the spiritual 
inheritance of his religious forebears. He is an acute example of this spiritual 
inheritance. He identified with the patience and forbearance of his people in an 
earlier period and their erstwhile community-building processes. 
The ethical coordinates of these earlier community processes, however, had become 
entangled in the modernising and accommodation-seeking processes of the Cape 
Muslim community. 
Imam Haron understood his community’s acquiescence during apartheid. He was, 
however, never constrained by such an attitude. Instead, he mobilised his spiritual 
and ethical resources to walk a brave path towards martyrdom relatively parallel to 
his community. 
His was the path that conferred dignity on all the oppressed in this country. His was 
the path of shahādah, a path of bearing witness to Allah, even against oneself, one’s 
kin and those closest to one (based on Qur’an 4, Verse 35).
In a fictionalised, yet apt, account of the last moments of Imam Haron’s life, Desai 
and Marney wrote that, 
Death beckoned and he must prepare. He could die with honour; 
he had remained a member of the faithful all his life; he had met all 
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his obligations to Islam; he had struggled to serve his people and his 
congregation with all his will and energy; he had kept his word to his 
comrades, their secret would die with him. Painfully and methodically 
the Imam undressed. […] Symbolically he splashed himself with water 
from his mug. Slowly he donned his pyjamas. He arranged his prayer-
mat carefully and, through the blur of pain in his chest, stomach and 
legs, he knelt in the direction of Mecca and prayed. He prayed for what 
seemed a long time […] He folded his prayer mat lovingly and picked 
up his Qur’an, kissed it and placed it neatly on the folded prayer-mat. 
Then he lay down on his blankets, placing a hand upon his stomach. … 
He rested his head on his other hand and, thus settled and ready to die 
honourably, murmured a last prayer; “In the name of Allah, the most 
gracious, the most merciful, forgive me my sins. Please care for my 
wife and children. Now more than ever they need your guidance and 
protection. Oh most merciful one, you are the only one, this I believe. 
And the Prophet Muhammad is your messenger. May peace be on his 
soul. […] Oh merciful one, take my soul; […] forgive my weakening. 
Oh merciful one, let me die now; let my soul be free; let my people be 
free.” (Desai and Marney 1978, 144-145) 
And then al-Shahīd Imam Abdullah Haron was no longer, at least not in the physical 
sense. 123 days of confinement, abuse, insult, persecution, torture and terror ended 
for him on that morning of Saturday, 27 September 1969.
The shahīd (martyr) enters Allah’s divine embrace as a person who lived an exemplary 
ethical life. In his martyrdom, Imam Abdullah Haron offers us life, an example of an 
ethical life for us to emulate in our circumstances. In turn, Allah invites the martyr 
into paradise with this sublime invitation (Sūrah al-Fajr, The Dawn, Q. 189:127-130);
(To the righteous soul will be said:) “O (thou) soul, in (complete) rest 
and satisfaction! Come back thou to thy Lord,- well pleased (thyself), 
and well-pleasing unto Him. Enter thou, then, among My devotees! Yea, 
enter thou My Heaven! 
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AFTERWORD
The essays in this book are demonstrations of the practice of Public Theology. Public 
Theology investigates the public contents of religious faith, the public rationality 
and reasonableness of religious faith, and the public meaning and significance of 
religious faith. In this book Prof. Aslam Fataar is practising Public Theology and 
Ethics from an Islamic perspective. He makes this point clear in the introduction: “In 
one way or the other, our attempt to tie Islam to democracy, pluralism and justice 
informs all the chapters in the book” (p. 12). 
Public Theology advances three features that religious faiths are to adhere to. These 
features constitute the acid test for healthy religious beliefs and practices, for religion 
that is good news to society. 
Religion is healthy and good news for society if it emphasises that the reverence 
and respect for God, and the honour and worship of God are accompanied by the 
quest for the wellbeing and dignity of all humans and all of creation. This dignity is 
constituted by a life of healing of all wounds, embracing justice, responsible freedom 
and equality through equity. In all spheres of life this dignity is acknowledged, 
affirmed and actualised. These spheres include political life, economic life, ecological 
life, civil society with all its institutions and individuals, public discourse, public 
opinion-formation and public policymaking.
The second feature of healthy religion, of religion that makes constructive 
contributions to society, is that it resists anti-intellectualism. Healthy religion 
embraces rationality, reasonableness and intellectual analysis of religious beliefs and 
practices. Healthy religion proclaims that it is not necessary to commit intellectual 
suicide in order to be a religious believer. Attempts are made to make religious beliefs 
and practices rationally accessible to those inside and those outside the community 
of faith. This intellectual character of religion also ensures that religions embrace 
the complexity of life and that they do not participate in the flight from complexity 
that we often see. Complexity has various features, namely plurality, ambiguity, 
ambivalence, paradoxality, duality, tragedy as well as aporia, i.e. dead-end street 
situations. Whilst addressing complexity, Public Theology does not want to hide 
in vagueness. Public Theology seeks simplicity on the other side of complexity, 
simplicity that has wrestled with complexity.
The third dimension of healthy religion, which serves the so-called Common Good, 
is the ethos of tolerance and embrace that healthy religion nurtures. Healthy religion 
guards against both relativism and absolutism. A lifestyle of extreme relativism 
implies that we believe in nothing, we stand for nothing, we live for nothing, nothing 
is right, nothing is wrong. Relativists embrace nihilism. Absolutism implies that I 
believe dogmatically in my own position and that of my group. There is no room for 
other positions. Those who differ from me are stereotyped, stigmatised, demonised 
and eventually annihilated. In this context tolerance is proclaimed, tolerance which 
means tolere, carry each other amidst differences. Related to this positive tolerance, 
which is more than just simply bearing with the nuisance, is the notion of embrace. 
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An ethos of embrace proclaims that amidst differences and even past enmity, we 
reach out to each other and seek life together with each other.
The Public Theology and Ethics in the pages of this book advance a life of dignity 
for all. It demonstrates the worth and value of intellectual reflection from a religious 
perspective. It fosters an ethos of tolerance and embrace. These essays seek a life of 
dignity in all walks of life. The rich variety of public themes bears witness to this.
To publish this book from an Islamic perspective in the Beyers Naudé Centre on 
Public Theology Series celebrates the rich heritage of inter-religiosity in South 
African society. People from various religious and secular beliefs worked together to 
overcome apartheid. Now we can work together to make poverty, unemployment, 
inequality, violence, social pathologies, state capture and corruption history. This 
book also honours the legacy of Dr Beyers Naudé, who embraced a life of ecumenicity 
and inclusion in search of dignity for all.
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